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Introduction to Economics as a Public Science 
Harro Maas*, Steven G. Medema**, and Marco Guidi***	 
 
This short article introduces readers to the papers published in this issue 
on the theme of “public reason” in economics. It provides ground to the 
notion of “public reason” in economics as a two-way process taking place 
in interstitial spaces between economics, as an academic discipline, and 
the various publics in which economics—its concepts, tools, and         
methods—acquires meaning as an instrument of social understanding and 
political change. 
Keywords: methodology, public reason, expertise 
Introduction à l’économie comme science publique 
Ce court article sert d’introduction aux articles publiés dans ce numéro sur 
le thème de la « raison publique » en économie. Il précise la notion de 
« raison publique » en économie comme un processus à double sens qui 
s’inscrit dans les espaces interstitiels entre l’économie comme discipline et 
les publics variés parmi lesquels ses concepts, outils et méthodes acquiè-
rent une signification comme instrument de la compréhension sociale et 
du changement politique. 
Mots-clés : méthodologie, raison publique, expertise 
JEL : A11, B20, B40, Z18 
 
 
 
The essays in this and the next issue of Œconomia are the result of a 
conference on “Economics and Public Reason,” which was hosted by 
the Centre Walras-Pareto for the History of Economic and Political 
Thought at the University of Lausanne in early May 2018. After the 
conference, the papers were rewritten in the light of the conference’s 
discussion and sent out for peer-review. In the end, fourteen papers 
were retained that will be published in this and the next issue, guest-
edited by Harro Maas of the Centre Walras-Pareto, Steven Medema of 
the Center for the History of Political Economy at Duke University, 
and Marco Guidi of the University of Pisa. Before briefly introducing 
the papers of this issue, the guest-editors would like to thank the    
editorial board of Œconomia, but especially Jean-Sébastian Lenfant, 
                                                            
*Centre Walras-Pareto for the History of Economic and Political Thought, 
University of Lausanne, harro.maas@unil.ch 
**Department of Economics, Duke University, steven.medema@duke.edu 
***Department of Economics, University of Pisa, marco.guidi@UNIPI.IT 
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Cléo Chassonnery-Zaïgouche, Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay and 
François Allisson and, of course, the contributors, without whom the-
se symposium issues would not be possible. Thanks also go to the 
Swiss National Science Foundation (grant nr. IZSEZ0_180388) and the 
University of Lausanne’s Institute of Political Studies for their finan-
cial support. 
The call for papers articulated the relation between economics and 
public reason as a two-way process, in which economics as a disci-
pline developed its forms of argument and evidence in exchange with 
its publics. The call also emphasized our interest in contributions that 
would take specific sites, textual genres, formal and informal net-
works, or profiles of specific categories of mediators as point of de-
parture. It was not our intention, as some might take “public reason,” 
to investigate the relation of economics to the specific liberal demo-
cratic context encroached by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas in 
their respective analyses of how such a liberal democratic order could 
or should be conceived.1 Instead, we used the label “public reason” to 
loosely refer to the interstitial spaces between economics, as an  aca-
demic discipline, and the various publics in which economics—its 
concepts, tools, and methods—becomes meaningful. We therefore 
conceived of our subject rather as a reference to Sheila Jasanoff’s col-
lection of essays, Science and Public Reason (Jasanoff, 2012; see also 
2009), in which Jasanoff develops the idea of science, not as a purely 
academic enterprise, but as an endeavor which develops in exchange 
with its publics. To make clear the nature and scope of our enterprise, 
we have elected to employ the title, “economics as a public science” 
for these two thematic issues of Œconomia.  
Nowadays, it is of course a commonplace to say that public and 
policy discourse is immersed in economic terminology and reasoning. 
Scholarly writing within the history of economics, and in recent years 
increasingly from economic sociologists and science and technology 
studies, has detailed the role of economists as expert advisors and 
public intellectuals (Mata and Medema, 2013), their role in politics 
(Guidi, 2017), individually or as part of groups and networks (Forget 
and Goodwin, 2011), from Roosevelt’s Braintrusters (Barber, 1988; 
1996) to the New Economics of the Sixties (Bernstein, 2001; Romani, 
2018), to the Mont Pelerin Society and the rise of neo-liberalism 
(Mirowski and Plehwe, 2015). In their excellent review of recent 
scholarship in this field, Hirschman and Berman (2014) made the use-
ful distinction between economists and economics. They noted that 
the influence of economists on public and policy discourse may reside 
far less in their direct pronouncements than in what Science and 
Technology Studies refers to as the socio-technical infrastructures of 
                                                            1 The literature is too vast to reference here, but see for example Rawls (1997); 
Benhabib (1991). 
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economic knowledge production and transmission. These studies do 
not concentrate on individual economists or networks but look at 
what Hirschman and Berman capture under the labels of styles of rea-
soning and policy devices that provide specific economic knowledge 
and produce its force and persuasiveness. Both notions have their 
own complex histories and connotations, but for present purposes 
they usefully distinguish between the core principles with which 
questions of economic policy are approached and the “sociotechnical” 
tools put in place to “help policymakers see and make decisions 
about the world” in specific ways.2 
The contributions in this first special issue thus center around 
questions of the economist’s ethos and his or her tools and modes of 
persuasion, while those in the second take up the (international) insti-
tutional settings within which economic concepts, tools and theories 
became and become expressed. The distinction is one of degree rather 
than kind, because inevitably there are many crossovers between the 
distinctions just made, as is easily seen from the attention that will be 
paid to the political institutional settings in this volume as well.  
The question of the economist’s ethos is perhaps most visible in 
the contribution by Andrés Alvarez, Andrés Guiot-Isaac, Jimena Hur-
tado. They raise the issue of the neutrality or non-neutrality of eco-
nomic expert advice against the diverging perspectives of Albert 
Hirschman and Lauchlin Currie on the role of the economic expert 
and the possibilities and limits of expert advice on economic devel-
opment. While both were concerned with the patchwork approach to 
economic planning which they experienced during their consulting 
work in Colombia, they took opposing messages from this, with their 
respective positions premised on their divergent perspectives on the 
interplay between “sound economic principles” and the force of local 
circumstances. While Currie was a believer in both sound principles 
and the need to adapt them to local circumstances, Hirschman was 
more sceptical about the existence of any such principles. Instead, he 
saw the economic expert as a mediator and catalyst whose judgment 
could enhance initiatives on the ground, but who by no means could 
enforce a consistent and encompassing development plan (something 
Currie perhaps ideally might have wished for, but deemed not possi-
ble in an imperfect world). Both perspectives thus suggest different 
roles to play by economists, embodying different attitudes toward the 
different audiences with whom they engage.   
The economist’s ethos is important in Arthur Cecil Pigou’s reflec-
tions on and practice as an economist in the public sphere as well. 
Pigou has commonly been considered an academic recluse, certainly 
                                                            2 Hirschman and Berman thus cut the cake rather differently from the vast litera-
ture on (economic) modeling that considers modeling itself as a style of reasoning 
that should be added to Alistair Crombie’s original list. For a discussion, see es-
pecially Morgan (2012). 
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in comparison with his much more vocal contemporaries such as John 
Maynard Keynes. But as Nahid Aslanbeigui and Guy Oakes detail, 
“public enlightenment” in correct principles of economic reasoning 
was a project of lifelong concern to Pigou, one for which he mobilized 
the support of his fellow economists when he deemed it necessary. 
Prominent here was his initiative in the early 1930s to publish a letter, 
signed by a wide list of economists (but not covering the whole spec-
trum of opinions) setting out the economists’ arguments against 
Chamberlin’s austerity policies. The initiative illustrates Pigou’s ab-
horrence of “partisanship” but also his naïveté in assuming the possi-
bility of a neutral vantage point from which economists could lecture 
politicians and the general public about a sphere of economic reason-
ing that could be distinguished from political parti-pris. Pigou articu-
lated an ethos of neutrality which effectively functioned, as 
Aslanbeigui and Oakes show, as an epistemological trap; economic 
policy prescriptions are inconceivable without being political. 
Pigou argued his position against a belief in the self-correcting 
power of markets, and hence the belief that involuntary unemploy-
ment would only be temporary. That such a belief has material con-
sequences as to how economists perform their research can be seen in 
the opposing positions of the Wisconsin institutionalists and Robert 
Lucas, discussed by Marianne Johnson and Aurélien Goutsmedt, 
Danielle Guizzo and Francesco Sergi, respectively. The Wisconsin in-
stitutionalists took as a consequence of their belief in the malfunction-
ing of markets, and especially labor markets, the need to pursue a re-
search agenda that was useful to diagnose market shortcomings and 
intervene by creating an institutional environment to correct them. 
This not only implied a heavy emphasis on legal reform, but also an 
educational commitment to show and tell the facts and the reforms 
needed.  
The result was a research agenda that focused on particulars, con-
ducted time and again using difficult and time-consuming (partici-
pant) field work, instead of an agenda that generalized its findings. 
For Robert Lucas, at the other end of the spectrum, such an activist 
agenda was anathema. His strong belief in self-correcting markets 
made it important to create an institutional environment that would 
prevent governments from actively intervening in the economy. This 
is why he strongly criticized the Employment Act of 1946, which in-
stitutionalized an activist government in the marketplace. One vehicle 
for this activism was the newly formed Council of Economic Advi-
sors. Indeed, Lucas blamed the Employment Act of 1946 for legitimiz-
ing government activism instead of institutionalizing governmental 
restraint. To put it bluntly, if you don’t believe in self-correcting mar-
kets, you have to put institutions in place that correct them. That’s 
exactly what Wisconsin institutionalists did with their agenda of ac-
tion research and legal reform. If you do believe in self-correcting 
| Introduction 205 
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 9(2) : 201-207 
markets, you have to put institutions in place that prevent the gov-
ernment from intervening in them. This is what Lucas and Buchan-
an’s constitutionalist approach to economic policy tried to achieve. As 
Goudsmedt et al. show, the “high theory” approach to macro-
economics developed by Lucas and others was never neutral with 
regard to economic policy. Instead, their general approach to macro-
economic modeling incorporated a “passive” view on economic poli-
cy which from the outset intended to constrain government activism.  
The paper in which Lucas articulated his famous “Lucas critique” 
and which he had distributed strategically in the right venues, was a 
manifestation of this overarching concern. It provides a nice illustra-
tion of Hirschman and Berman’s point that economists sometimes can 
be more effective indirectly by framing a policy agenda than through 
direct, concrete policy interference. In Lucas’ case, the irony, of 
course, was that his notion of passive politics became hailed by the 
medium he deliberately tried to steer away from: journalism and the 
daily press.  
The story told by Goudsmedt et al. is complemented in this vol-
ume with an account of the nemesis of Lucas’s approach to econom-
ics: The New Economics of the 1960s that self-consciously took the 
possibilities of fine tuning the economy to the extreme. As Béatrice 
Cherrier shows, Walter Heller was New Economics incarnate. Cher-
rier concentrates on Heller’s most effective weapon in changing poli-
tics, one that in its form and execution was the radical opposite of 
high theory: the memo to the President. Cherrier’s detailed account of 
Heller’s crafting of his memos, and the important place they gained in 
policy preparation, shows them to be genuine policy devices that help 
policymakers to make economically informed decisions (Hirschman 
and Berman, 2014, 782). But her contribution also points to the im-
portant role played by institutional infrastructures. Heller’s memos 
could never have had such an important influence on the decisions of 
the American president were it not for the existence of the recently 
created Council of Economic Advisors (as rightly seen by Lucas), a 
system that gives substantial discretionary power to the President, a 
particular President willing to discuss and trying to understand eco-
nomic policy matters, and the interventionist style of economic rea-
soning of the New Economics that generically backed up Heller’s ar-
guments. 
The importance of this setting becomes clear when contrasted with 
the very different institutional structure for macro-economic policy 
that evolved in the Netherlands after the Second World War. As Tom 
Kayzel argues, the so-called Dutch Central Planning Bureau gained 
its present overwhelming authoritative voice on questions of macro-
economic policy when it adjusted its macro-modeling approach away 
from mere forecasting to the design of “railway timetables” that com-
pared the consequences of different economic policies in one compre-
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hensive table, thus enabling politicians to discuss forecasting out-
comes while black-boxing the economic model that produced them. 
But just as the memos to the President lost their patina once Heller 
and the New Economics were no longer there, so did the comparative 
policy tables produced by the Dutch CPB once it tried to take on 
board the medium- and long-term effects of technical change. That 
model produced policy alternatives that were substantially reduced 
in scope and, paradoxically, it was only by mobilizing the political 
domain as an ally against the substantial resistance to the new CPB 
modeling coming from within the academic realm that the CPB was 
able to regain and even increase its political authority.  
These last contributions thus show the contingencies that make 
economic styles of reasoning, policy devices and socio-technical infra-
structures sufficiently aligned to be effective. Sometimes, however, 
the necessary alignment never occurs, as a result of which potentially 
influential ideas fail to gain traction. This was the case in the applied 
field of port economics, where marginal cost pricing, as in Pirandel-
lo’s famous piece, was waiting for an audience that would pick up on 
its importance. That audience only came when ports were no longer 
only considered within the context of national economic politics, as a 
question of national interest, but instead had moved into the sphere 
of the European Union and became considered in terms of legitimate 
competition and economic efficiency. When ports were no longer 
seen as public utilities and lost their public goods character, they be-
came ‘economized’ in terms of marginal cost pricing. But this did not 
happen without the transfer of decision-making authority to the Eu-
ropean Union, which provides our final reminder, to be followed up 
in the next issue, that it is not only the economist’s perception of his 
or her role in the public sphere which matters. The institutional set-
ting in which an economist provides public policy pronouncements is 
equally important.  
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Lauchlin Currie and Albert O. Hirschman  
on Development as a Problem of  
Decision Making 
Andrés Álvarez*, Andrés Guiot-Isaac**,  
and Jimena Hurtado***	 
 
This paper analyzes L. Currie and A. O. Hirschman’s contributions to   
development economics in the context of their Colombian experience as 
foreign experts. We show that the common ideas about the divergences 
between these authors have overlooked the view they shared of the       
experts’ role as a triggering factor in development strategy. They both be-
lieved experts should facilitate and guide the decision-making process. 
Using published and archival sources, we show that their experiences as 
experts in Colombia led them to redefine their ideas and understand the 
influence of the political economy of development policies on the advice 
that experts give. 
Keywords: Currie (Lauchlin), Hirschman (Albert O.), Colombia, develop-
ment economics, political economy 
 
Le développement comme problème de prise de décision chez  
Lauchlin Currie et Albert O. Hirschman 
Cet article analyse les contributions de L. Currie et A. O. Hirschman à 
l’économie du développement dans le contexte de leurs expériences 
colombiennes en tant qu’expert étranger. Nous montrons que les idées 
reçues sur les divergences entre ces auteurs ne tiennent pas compte leur 
vision commune quant au rôle de l’expert comme élément déclencheur 
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dans la stratégie de développement. Tous deux considèrent que les 
experts devraient faciliter et guider les processus de prise de décision. A 
l’aide de sources publiées et d’archives, nous montrons que leurs 
expériences en tant qu’experts en Colombie les ont poussés à redéfinir 
leurs idées et leur ont fait comprendre l’influence qu’ont les théories des 
politiques de développement sur les conseils dispensés par les experts. 
Mots-clés : Currie (Lauchlin), Hirschman (Albert O.), Colombie, économie 
du développement, économie politique 
JEL: A11, B2, B31, N16, O2 
 
 
 
Although our treatments differ significantly, Hirschman 
and I appear to be close on this most fundamental of di-
agnoses: ‘If backwardness is due to insufficient number 
and speed of development decisions and to inadequate 
performance of developmental tasks, then the funda-
mental problem of development consists in generating 
and energizing human action in a certain direction.’ The 
difficulty lies in securing agreement on the direction. 
(Currie, 1966, 141, fn 1). 
 
 
Paul Krugman (1993; 1994) defines the 1940s and 1950s as the period 
of “High Development Economics.” During these years, according to 
Krugman, an alternative view on development emerges, trying to 
overcome the limits perceived in the prevailing theoretical economic 
models. The main claim of this alternative view was that the problem 
of underdevelopment escaped from traditional economic analysis, 
and therefore demanded new tools of analysis. Precisely during these 
years, Lauchlin Currie and Albert O. Hirschman built their views on 
development using their experience as foreign experts in Colombia. 
Even if these views share the main assumption Krugman identifies in 
high development economics, namely, the central place given to in-
creasing returns to scale1, their distinctive trait is something else. In 
this paper we try to show that what Currie and Hirschman share, and 
distinguishes them from high development theorists, is their common 
understanding of development as a strategic process of decision mak-
ing; an idea that begins with recognizing the importance of the politi-
cal economy of development and the role experts play in it. 
The scholarship on Currie and Hirschman has traditionally under-
scored the opposition between them due to theoretical, personal and 
                                                            1 “Loosely, high development theory can be described as the view that develop-
ment is a virtuous circle driven by external economies -that is, that modernization 
breeds modernization” (Krugman, 1994, 41). 
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sociological positions (Sandilands, 2015). Whereas Currie is associat-
ed with balanced growth, Hirschman is presented as an advocate of 
unbalanced growth2, and these contradicting theoretical stands were 
evidenced during their joint work in Colombia, when their strong 
personalities and quest for reputation made this opposition particu-
larly salient (Alacevich, 2009; 2016). In this paper, we explore another 
possibility. Following Deas (2012), instead of starting from their op-
positions, we begin with what is common to both thinkers. We then 
aim at reframing the divide among them from a different point of 
view. We take seriously Currie’s (Sandilands, 1991) and Hirschman’s 
(1984; 2001) own avowal about their scarce knowledge of develop-
ment economics at the time they were appointed advisers in Colom-
bia, and we explore how their ideas changed due to their work in a 
developing country. In particular, we retrace their views on the role 
of experts as policy advisers in countries they know little about. 
As the opening quote shows, Currie and Hirschman coincide in 
that the strategic nature of development should lead to the coordina-
tion of economic and political forces and decision makers in a consen-
sual path of development. The key to the divide between both is the 
way each one of them believes this coordination can be achieved. 
Currie (1965; 1981) advances a top-down approach, underscoring the 
importance of economic education in order to have an informed pub-
lic opinion and professional economists. When public opinion be-
comes informed about its own interests and how to achieve them and 
national professional economists can produce reliable information 
and analysis it will be possible to have a favorable situation for de-
velopment. Hirschman (1984), on his side, considers it is necessary to 
take advantage of what already exists because the seed of develop-
ment is there, and does not require being planted or special educa-
tion, but rather fostering a common vision or a project of society that 
an expert might help make visible and publicly debated (Hirschman, 
1970). 
Currie (1966; 1967) and Hirschman (1958) share a deep belief that 
the main thrust of development is strategic thinking or a strategic 
view, where experts may play an important part. The way towards 
modernity, they agree, requires the construction of common social 
goals and coordinated actions of the main actors involved in this 
transformation. They diverge on the exact part experts should play, 
                                                            2 However, Currie’s notion of “balanced growth” differs significantly from the 
way that Hirschman interprets Rosenstein Rodan’s (1943) theory of the “Big 
Push.” For Currie, “balance” involves a balancing of supply with the actual or 
potential elasticities of demand that vary considerably as between the various 
sectors of the economy, and is the basis for Currie’s selective prioritization of 
‘leading’ sectors accordingly. See Currie’s (1970 [2018]) critique of Hirschman’s 
interpretation of Rosenstein Rodan in a paper published only recently, in 
Sandilands (2018). In sections 2.1 and 2.2 we come back to these views. 
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and on the way this strategic thinking could be brought about and 
promoted. This divergence is the consequence of the way each of 
them thinks economics and politics are related. Whereas Currie (1981) 
believes politics should accommodate to the economic reality, 
Hirschman (1984) is convinced that there is a fundamental interde-
pendence between politics and economics, and that economists 
should learn to deal with this. According to Currie experts should 
advise, propose and guide decision-makers using the art of advising, 
trying to have direct influence on their understanding, and therefore 
on their decisions. For Hirschman, emphasizing the uncertain charac-
ter of any decision-making process and its context, experts should act 
as facilitators, catalyzers and promoters of public and political debate 
that reveal hidden or underused mental, intellectual and physical re-
sources, following the principle of the hiding hand. Therefore, they 
both recognize the importance of decision makers and stake holders, 
and of experts in dealing with these fundamental agents of develop-
ment as a strategic process. 
The paper is divided in three parts besides this introduction. In the 
first part, we position our interpretation on the divide between Currie 
and Hirschman considering prevailing interpretations. In the second 
section, we flesh out our contribution analyzing how Hirschman and 
Currie reacted to their early experience as foreign advisers in Colom-
bia. We show this experience allowed them to converge on a view of 
development as a process of change that faces the problem of imple-
mentation given the scarcity of decision-making skills. The third sec-
tion deals with their divergence about the role experts play in this 
process of promoting the coordination of decisions towards appro-
priate development paths. Some concluding remarks, pointing at 
Currie and Hirschman’s influence in Colombia and the influence the 
Colombian experience had on both, end this paper. 
1. Towards an Alternative Interpretation  
of the Currie-Hirschman Divide 
Hirschman and Currie visited Colombia as experts, commissioned by 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
during 1949 and into the 1950s3. Although they share the same goal of 
contributing to the formulation of economic policies with a develop-
mental purpose, it has been recognized they disagree on their theo-
ries, their personalities clashed, and they differ in their views on ex-
pertise. These are the three prevailing interpretations about their dif-
ferences. 
                                                            3 See Álvarez, Guiot-Isaac, and Hurtado (2017) for an account on Currie´s and 
Hirschman’s experiences as experts in Colombia and the details of their personal 
and professional controversies during that period. 
| Lauchlin Currie and Albert O. Hirschman on Development 213 
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 9(2) : 209-235 
The first interpretation, found in Sandilands (2015) and Caballero 
(2008), underlines theoretical differences between Currie and 
Hirschman. The second, developed by Alacevich (2009; 2016), offers a 
sociological explanation building on Merton’s view of a “battle of 
egos” that was engaged and heightened with their joint work in     
Colombia. The third can be found in Adelman (2013) and Escobar 
(1995), who associate Currie with technocratic development, and 
Easterly (2014), taking this a step further, associates Hirschman with 
free development. 
Technocratic and free development are terms Easterly (2014) uses 
to describe different forms of development policy and design. He as-
sociates the former with autocratic approaches to development in 
specific political contexts with little to no participation of citizens who 
have practically no economic or political rights, in contrast with the 
latter. Easterly (2014) places experts as allies with autocratic devel-
opment. Neither Currie nor Hirschman would agree with the place 
given to experts in these definitions. As we will show in what follows, 
Currie and Hirschman do not associate expert advice and involve-
ment in development policies with a specific type of political regime 
(i.e. dictatorships or authoritarian regimes and democratic regimes). 
Experts might participate either in authoritarian or democratic re-
gimes and they will always be involved in the decision-making pro-
cess, which should make them aware of the political economy in the 
country. 
Following Seers (1962), we argue the success of expertise depends 
upon the technical and political economy aspects in the underdevel-
oped countries where expert advice is provided. This is the combina-
tion that we intend to explore and that brings to the fore something 
we believe has been overlooked in all three interpretations. Namely, 
development is about strategy, which has to do with the particular 
context under transformation and the decision-making skills needed 
to define, adapt and implement such transformation. 
1.1. A Theoretical Debate on the “Big Push” Mechanisms 
Sandilands (2015), the main comparative study on the theoretical 
standpoints of Hirschman and Currie, shows that, in spite of their 
agreement about the advantages of external economies to trigger eco-
nomic transformation, they disagree on the theoretical mechanisms to 
attain such a process (Sandilands, 2015). 
This interpretation builds upon the divergence between Currie 
and Hirschman on the growth model underlying their theories. Ac-
cording to this view, Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943) model of the Big Push 
is the main seminal reference and inspiration for Currie’s theory 
(Sandilands, 1990, 227; 2018), and the target of Hirschman’s criticism. 
Sandilands’s argument emphasizes that for Currie the Big Push model 
implies a demand-side argument according to which growth arises 
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from pecuniary externalities that result from the interrelationships 
between reciprocal real demand. Unlike Currie, Hirschman’s theory 
of economic growth does not follow the “real demand” approach that 
stems from this theoretical tradition that runs from Adam Smith 
(1776) to Allyn Young (1928)4. 
The most striking feature of Hirschman’s theory would be his op-
position to the idea that the process of virtuous growth and economic 
transformation, called development, is the result of the expansion of 
the market due to pecuniary externalities. Therefore, according to 
Sandilands (2015, 229), Hirschman privileges the supply side and 
technological linkages over real demand, and his notion of forward 
linkages results in a poor representation of market-size conditions. 
While the extension of Hirschman’s ([1977] 2015) analysis to “final 
demand linkages” brings him closer to Currie’s notion of real de-
mand effects, nevertheless they may be held to differ on the potential 
empirical magnitudes—hence strategic significance—of the linkages 
as opposed to the number of the linkages, making their opposition on 
this matter less clear. 
These theoretical differences explain the opposition of these two 
economists on the role of planning as a mechanism to implement de-
velopment policies. Currie has been traditionally associated with 
plans and Hirschman with projects as means of problem-solving 
(Adelman, 2013, 302). Both plans and projects are policy mechanisms 
that involve decision-making, but they differ on the scale. Both have 
to do with allocating investments and searching for means to finance 
them, but plans have been more associated in Colombia with general 
policy guidelines headed by the central government, and projects 
with specific problem solving by economic agents5. 
Even if there are theoretical elements that place Currie and 
Hirschman on different stands as to the appropriate growth model 
that should be implemented in developing countries their theoretical 
distance can be shortened or, at least, put into perspective using the 
Colombian context. This will bring us closer to the second interpreta-
tion of the divide between these two economists; an interpretation 
which privileges sociological and personal traits. 
 
 
                                                            4 We thank Roger Sandilands for his remarks on Hirschman’s difficulties to un-
derstand the distinctiveness of this tradition. 5 This does not mean that overall plans, conceived and implemented under the 
responsibility of the central government, do not imply decision-making. As we 
note here, the main difference has to do with the scale at which decisions are 
made and who appears as the primary body responsible for such decisions. We 
come back to this point in section 3.2. 
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1.2. A Sociological Divide: “A Clash of Egos” 
Colombia has a long tradition of economic planning (Urrutia, 1988), 
inaugurated precisely with the IBRD’s Mission Report. When Currie 
(in 1949) and Hirschman (in 1952) arrived in Colombia they found a 
central administration interested in promoting technical analyses and 
recommendations but largely in the hands of non-professional econ-
omists, mainly lawyers. The impetus these foreign experts gave to 
economic planning was halted in 1953 with the military coup of Gen-
eral Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, whose military government lasted until 
19576. During the first civil government of the so-called National 
Front of Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958-1962) a national Law was 
passed by a future president, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, considered to be 
one of the main promoters of technocratic economic policy design, 
creating the National Council of Economic Policy and Planning and, 
later, the National Planning Agency. Urrutia (1988, 165) argues that 
the Bank’s Mission Report (1950) had paved the way for the creation 
of these agencies showing the scope and possibilities of applying eco-
nomic analysis to specific problems. It succeeded in showing the im-
portance of trained economists to diagnose, inform and provide poli-
cy recommendations. The so-called “Currie mission” then appears as 
the starting point of a long tradition of expert economic policy design 
in the country. 
The creation of the planning agency during the first National Front 
government reinforces this perception. The military government was 
deposed through an alliance between the two traditional political par-
ties, the Conservatives and the Liberals. They agreed to alternate in 
government leading to 16 years of two liberal and two conservative 
governments. Both Liberal governments, Alberto Lleras (1958-62) and 
Carlos Lleras (1966-1970), gave ample room and support to economic 
planning. Whereas national professional economists were not yet 
available during Alberto Lleras’ administration, Carlos Lleras created 
a more significant group of young economists who were in charge of 
supervising and advising the government on economic affairs. 
This transformation of the sociological features of those in charge 
of economic policy can be associated with the IBRD’s mission and its 
results. Currie and Hirschman arrived in a country with little experi-
ence in technical economic policy making and came with previous 
experience in economic recovery plans but not exactly in developing 
countries. Prior to arriving in Colombia, Currie had worked as assis-
                                                            6 Adelman (2013) and Sandilands (1990), in their authoritative biographies of 
Hirschman and Currie, respectively, show that both economists took their dis-
tance from the Rojas Pinilla government. Currie retired to a cattle farm in Albán, 
in the Colombian central region, and Hirschman opened a private consultant 
office, travelling through Colombia. These personal decisions show that the polit-
ical regime in Colombia is not the main feature to understand the role of experts 
for Currie and Hirschman. 
216 Andrés Álvarez, Andrés Guiot-Isaac, and Jimena Hurtado | 
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 9(2) : 209-235 
tant to the chairperson of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System and assistant to President Roosevelt, making him a New 
Deal economist. Hirschman had worked as an economist in the Mar-
shall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe7. 
When they arrived in Colombia the development question was in 
its beginnings so they were confronted with the challenge of analyz-
ing and talking about economic transformation from the place that 
needed to be transformed rather than revitalized. No doubt their eco-
nomic training was crucial, but realizing the political economy of de-
velopment policies and being directly involved in it also played an 
important part. We believe this means their disagreements went be-
yond theoretical positions, and involved life experiences but cannot 
be reduced to those either. 
Alacevich (2009) proposes an interpretation of the Currie-
Hirschman divide that can be classified along these lines, even 
though it underscores the clash of egos, leaving aside the influence of 
the place where they were acting as development experts. According 
to Alacevich (2009), Hirschman and Currie’s divergent theoretical 
stances regarding development plans and projects, and balanced and 
unbalanced growth are not fundamental as there is evidence of a cer-
tain convergence between their policy recommendations. Therefore, 
their disagreements would be the expression of a tactical conflict be-
tween experts in their handling of relevant information especially that 
concerning their diagnoses and policy recommendations on fiscal and 
monetary matters (Alacevich, 2009, 86). 
This tactical clash, as Alacevich (2009) argues, took place within a 
particular institutional setting. Internal tensions within the IBRD, and 
the way it wanted to deal with Colombia and local officials, fostered 
Currie and Hirschman’s confrontation. The way they inserted them-
selves within the Colombian government, the networks and relation-
ships they established, play a major role (Álvarez et al., 2017). Their 
experience as experts in Colombia revealed not only their theoretical 
divergences or their personal strategies to be seen as key figures but 
also a divergence of attitudes towards the place that each one should 
occupy as “counselor of the prince.” 
In Colombia, Currie and Hirschman had first-hand experience in 
dealing with the economic and political actors involved in develop-
ment planning and policy making. They both enjoyed a certain de-
gree of freedom in their role as foreign experts. Currie as head of the 
first economic international mission to the country, and Hirschman as 
an expert hired by the government through the advice of the IBRD 
appeared as outsiders and, to some extent, impartial agents (Hirsch-
man, 2001, 81). Their advice, even if not always followed à la lettre, 
was sought and respected. Sometimes, also, their advice was used in 
                                                            7 We provide more details on their background in section 3.1. 
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power disputes among national actors, which made them realize the 
waving frontier between technical and political discussions (Álvarez 
et al., 2017). Almost in spite of themselves, they were involved in the 
national political dynamics and negotiations, which gave them a priv-
ileged and inside view of the political economy of development in a 
developing country (Álvarez et al., 2017). As we shall see in section 3, 
this had profound implications for their view on the role of experts. 
1.3. Policy Design: Technocratic vs. Free Development 
According to Easterly (2014) the 1949 IBRD Mission to Colombia 
marked the ultimate triumph of the alliance between autocrats and 
economic experts. Committing to a nonpolitical clause in the Bank’s 
1944 Articles of Agreement8, the IBRD hired Currie to lead an eco-
nomic mission in a country that was in state of siege due to growing 
partisan violence9. The clashes between Hirschman and Currie in the 
follow-up planning council created after the Mission10 has led some 
authors, notably Easterly (2014), to associate Currie with a technocrat-
ic approach towards development and Hirschman with a commit-
ment to free development. 
Currie, the leader of the Mission, is depicted as the prototypical 
foreign adviser that privileges expert knowledge, and Hirschman is 
presented as the dissenter who promotes bottom-up autonomous de-
velopment. The former would manifest contempt for the visited 
country and the latter fascination for it. Adelman (2013, 299) associ-
ates personal traits to their opposite positions: Currie, with more ex-
perience than Hirschman, was a confident expert, convinced he knew 
what should be done to accomplish development goals, whereas 
Hirschman, less experienced but also coming from a more troubled 
personal path that had taken him through trying ordeals, was more 
skeptical. Adelman (2013) contends that such different personal back-
grounds also influenced the way they played their roles as experts. 
                                                            8 “The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any mem-
ber; nor shall they be influenced in its decisions by the political character of the 
government of the member or the members concerned. Only economic considera-
tions shall be relevant to their decisions” (Easterly, 2014, 115). For Easterly, this 
was the original sin by which the Bank embraced the technocratic approach to 
development at the expense of ideals of freedom (Easterly, 2014, 105). 9 In 1948 presidential candidate and leading figure of the Liberal Party, Jorge 
Eliécer Gaitán had been assassinated, giving rise to what is known as the Bogotazo 
with massive riots and the destruction of an important part of downtown Bogotá 
on April 9th, the day of the assassination. The Bogotazo is also considered as the 
key date for the open display of violent confrontations between political parties 
and factions at the origin of Colombia’s lengthy period known as La Violencia. 
Currie arrives in Colombia in 1949, and what he finds is a country full of poverty 
amidst abundant natural resources, with little public administration and respect 
for the rule of law (Sandilands, 1990, 163). 10 See Álvarez, Guiot-Isaac, Hurtado (2017). 
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Currie led the mission as if Colombians were incapable of under-
standing the structural reasons of the country’s situation because they 
were immersed in it and lacked the perspective and objectivity of for-
eign experts, a position Hirschman deeply disagreed with (Adelman, 
2013, 307). Hirschman had more confidence in local knowledge and 
experience as a valid source of meaningful inputs to advance devel-
opment policies. 
Escobar (1995, 26) associates positions such as Currie’s, and the 
Currie Mission specifically, with the normalizing of the third world, 
as no other visions or alternatives were seriously considered. Devel-
opment experts were to act as missionaries showing the way towards 
the affluence of the West, following in its steps (Escobar, 1995, 56). 
Hirschman’s differences with the IBRD mission have been interpreted 
as a general reaction against the centrality of expertise in develop-
ment and to this view of a “normal” path towards development. Cur-
rie has the “missionary trademark,” the “exalted status as the foreign 
expert,” which makes Hirschman “cringe” (Adelman, 2013, 299, 307). 
Also, Hirschman reacts against a premise of the Currie mission that 
“only foreign experts could really understand the problem because 
they were foreign and because they were experts” (Adelman, 2013, 
307). Easterly (2014) and Ellerman (2004) present Hirschman as an 
early dissenter of the technocratic approach, and a precursor of grass-
roots development, citing his opposition to the mission but drawing 
mostly from his writings on foreign aid and north-south relations 
from the 1960s. 
However, this narrative presents an incomplete picture of the con-
ception that Currie and Hirschman had on the role of expertise in de-
velopment. Currie was not unconcerned with involving other agents 
in decision-making, and nor does Hirschman completely deny a place 
for expert knowledge. Political dynamics and technical advice are 
fundamental for expertise to play a meaningful role in development 
processes (Seers, 1962), and the combination of both factors is what 
Currie and Hirschman realized determines the possibilities of suc-
cessfully implementing expert policy recommendations. This shared 
recognition highlights the common ground Currie and Hirschman 
share (section 2), and allows presenting a nuanced interpretation of 
their disagreements (section 3). 
2. Beyond the Divides: Sharing Ideas against the  
Mission’s “Comprehensive Approach” 
We propose an alternative interpretation of the Currie-Hirschman 
divide that allows us to focus on the place from where they started 
thinking and working on development, following Malcolm Deas’ 
(2012) suggestion for understanding their differences by starting with 
what they share: 
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It has been common to contrast Hirschman and Currie, but …, they both 
shared certain characteristics. Neither the one, nor the other believed so 
much in development economics. (Deas, 2012, 148) 
Their disbelief stems from their view of theory and economics as just 
an instrument, a tool, in understanding and producing policy rec-
ommendations that could be translated into development policies. 
They both believed in the need to mobilize resources and energies in 
a desired direction, which they identify with development as requir-
ing strategy. Currie and Hirschman agreed on their critique of the 
IBRD’s comprehensive approach to development because it did not 
take into account implementation details and local political and eco-
nomic features. 
 Hirschman’s critique is well-known and has been seen as being 
addressed to Currie because it was he who led the Survey Mission to 
Colombia that resulted in the 1950 report advocating a comprehen-
sive approach. However, Currie also distances himself from this ap-
proach after his return to Colombia in 1950, this time on a Colombian 
Government contract to advise a newly formed Committee on Eco-
nomic Development (later the National Planning Council), to help 
elaborate the precise ways and policies needed to implement the re-
port’s recommendations for Colombia. 
Even if they share their critical view on the comprehensive ap-
proach, the substance of their criticism diverges as well as their own 
alternatives to it. This critical view is, for both, the result of their ex-
perience in the country because they both change their opinion about 
the report afterwards (Álvarez et al., 2017). 
As mentioned above, both economists agree that development is a 
problem of mobilizing resources and energies in a desired direction. 
The solution to development problems is not technical as orthodox 
development theorists argued11. In practice, Hirschman and Currie 
share a common understanding of development as a strategic process 
that implies political economy considerations; in particular, the role 
of the expert and the place of public involvement in economic mat-
ters. 
Hirschman takes issue with overall planning and with balanced 
growth theory. He advances instead the idea of development as fos-
tering decision-making skills. Currie criticizes the approach advanced 
in the Survey Mission report and especially the eclectic approach of 
attacking problems separately. He considers coherence and order is 
needed to trigger development. Therefore, he asserts general plan-
ning is the appropriate approach, prioritizing goals and steps; plan-
ning means focusing on the sequence and order of steps that lead to 
those goals. 
                                                            11 We expand on what “orthodox” means in section 3.3. 
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2.1. Currie’s and Hirschman’s Prior Development Policy Experience 
Neither Currie, nor Hirschman were experts on development upon 
their arrival in Colombia. While Currie had worked as a top economic 
adviser in the Federal Reserve, 1934-39, and then as President Roose-
velt’s White House adviser on economic affairs, 1939-45, his only con-
tact with an underdeveloped country had been two visits to China in 
1942 and 1943. His involvement there was initially to investigate the 
causes of China’s wartime inflation, but he was then involved with 
the civilian lend-lease program for China. He was also the acting 
head of the Foreign Economic Administration, 1943-44 and in the ear-
ly 1945 headed a wartime mission to Switzerland as President Roose-
velt’s emissary. He left government service after Roosevelt’s death in 
April 1945 to work as a private consultant with projects that included 
private business with China, Argentina, and Mexico. Hirschman had 
even less knowledge in development economics. After receiving an 
unorthodox formation in statistical economics in Europe, he emigrat-
ed to the United States in early 1941 and worked at Berkeley Univer-
sity for three years before enlisting in the US Army in February 1944, 
serving in North Africa and Italy. After the war he worked as an 
economist with the US Department of Commerce and the Federal Re-
serve Board and was the Fed’s representative on the European Re-
covery Program where his work included dealing with exchange con-
trol problems (Adelman, 2013; 2016). Paradoxically, both Currie and 
Hirschman ended up as foreign advisers in the emerging “third 
world” (Escobar, 1995) escaping, wittingly or unwittingly, from 
McCarthyism. 
Therefore, their first stay in Colombia was formative for them. It 
was determinant in a negative way, as an experience from which they 
attempt to distance themselves afterwards, specifically, from some 
aspects of their work as foreign advisers for the IBRD Mission and the 
follow-up National Planning Council. This process of demarcation is 
productive because it allows them to present alternative views on de-
velopment. Both developed a broad understanding of development, 
free from any economic reductionism, as a process of decision-
making. It is in this sense that we propose to interpret Deas’ (2012, 
148) statement that “[n]either the one, nor the other believed so much 
in development economics.” 
But their view of development certainly differed about the place 
they assigned to politics and stake holders. Currie, for his part, con-
tends that there is no such thing as development economics but rather 
economics applied to particular conditions prevailing in developing 
countries. He is aware of the decisive role stake holders play in the 
implementation of any policy, which explains the amount of time he 
spends communicating with key politicians, including Ministers and 
Presidents, in order to influence their decisions by praising their ac-
tions when they were supported and in line with technical advice in-
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stead of pointing at possible mistakes or misunderstandings. Currie 
sees economic advice as a type of technology transfer dependent up-
on the administrative capacity and the local actors’ level of compe-
tence. In this sense, advising is an art (Currie, 1981, 188), using rigor-
ous theoretical analysis and mental discipline that must consider the 
prevailing circumstances in order to attain desired objectives (Currie, 
1981, 208). An expert must adjust theory to the situation at hand, and 
identify transforming forces to promote them (Currie, 1981, 231). In a 
context of low administrative skills and negligible advanced econom-
ic education the expert then acts as a sort of guide. This was not 
Hirschman’s view. For him, rather than guiding, the expert can act as 
a catalyst in public debate, someone who does not necessarily have 
the answers but can help in articulating them. 
2.2. Hirschman’s Critique of the Comprehensive Approach of the 1949 
Survey Mission and the Critique of Balanced Growth 
The IBRD 1949 Mission was not the “first mission sent out by the 
Bank, or even its first mission to Colombia,” but it was the first in 
charge of designing an “overall framework for development and ap-
praising project proposals in the light of that framework” (Mason and 
Asher, 1973, 299). The final report the Mission submitted was con-
ceived as a “comprehensive and internally consistent program [...] to 
raise the standard of living of the Colombian people” (IBRD, 1950, ix, 
x). According to Currie, the Mission chief, “the recommendations will 
have fully served their purpose if they succeed in stimulating Colom-
bians to think in terms of the whole economy” (IBRD, 1950, xii). Fol-
lowing this advice, the Colombian Government created two years 
later the National Planning Council and hired Hirschman as foreign 
adviser. 
After finishing his work at the Council, Hirschman concludes that 
the general balance of the planning experiment was disappointing12, 
due to “a misconceived notion of what planning could and should 
be” (Hirschman, 1954 [unpublished], 3). He elaborates on this in his 
first scholarly article on the subject, arguing that development plans 
produce the “optical illusion that economics as a science can yield 
detailed blueprints for the development of underdeveloped coun-
tries” (Hirschman, 1954, 42). Eventually, he warns, this spurious pre-
tension will “invite reactions of the type: But the Emperor has noth-
ing on!” (Hirschman, 1954, 41). He believes this “overemphasis on the 
confection of ‘overall integrated programs’” led local and internation-
                                                            12 Hirschman, Albert O. May 15 1954. Algunas consideraciones sobre la oficina y 
el trabajo de planeación. Box 39, folder 4. Albert O. Hirschman Papers, Seeley G. 
Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ (AOHP). Our transla-
tion, and henceforth we refer to this as Hirschman (1954 [unpublished]). 
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al actors to adopt an “absurd conception of the role of the economist” 
(Hirschman, 1954, 44). 
Assigning this role of planner to the economist is rather a waste of 
her expertise, “one of the very scarce resources in underdevelopment 
countries” (Hirschman, 1954, 47), who should rather focus on identi-
fying promising sectors, and conceiving concrete projects in close col-
laboration with private and public entities (Hirschman, 1954 [un-
published], 4-5). In the debate between projects and plans, Hirschman 
chooses the former because they allow the economist to make the best 
use of expert knowledge, not because the latter exceeds the limits of 
private knowledge. But this does not imply limiting expert 
knowledge to casuistry, for proper economic theory provides “mean-
ingful generalizations … concretely helpful in the location and elabo-
ration of promising, specific investment projects” (Hirschman, 1954, 
44). 
The Strategy of Economic Development is the result of Hirschman’s 
effort to “elucidate his own immediate experience” as foreign adviser 
in Colombia (Hirschman, 1958, vii). His criticism of the “balanced 
growth doctrine” is the translation of his disagreement with compre-
hensive economic planning in Colombia into the language of the con-
temporary theoretical literature in development. According to 
Hirschman, the central idea of the “balanced growth doctrine” is that 
equilibrated growth reduces the risks associated with complementari-
ties of demand, guaranteeing that society profits from external econ-
omies. The policy implication of this theoretical framework is that 
only a simultaneous attack on all sectors—a Big Push—is effective in 
overcoming the condition of underemployment that characterizes 
underdeveloped countries. However, Hirschman considers that this 
doctrine “fails as a theory of development” (Hirschman, 1958, 51), be-
cause it “is an attempt to prove the need for a sudden massive ef-
fort”13 (Hirschman, 1958 [unpublished], 6-7), without explaining how 
to transform “one type of economy into some more advanced type” 
(Hirschman, 1958, 51-52). 
In order to provide an alternative framework, Hirschman resorts 
to breakthroughs in growth theory; in separate works, Harrod (1939) 
and Domar (1957) show that some conclusions that are valid in static 
systems do not apply in dynamic frameworks (Hirschman 1958, 30-
31). Borrowing from this idea, Hirschman shows that, from a dynam-
ical perspective, the possibilities disequilibria create outnumber the 
risks. Besides, he faces the challenge of adapting Harrod and Domar’s 
framework to the study of developing economies (Boianovsky, 2018, 
485). Harrod and Domar’s treatment of investment, as income and 
                                                            13 Hirschman, Albert O. [unpublished] 1958. Economic Development: Current 
Research and Problem Areas. Box 58, Albert O. Hirschman Papers, Seeley G. Mudd 
Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ (AOHP). Henceforth we 
refer to this as Hirschman (1958 [unpublished]). 
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capacity generator, supposes an equilibrium between savings and 
investment that Hirschman considers inapplicable to underdeveloped 
countries, because there “investment and saving decisions are largely 
interdependent … [and] savings depend far more on the opening up 
of investment opportunities and on the removal of various obstacles 
to investment than on increased income” (Hirschman, 1958, 32). More 
than the result of autonomous or induced investment, economic 
growth in underdeveloped countries is fueled by the “perception of 
investment opportunities and their transformation into actual in-
vestments” (Hirschman, 1958, 36)14. This perception can be induced 
or enforced through Hirschman’s Principle of the Hiding Hand 
(Hirschman, 2014). Experts could promote investments in certain sec-
tors and projects emphasizing the possible positive results rather than 
the costs, incentivizing risk averse agents to take risks. Even if uncer-
tainty can never be resolved, the expert should attempt to find an ad-
equate balance between uncertainty and risk taking in order to pro-
mote transformative projects that may lead to social change and de-
velopment. 
Despite the fact that the language of economic growth allows 
Hirschman to expose the limitations of understanding economic de-
velopment as a static phenomenon, he is emphatic that development 
is not synonymous with growth. In the Introduction to Strategy, he 
argues that “[the tension of development] is not so much between 
known benefits and costs but between the goal and the ignorance and 
misconceptions about the road to that goal” (Hirschman, 1958, 10). 
The divorce of development from benefit-cost analysis leads him to 
restate his distance from the balanced growth theory in broader 
terms: 
My point of departure is that development is not held back so much by 
scarcities in resources and abilities as by difficulties in reaching the deci-
sions necessary to bring these resources and abilities into play … What I 
am presenting therefore as a theory of development is a theory of maxim-
izing induced decision-making (Hirschman, 1958 [unpublished], 7) 
Decision making is rather a political process where the Hiding Hand 
appears as the main tool the expert has to help specific agents to 
make decisions15. This explains why the policy recommendation of a 
Big Push—foreign lending and comprehensive planning—to achieve 
                                                            14 Boianovsky (2018, 492) shows how Hirschman’s criticism of Harrod-Domar’s 
model relates to “investment-stimulating projects.” Besides this point we focus 
on how this criticism leads to the Principle of the Hiding Hand and informs the 
role of experts. 15 This interpretation is consistent with Frobert and Ferraton’s (2003), who argue 
that Hirschman’s notion of hidden rationalities, central for his understanding of 
development, entails the “will and intrinsic ability [of concerned communities] to 
define ends collectively and find means to achieve them” (2003, 32). We will 
come again to this notion in the next section. 
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structural transformation is “an escapist solution,” because it requires 
“huge amounts of precisely those abilities which we have identified 
as likely to be in very limited supply in underdeveloped countries” 
(Hirschman, 1958, 52-53). In particular, comprehensive plans demand 
an outstanding ability to reach consensus, because they expect socie-
ties to introduce not only positive externalities but also “some of the 
social costs into the economic calculus” (Hirschman, 1958, 57). This 
prescription fails to acknowledge that underdeveloped societies lack 
precisely the organizational basis to solve such conflicts. 
According to Hirschman, “inducement mechanisms” provide a 
decentralized alternative to comprehensive planning, without taking 
for granted the society’s ability for decision-making. During his stay 
in Colombia, Hirschman perceived that mechanisms such as show-
piece projects and social overhead capital shortages generate pres-
sures that induce responses from private enterprises and public au-
thorities, following their desire for profit and political survival 
(Hirschman, 1958, 64). This explains his interest in “a general study of 
decision-making processes” (Hirschman, 1958 [unpublished], 15) be-
cause he considers that “the evaluation of economic policies in un-
derdeveloped countries” is “one of the most neglected and at the 
same time interesting and potentially useful research areas” (Hirsch-
man, 1958 [unpublished], 14). Following his own advice, his study of 
the political economy of the 1961 agrarian reform in this country 
showed him further that the response of policy-makers is “not neces-
sarily or intrinsically less automatic than the response of entrepre-
neurs to a rise of the price of their product” (Hirschman, 1963, 20). 
Citizens and stake holders can use the art of voice to command the 
attention of decision makers (Hirschman, 1970). 
2.3. Currie’s Critique to Programming and the Non-Strategic  
Features of the Survey Mission 
Hirschman’s critical and skeptical tone towards this comprehensive 
approach of the Survey Mission is not that far from Currie’s own as-
sessment of it. After arguing that the main contribution of the Survey 
Report was instilling in policy makers a comprehensive perspective 
to tackle development problems16, he reflected upon the difficulties 
this legacy implied. Following the overall framework of the Mission 
to Colombia, the World Bank replicated this experience in several 
countries (Mason and Asher, 1973). The comprehensive approach 
seemed “to justify a broad-scale attack on many fronts, and this actu-
ally became the practice among advice-givers” (Currie, 1981, 67). 
However, the disappointing results of such attempts led Currie to 
                                                            16 Currie, Lauchlin. December 5 1950. Some Economic Problems, Address of Dr. 
Lauchlin Currie at Palacio San Carlos. RM0039, rolls 1-2, World Bank Mission, 
1948-1953. Archivo Lauchlin Currie, Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango (BLAA), 1-2. 
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declare a mea culpa, acknowledging that “the first of such comprehen-
sive study missions—the World Bank Report on Colombia in 1949—
seems to have been responsible for much misspent or at least disap-
pointing subsequent effort” (Currie, 1981, 53). He consoles himself, 
however, arguing that policy advisers failed to understand “the very 
special nature of this experience,” which could only have been suc-
cessful under a “combination of circumstances [that] is very difficult 
to replicate” (Currie, 1981, 67). 
This line of criticism continues to appear in Currie’s writings each 
time he deals with this type of planning characterized for including 
“many separate items without giving predominance to any of them.” 
The problem of this eclectic approach is that “many disparate goals 
are pursued simultaneously, and at first sight, there appears to be no 
order or scale of priorities” (Currie, 1966, 68). Moreover, it leads to 
confuse planning with programming, placing the “emphasis on quan-
titative relationships to the neglect of theory and qualitative consider-
ations” (Currie, 1966, 8). 
Like Hirschman, Currie considers that in poor countries with un-
skilled public administrations and “few trained economists, the waste 
is indefensible” (Currie, 1966, 60). While programming techniques are 
useful, “over and above it must be planning—the choice of objectives, 
the diagnosis of the problems, and the strategy of the attack on the 
problems to achieve the objectives” (Currie, 1966, 8). Sound economic 
planning involves more than understanding the interdependencies 
between economic variables, it requires defining a “rational system of 
priorities” (Currie, 1966, 200) in resource allocation. This reappraisal 
of planning led Currie to argue that it would be more effective if it 
followed a strategic17 rather than an eclectic approach: “planning (and 
advising), whether by foreigners or nationals, offers more chance of 
being effective if it is selective in emphasis rather than comprehen-
sive” (Currie, 1981, 67). 
Moreover, economic programming concentrates on empirical ex-
haustiveness at the expense of theoretical coherence, which leads to a 
                                                            17 On an address in the commemoration of the thirty years of the Survey Mission, 
Currie shared with the audience an anecdote that revealed the importance of 
thinking in strategic terms: “A final anecdote. The atmosphere became unpropi-
tious for planning in early 1953 with the Presidency of Rojas Pinilla and I pre-
pared to resign. Before I did so, however, I wanted to assure myself that the par-
tida for a road from Barranquilla to Ciénaga Grande, which Karl Parrish of Bar-
ranquilla had urged to me in my studies there, was inserted in the next year’s 
budget. So I saw the General on this matter. He was not very much impressed by 
my economic arguments. Suddenly, however, he said ‘You’re right, but not for 
the reasons you cite. It is necessary for strategic purposes.’ I was suitably im-
pressed and the partida was placed in the budget and the road was subsequently 
built ‘for strategic purposes’”. Currie, L. August 31 1979. A talk by Lauchlin Cur-
rie. RM0029, roll 1, Talks, speeches, prologues, 1979-1988 and distinctions, forum, 
1963-1992, BLAA, 12-13. The stress is Currie’s. 
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fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of development. Currie 
identifies the emphasis on capital-output ratios of programming 
techniques with the “capital formation approach,”18 which he consid-
ers a misguided orthodoxy in development theory (Currie, 1966, 127). 
Thinkers as diverse as Myrdal, Prebisch and Nurkse share the belief 
that the main obstacle for underdeveloped countries was the scarcity 
of capital. Like Hirschman, Currie sees “no particular merit in treat-
ing all development problems in terms of capital formation, capital 
stock, consumption, and production” and considers that noting the 
identity of saving and investment is “by no means a theory of em-
ployment or a theory of development” (Currie, 1966, 130). 
He even quotes a fragment of the Strategy19, adding that Hirsch-
man is “still another skeptic” of the predictive and operational value 
of this approach (Currie, 1966, 137). These theorists fail to understand 
that “the truly difficult problem in accelerating development is not 
technical, difficult as that is, but rather the lack of will and 
knowledge” (Currie, 1966, 140). Planning should not be reduced to 
programming because underdeveloped countries need to economize 
their decision-making skills—the will to develop and the knowledge 
of how to develop—by strategically defining priorities and possible 
roads to mobilize human energies in this direction. 
Currie’s further experiences as policy adviser in Colombia20 made 
him reconsider the proper economic theory to think coherently and 
                                                            18 The way Currie reads this approach is similar to what Boianovksy (2018) iden-
tifies as a traditional view of development economists as capital fundamentalists. 
A simple synthesis of this historiographical approach can be found in Meier and 
Seers (1984, 16): “The extension of Keynesian short-run employment theory into 
long-run growth theory in the form of the Harrod-Domar equation (g = s/k, 
where g is the growth rate, s the savings ratio, and k the capital-output ratio) im-
plied that the growth rate could be maximized by maximizing the marginal sav-
ing from output growth and by minimizing the incremental capital-output ratio 
(ICOR).” 19 “A model based on the propensity to save and the capital-output ratio is bound 
to be far less useful in underdeveloped than in advanced countries. Its predictive 
and operational value is low” (Hirschman, 1958, 32). 20 The political scenario of Colombia in the 1960s provided Currie a field of ex-
perimentation on policy advice. In 1961, Currie prepared an economic plan for 
the government called Operación Colombia (OC). The main idea behind this plan 
was to capitalize on the benefits of the green revolution by creating urban jobs for 
the rural unemployed. The key was to define a leading sector, which would trigger 
self-sustained growth through three mechanisms: stimulating demand for pro-
duction inputs in a broad way to encourage demand in other sectors, absorbing 
low-skilled labor, and creating a virtuous circle of adoption of new technology. 
OC was not adopted. Currie realized he overlooked the political implications of a 
transformation of the agricultural sector, in a country with deep political and 
economic inequalities in land ownership. However, he successfully put forward a 
new plan, the Four Strategies Plan, which was implemented in 1972, thanks to 
energetic persuasion skills from a key advisory position in the National Planning 
Department and close links with President Misael Pastrana. 
| Lauchlin Currie and Albert O. Hirschman on Development 227 
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 9(2) : 209-235 
define priorities. Greatly influenced by his 1920s Harvard mentor Al-
lyn Young (Currie, 1997), he believed that his theory of demand-
induced growth (Young, 1928) should be the foundation for the con-
struction of a theory of development. 
Following this, he believed that the role of the adviser in develop-
ing countries is to accelerate growth by stimulating latent demand 
that might then stimulate latent productive capacity in areas where it 
is most needed and fruitful. The difference between developed and 
underdeveloped countries is of degree, not of substance. It affects pol-
icy but not the validity of economic theory. The question is, thus, how 
to implement policies derived from sound economic theory in a con-
text where decision-making skills are scarce. 
His experience with Operación Colombia, his first failure as policy 
adviser because it was not adopted, made him realize that overlook-
ing the political implications of any policy could mean the neglect of 
economic advice. The need for a close relationship with economic and 
political decision makers led Currie to cultivate his contacts with sev-
eral high-ranking officials to promote economic discussion. Praising 
key actors for their ability to understand and implement sound de-
velopment policies instead of focusing on possible misunderstand-
ings is an efficient way to influence and guide policy and political de-
cisions, and can be understood as the art of advising. 
Implementation of sound economic ideas and neutralizing politics 
become a motto of his advice for experts to interact with politicians, 
private agents and policy makers. Concurring with Hirschman, Cur-
rie developed the conviction that decision making is the art of align-
ing (coordinating) “human action in a certain direction … The diffi-
culty lies in securing agreement on the direction” (Currie, 1966, 141, 
fn 1). In this sense, direct communication and the art of advising ap-
pear central. 
Even if Hirschman and Currie differ in the content of their criti-
cisms of economic planning and programming, both agree that the 
theory on which these policy mechanisms are grounded does not 
work as a strategy of development. In particular, they both disagree 
with what they considered the orthodoxy in development theory 
proposed. Neither “balanced growth”21 nor capital formation repre-
sented the most appropriate road to development. Any such ap-
proach would lead to the misuse of resources, ignoring specific cir-
cumstances and attempting to apply general recipes. The problem is 
not with the recipe but with the capacity to implement any economic 
policy; the problem has to do with the decision-making skills present 
in developing countries. This explains their shared vision of devel-
opment as strategy, and of the misuse of economic expertise in such 
comprehensive approaches. According to Currie (1967, 13), it is the 
                                                            21 At least as defined by Hirschman but again see Currie’s (1970 [2018]) critique. 
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“task” and “responsibility” of economists to define national objectives 
and conceive consistent plans to achieve them. Confirming the need 
for experts, Currie insists that economists are the most suited for this 
task because they have developed coherent theories explaining the 
economy as a system of interrelationships. 
3. The Expert’s Role as Catalyst of Decision Making 
If development is a matter of defining priorities and energizing re-
sources, this means it is not just a technical, but a political problem. 
Both Currie and Hirschman drew this insight from their work in Co-
lombia (see Álvarez et al., 2017). However, the Colombian experience 
and its particular political economy context led them both to propose 
alternative ways to attain that goal. 
3.1. Currie: Breaking the Vicious Circle of Low Growth  
and Economic Ignorance 
Understanding development as strategy means striving to formulate 
a coordinated path between local economic, political and social 
agents. Such coordination requires developing or enforcing decision-
making skills, which need some type of common ground of discus-
sion. For Currie, this common ground is economic education whereas 
for Hirschman (1970, 43) it corresponds to “the art of voice.” 
Currie presents the challenge as breaking the difficult interaction 
between culture and development, which he conceived as a vicious 
circle between low growth and cultural practices and beliefs: 
If a people with a particular culture has, to date, shown itself to possess 
less than acceptable domination of environment, how can the degree of 
change that seems necessary to accelerate the process of development and 
the date of transition from a less to a more developed category be brought 
about? (Currie, 1981, 237) 
The problem here is to transform this particular culture that seems 
incapable of important change, and the question is how this should 
be done. 
Currie believes that a first step to transformation is having sound 
foundations to propose such changes, which are to be found not in 
development economics but rather in basic rudiments in economic 
analysis. The discussion between policy makers and decision makers 
should be based on this common ground, which would then lead to 
discussions on the specific goals and steps to achieve them. 
Currie believed there is only one correct type of economic analysis, 
around which there is a consensus in the profession, that can be ap-
plied in different circumstances (Currie, 1981, 6, 118). This difference 
of circumstances materializes in the degree of control and efficiency 
in each country and the ability to choose over policies (Currie, 1981, 
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39), and here is where debate should center. Economics for developed 
and developing countries is the same, but the policy 
recommendations need to be adapted as conditions differ. Though 
these recommendations may differ among economists, if policy 
makers and decision makers share a common ground it guarantees 
that all those involved in determining policy goals, policy design and 
implementation also share a common language and understand each 
other thanks to it. Therefore, Currie considers economic education is 
paramount to development processes22. 
In line with the idea of the art of advising, Currie himself plays an 
important role in the development of economic education in Colom-
bia. In his report on this topic, Currie (1965) recognized the progress 
made on this front over the previous 15 years. The creation of the 
Administrative Department for National Statistics and of some 15 
Economics Departments around the country attest to this process. 
However, Currie insisted on a clear distinction between economic 
science as taught in a textbook such as Samuelson’s Economics and the 
skills required for national, regional and urban planning: 
When the distinction is not recognized and the teaching of ‘planning’ is at-
tempted at an early stage in the preparation of an economist, there is a risk 
of oversimplifying what is perhaps the most difficult branch in which an 
economist can work, and of creating mental rigidities. What is needed is to 
be alert, have originality and mental agility combined with a thorough 
grounding in economic theory. (Currie, 1965, 13, our translation). 
Along these lines, an investment policy in education was needed if 
the country was to overcome the limitations on development associ-
ated with deficient policy making due to lack of capacity and train-
ing. Currie thought such an investment should aim first at training 
the upper class, and, to a slightly lesser extent, … the larger middle class. 
A corollary is that expenditures on training, especially abroad, and on cre-
ating attitudes favorable to better domination and control of the environ-
ment will prove highly productive over a period of time. (Currie, 1981, 
228) 
                                                            22 Currie himself would play an important role in the development of economic 
education in Colombia. He was active in the country’s two major Economics De-
partments, promoting not only their undergraduate and graduate programs, but 
also contributing to the consolidation of economic research centers associated 
with these Departments at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia and the Uni-
versidad de los Andes. He was made Professor Emeritus of the latter in 1987, 
where he taught until 1991, two years before his death. He is also known for par-
ticipating in the direct economic education of key politicians and officials. He not 
only held regular classes at the National Planning Department to explain the the-
ory behind his policy recommendations, he created the Grupo de los miércoles, an 
informal group of influential figures, made up of industrialists, bankers, and re-
gional governors, where, using the Socratic method, he would sound out his ide-
as on reform. 
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Moreover, economic education should go beyond Economics De-
partments, and reach the relevant public: “the upper classes should 
have enough understanding of how the economic system works as to 
be able to comprehend and evaluate the probable impact of specific 
economic programs and proposals” (Currie, 1965, 14, our translation). 
Only where key stake holders are economically enlightened, can 
trained economists effectively inform policy making. 
This is even more important in a context where the number of for-
eign experts and international missions is shrinking, making the im-
pact of expert knowledge less direct and harder to trace. Rather than 
a direct influence, expert advice would now come through the form 
of the conditions for loans, articles, books, and the training of national 
policy makers abroad. These newly trained policy advisers would 
then have an increased responsibility “to modify and adapt theories 
and policies to domestic requirements” (Currie, 1981, 227). 
Such an education would ease the work of policy advisers, who 
could then play their role as guides in the debate, using good eco-
nomics and the knowledge of specific conditions in order to identify 
and promote transforming forces (Currie, 1981, 213). Currie compares 
the policy adviser with “a driver in heavy traffic” who “must be alive 
to many things going on around him” (Currie, 1981, 206). Therefore, 
the policy adviser cannot concentrate only on theory, but rather be 
able to consider the circumstances, the quality and reliability of the 
information, the coherence of the policies proposed to achieve general 
goals, and the social and political context (Currie, 1981). In order to be 
able to participate and illuminate the public debate, the expert should 
also be able to converse with different audiences, be them other econ-
omists or the relevant public. Besides theoretical and technical skills, 
the expert must also be persuasive. 
3.2. Hirschman: From the “Visiting Economist Syndrome”  
to the “Facilitator” 
Concerning the art of communication as a major requirement for the 
successful expert, Currie joins Hirschman. Being able to participate in 
professional and public debate is their skill. There is no sense in for-
mulating goals and policies if they are not appropriated and legiti-
mized in public debate, if public opinion and all stake holders do not 
understand and share them. 
However, Hirschman gives a less central role to economic educa-
tion and to the expert in the debate. More in the line of trying “to 
identify those [powerful] forces [that are tending to bring about great 
transformations in society] and to shape his advice to further rather 
than to obstruct them” (Currie, 1981, 231), Hirschman sees the expert 
as a figure that identifies and empowers voices that have been hidden 
or neglected. The focus should not be on bringing knowledge or edu-
cating people in economics, the motto of the “visiting economist syn-
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drome,” but rather finding “hidden rationalities” (Hirschman, 1984) 
and bringing them to the light, so that local knowledge could be used, 
shared and expanded. The role of the expert is precisely to involve 
other agents in the process of common “self-discovery” and “self-
affirmation” (Hirschman, [1961] 1970, 304) that characterizes devel-
opment as a process of endogenous change. It is not the art of advis-
ing behind the expert as an economic educator that advances this role 
but rather the promotion of voice, and the encouragement through 
the Hiding Hand. 
Therefore, rather than, as Currie thought, economics informing 
and even determining public debate, Hirschman favored recognizing 
the political and social context within which economic policy debate 
took place, making this debate a political one. The purpose was not to 
avoid or change this debate as untechnical, uninformed or the expres-
sion of vested or unenlightened interests. Economic policy debate 
was a political one, where all stake holders should be able to exercise 
their voice. 
In brief, even if Currie and Hirschman disagreed on the precise 
grounds for an informed public debate on economic policy and the 
role the expert should play in it, they agreed that with the “growth of 
a more informed and critical public opinion, what can be hoped for is 
that there will be a tendency for decision-makers to identify their per-
sonal interests more with the longer term interests of the community 
and to give more weight to the probable judgement of history” 
(Currie, 1981, 228). Therefore, the strategy of development could be 
defined, shared and appropriated widely. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Currie’s and Hirschman’s experience in Colombia gives us an idea of 
how they believe expertise should be understood. Exploring their re-
flections on their own roles as foreign experts, allows to show the lim-
its of development theory and the influence of the political economy 
of development, and call our attention to the role of experts. They 
should develop their capacity to make public interventions (Mata and 
Medema, 2013) through the art of advising or the Principle of the 
Hiding-Hand. Successful expertise implies being aware of the recip-
rocal influence experts and decision-making agents have on each oth-
er. 
Neither Currie nor Hirschman seem to acknowledge that the for-
mer’s art of advising or the latter’s Hiding Hand Principle lead pre-
cisely in this direction. Their appraisals of the role of the expert in de-
velopment processes point to the risks or the negative sides of these 
practices: the art of advising would hide the expert’s superiority, and 
the Hiding Hand Principle would ignore the risks of false or inaccu-
rate advice. 
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The divide between Currie and Hirschman can be traced to the 
apparent independence that the Colombian economic technocrats 
have from politics. Such independence seems to agree with Currie’s 
view about the relationship between politics and economics. There is 
a prevailing view in Colombia as to the ability experts have to get 
around politics but it could also be argued that the important difficul-
ties of the country’s development are related with what Hirschman 
identifies as its inability to deal with politics and assume the role of 
experts in the political economy of development and in economic, 
social and political debates. Here we might find the roots of what 
could be called the Colombian paradox of a stable economy within an 
unstable political and social context. 
Archives 
Archivo Lauchlin Currie, Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango (BLAA), Bogotá. 
This archive contains copies of what is also in Duke University’s Spe-
cial Collections Library. 
Albert O. Hirschman Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, 
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ. (AOHP). 
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1. Pigou in the Arena 
On November 5, 1903, The Cambridge Review summarized the debate 
of November 3 in the Cambridge Union on free trade and tariff re-
form, the most heated fiscal issue of the day in British politics. The 
controversy had become inflamed in May, when the political wisdom 
and economic benefits of free trade—the corner stone of economic 
ideology in the Victorian era—were contested by Joseph Chamber-
lain, Colonial Secretary in the Conservative government of A.J. Bal-
four, committed imperialist, and self-anointed prophet of the tariff 
reform movement.1 An “extraordinary fervour” was on display in the 
Cambridge Union: “a house crowded and overflowing—an atmos-
phere charged with electrical excitement—tumultuous applause”—ad 
hominem speeches and personal invective, “and above all the fiery 
intensity and bitter sarcasm of Mr Pigou.” In the account of the Cam-
bridge Review, Pigou eviscerated the case for protective and retaliatory 
tariffs by exposing the shoddy arguments of tariff reformers. In intro-
ducing unexplained data without analyzing causes, they embraced 
colonial trade at the expense of more profitable free trade, filling the 
pockets of “the richest and most idle class in Britain.” Chamberlain’s 
proposals would “establish vested interests, encourage trusts, stir up 
jealousy in our colonies,” and inevitably lead to import taxes on criti-
cal staples such as raw cotton, wool, and lumber—in short a “ruinous 
policy” for the British people (Cambridge Review, 1903, 55-56). This 
was A.C. Pigou as a young firebrand, the twenty-six year-old fellow 
of King’s College elected only the year before. His engagement in the 
tariff reform controversy included short books for the general reader 
and articles for political periodicals as well as extra-mural public 
speeches. In attacking the bases of an influential set of policies, he ad-
dressed the public in plain if sometimes polemically ornamented lan-
guage, accessible to an audience with little or no economic expertise 
(Pigou, 1903a; 1903b; 1904a; 1904b; 1906a; 1906b).  
The political pedagogy that underpinned Pigou’s contribution to 
the tariff reform controversy marked the appearance of an important 
assumption in his thought that linked the conditions for effective 
economic policy to public sentiment on economic issues and the eth-
ics of the economics profession. These linkages can be clarified by in-
troducing the concept of a Pigouvian project of public economic en-
lightenment. The tutelage of the public on economic matters became a 
critical civic and professional responsibility of the economist when 
three circumstances intersected. (1) Influential policies flawed by er-
rors in economic reasoning endangered British public interest. (2) 
Correcting flawed policies called for substantial changes in the con-
ventional economic wisdom of the political class: parliamentarians, 
                                                            
1 On the tariff reform controversy see Sykes (1979) and Aslanbeigui and Oakes 
(2015b). 
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cabinet members, civil servants, and influential writers and editors of 
political weeklies that framed and reflected perceptions in Westmin-
ster and Whitehall. However, changes of such magnitude could be 
made only by recasting the sentiments of the electorate. Such a shift 
in the public mind called for basic competence in economic reasoning 
and judgment on plain facts of policy making. (3) The public could 
not be expected to grasp the elements of economic logic unless pro-
fessionals in the discipline assumed an obligation to enlighten them 
on the issues at stake, how they should be understood, and policies 
that would be reasonable in light of a sound understanding.  
In this essay, we analyze Pigou’s project of public economic en-
lightenment, how he executed it, and some of the premises on which 
it was based. Although differences in rhetorical tone and polemical 
style are evident in his popular writings and lectures, their consisten-
cy in method and purpose over some four decades is remarkable. 
The plan of the ensuing investigation can be briefly sketched. Sec-
tion 2 considers Pigou’s conception of the institutional importance of 
public economic enlightenment in the British polity of his time, the 
responsibilities it imposed on economists, and how he acted on them. 
Section 3 considers the question: who or what constituted the Pigou-
vian public? Section 4 reconstructs three moments in the history of 
British public economic enlightenment in which Pigou intervened: the 
labor problems following the Great War, the dangers of economic 
austerity in the 1930s as the British government grappled with the 
Great Depression; and the threats to the British economy posed by 
wage increases and inflation in the years following World War II. Sec-
tion 5 concludes the essay with skeptical observations on Pigou’s 
principle of nonpartisanship as an ethical axiom governing conduct of 
economists in educating the public. 
2. The Pigouvian Project of  
Public Economic Enlightenment 
The polity that is tied to the economy in Pigou’s writings was invari-
ably the British state at the time of writing. The exigencies addressed 
by intelligent policy were the demands of the day and the impera-
tives visible on the political horizon. Long-term strategic planning, 
which became fashionable in the policy sciences after his death, was a 
vain exercise. Because of the imponderable contingencies of history, 
confident projections of the remote consequences of current trends 
were out of the question. Although British economic policy was an 
artifact of the mother of parliaments, a representative body chosen by 
eligible voters, Pigou had very little confidence in the policy judg-
ment of voters, most of whom he regarded as economically illiterate. 
He also expressed occasional doubts about the economic savoir faire of 
British MPs and professional civil servants. Moreover, the democratic 
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complexion of representative government compromised the benefits 
of expertise, such as it was. In his view, the institutional structure of 
British political economy imposed two formidable constraints on 
public policy. (1) A policy had reasonable chances of success only if it 
enjoyed the “general assent” of the public. Assent would be forth-
coming only if the public understood the policy and believed in its 
efficacy and fairness. (2) However, citizens were unlikely to grasp the 
essentials of any policy because of their economic incompetence. Easi-
ly misled by economic charlatans, they were also likely to be duped 
by the propaganda of special interests. Untutored but often dogmati-
cally confident in the rectitude of their opinions, they were oblivious 
to basic distinctions, such as the differences between saving and in-
vesting. In consequence, it was futile to suppose the public could fol-
low arguments employed in even a simple piece of economic analy-
sis. In order to perform their role as citizens—responding to Parlia-
ment with informed consent, reservations, or dissent—they needed 
primary education, even if informal, in economic reasoning and some 
facility in arriving at sound judgment on important issues of policy. 
And who would tutor the public on economic affairs? Pigou held that 
this responsibility fell to professional economists—it was an essential 
desideratum of the ethics of economics as a vocation.  
The necessity of public legitimation of economic policy, the gen-
eral economic ineptitude of the public, and the obligation of econo-
mists to repair this deficiency were prominent themes in Pigou’s 
work. In his inaugural address delivered on the occasion of his elec-
tion to the Cambridge chair of political economy vacated by Alfred 
Marshall, he noted the critical function of economic reasoning in 
demonstrating the fallacies in economic arguments popularly be-
lieved to be plausible. Because most British citizens seemed to believe 
that they were not only competent but “bound in solemn duty” to 
offer pronouncements on matters of policy, speaking “from the van-
tage point of complete ignorance concerning social science,” the result 
was unsurprising: “arguments repugnant to any form of logical rea-
soning are always in the air, and are always liable to influence the 
policy of a Democratic State.” It was the task of economists to “check 
misguidance” by correcting the economic logic of “untrained com-
mon-sense” (Pigou, 1908, 18-19). 
In 1924, when the British government was planning for a return to 
the gold standard after effectively abandoning it at the beginning of 
the Great War, Pigou considered the wisdom of adopting an alterna-
tive monetary scheme that would loosen the ties that coupled British 
currency to gold. Although he made a case for a system proposed by 
the Yale economist Irving Fisher on the grounds of its price stability, 
he finally decided against it: the scheme was unfamiliar, and might 
even be incomprehensible, to the public. 
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In practical affairs, to introduce large changes the meaning of which most 
people cannot understand is dangerous. So far as the United Kingdom is 
concerned until the gold standard has been re-established, more elaborate 
improvements in our monetary system are not practical politics. When it 
has been re-established public opinion is unlikely, for some time, to sanc-
tion any formal departure from it (Pigou, 1924, 121; see also Pigou in 
HMSO, 1931, 54).  
Novel policies that represented a departure from convention, tradi-
tion, or what passed for common sense would not succeed. Stated in 
the academic discourse of our time, a policy that marked a paradigm 
shift would fail unless measures were taken to embed it in the public 
consciousness, forming a consensus in its support by developing a 
popular conviction in its good sense and fairness. Unlike Keynes, 
Pigou was profoundly suspicious of intellectually deft and ingenious 
policy innovations. In this respect, he rather than Keynes was the au-
thentically Burkean political economist.  
In 1924, Pigou also criticized an unconventional policy to retire the 
national debt Britain had amassed during the Great War. Proposals 
for a capital levy, whereby owners of capital or other wealth would 
pay a large one-time tax, would be effective only if the public gave 
“general assent” to its practicability. That had not happened and 
could not be anticipated. Although a capital levy had enjoyed broad 
support immediately after the war, its time had passed: current opin-
ion had solidified against it (HMSO, 1927, 443).  
In 1929, Pigou delivered the Sidney Ball Lecture at Barnett House 
in Oxford, a center for adult civic education. In arguing that general 
economic study was important for both knowledge and practice, he 
considered the lag between the initial development of an economic 
theory and its reception by “the practical man.” The main explana-
tion, he thought, did not lie in Parliament, overburdened with debate 
and administration and unable to keep abreast of current research. 
After all, Parliament had access to a “brilliant Civil Service” as well as 
independent expertise. The real reason: implementation of a policy 
often depended on “the degree of economic knowledge possessed by 
the general body of the public.” Returning to monetary policy, he 
claimed that “every economist knows that in the world of economists 
it would be easy to set up a monetary machine much superior to the 
gold standard: but in the world of actual men with their prejudices 
and ingrained beliefs, where perhaps not one in 100,000 understands 
the nature of money, it may be held that an attempt to do this would 
lead to disaster.” To Pigou, the lesson of the abysmal state of public 
understanding of money was clear. In order to perform their public 
function, economists could not in good conscience rest with education 
of the political class: “we need also that the main body of the people 
shall have some training in economics—sufficient training at least to 
perceive that they do not possess complete training.” Economists 
were obligated to ensure that their subject matter was understood “in 
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some measure by the general body of educated men” (Pigou, 1929, 
21-22).2 His Sidney Ball lecture was one of Pigou’s efforts to meet this 
obligation. 
In the preface to his last book (Pigou, 1955), Pigou addressed the 
difficulty of the project of public economic enlightenment: it was not 
an inordinately difficult enterprise. The conceptual and mathematical 
refinements of economic analysis could be disregarded. It was vital 
only to train the “plain man”—in Pigouvian parlance, “any educated 
person”—in the “central core of economic truth” and the basic tools 
of economic reasoning. In this fashion, citizens could learn how to 
judge the merits of policies to the extent needed for their own inter-
ests and public welfare. The requisite body of economic knowledge 
could “be made intelligible to any educated person who chooses to 
take a little trouble.” Reprising a favorite comparison, he observed 
that “if it is possible to remove the scaffolding from Einstein’s terrific 
structures, as Einstein himself has shown that it is, in such a way that 
laymen can get a good general idea of what they essentially are, the 
same thing should be possible in our own much easier field” (Pigou, 
1955, v).3 
In the opening pages of The Economics of Welfare, Pigou’s magnum 
opus, he compared economics to physiology: its ultimate value was 
determined by the fruits of its discoveries, its contributions to human 
well-being (Pigou, 1932, 5). He regarded it as self-evident that educat-
ing the public on economic affairs was one of these contributions, 
placing it squarely within the province of professional economics. 
Was it presumptuous on his part to suppose that he was qualified to 
instruct the British public on how to think about economic policy? 
Certainly not by the standards of his time. Regardless of party affilia-
tion, British governments routinely appointed economists to commis-
sions formed to investigate a host of economic problems. The list of 
those selected during the years of Pigou’s professorship is quite long 
and included William Ashley, William Beveridge, Edwin Cannan, 
John Clapham, Keynes, Dennis Robertson, and Lionel Robbins. Pigou 
himself served on the Committee of Economists formed by the Board 
of Trade (1916), the Committee on Currency and Foreign Exchanges 
after the War (1918), the Royal Commission on the Income Tax (1919), 
the Committee on the Currency and Bank of England Note Issues 
                                                            
2 After World War II, Pigou returned to the political dangers of a large gap be-
tween current economic expertise and public economic literacy. In war as in 
peace, if the state “tried to go more than a short distance ahead of what general 
opinion sanctioned, the administrative machine would break down under the 
strain” (Pigou, 1952, 205). 
3 Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory was first published 
in German in 1916. It was translated into English in 1920 and subsequently ap-
peared in many editions. In his preface, Einstein explained that the book was 
written for interested readers who lacked training in the mathematics of theoreti-
cal physics. 
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(1924), and the Committee of the Economists formed by Prime Minis-
ter Ramsay MacDonald (1930). In addition, he gave expert testimony 
to the Royal Commission on the Coal Industry (1919), the Committee 
on National Debt and Taxation (1924-1925), and the Committee on 
Finance and Industry (1930).4 Pigou’s confidence in the academic 
economist as the most authoritative source of expertise on public eco-
nomic affairs conformed to the British political ethos of the period. 
His professorship (1908-1943), of course, spanned a long period: from 
the twilight of the long nineteenth century to the depths of World 
War II, from the Liberal cabinet of Herbert Asquith to the wartime 
cabinet of Winston Churchill. Parliaments and governments were 
formed and dissolved, and Treasury mandarins appeared and disap-
peared. However, a Westminster-Whitehall consensus on the exper-
tise of academic economists in policy matters remained in place. 
3. The Pigouvian Public 
The “general body of the public”? “The main body of the people”? 
“The general body of educated men”? Who or what constituted the 
Pigouvian public? True to form, the Professor did not satisfy readers 
with a taste for precision. By way of answering this question, he in-
troduced terminology that was current in literary culture in order to 
indicate the demands his various writings made on readers: low-
brow, middle-brow, highbrow—terms that distinguished the preten-
sions of a literary artifact as well as the cultural aspirations of readers. 
Originally derived from phrenology—people with high foreheads 
were believed to be highly intelligent, people with low foreheads, the 
‘Neanderthals’, much less so—the term ‘high-brow’ became current 
in the early years of the twentieth century.5 Pigou claimed that a low-
brow book such as Socialism vs. Capitalism was not a learned work but 
intended for “the general reader” (Pigou, 1937, v). Medium-brow 
books such as Lapses from Full Employment (1945) were “semi-
popular,” addressing problems plagued by “a great deal of confused 
thinking” (Pigou to Macmillan, n.d., circa October 4, 1943, Macmillan 
Archive). Their aim was intelligibility and simplicity at minor costs to 
“unpracticed readers,” who would find some arguments challenging 
(Pigou, 1945, 5). These books, he thought, would be helpful to readers 
interested in policies “the implications of which they can’t possibly 
understand without some sound background” (Pigou to Macmillan, 
May 9, 1944, Macmillan Archive). High-brow works were theoretical-
ly sophisticated and fully intelligible only to economists well-versed 
                                                            
4 On Pigou’s theory of economic policy analysis and his engagement in the public 
sphere, see Aslanbeigui and Oakes (2015a). 
5 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘middle-brow’ first appeared in 1925 
in Punch. 
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in mathematics (Pigou to Macmillan, n.d., circa 1934-35; November 
18, 1939; July 23, 1940, Macmillan Archive). 
Pigou’s low and middle-brow works were exercises in public eco-
nomic enlightenment. Economics in Practice (1935) was a collection of 
six such lectures. Four were given in 1934 at LSE, which wanted them 
published. Pigou agreed to LSE’s terms on the condition that the lec-
tures not be “of an abstruse character, but on matters of general inter-
est and more or less popular in tone.” The other two were given to a 
similar audience in Cambridge (Pigou, 1935, v). After their visit to the 
Soviet Union, Sidney and Beatrice Webb published Soviet Com-
munism: A New Civilization? (1936), which Pigou reviewed for The 
Economic Journal. He wrote Beatrice that he was “making up some 
popular lectures about socialist central planning” but had doubts 
about publication (Pigou to Beatrice Webb, January 13, 1937, 
WHB/IIb/36 [Parts V and VI]). Written in the manner of the lectures 
in Economics in Practice, they became Socialism vs. Capitalism. The book 
proved wildly popular and was reprinted ten times between 1938 and 
1960. Lapses from Full Employment, published in April 1945 as the Eu-
ropean war was ending, was reprinted in September 1945 and again 
in 1949. Income: An Introduction to Economics (1946) comprised seven 
lectures he delivered at the request of a Cambridge professor for an 
audience of engineering students. Believing they would have a wider 
appeal, Pigou attempted to “provide an outline sketch of an im-
portant part of economics that shall be intelligible and, if possible, 
interesting to non-economists,” including soldiers returning from the 
war “who would like to get a general idea of what economics is 
about” (Pigou, 1946, v; Pigou to Macmillan, September 26, 1945, 
Macmillan Archive). It was also a success. Selling nearly 3000 copies 
in its first three weeks of publication, it was printed twice in 1946 and 
twice in 1948 (Pigou to Macmillan, October 8, 1946, Macmillan Ar-
chive; Pigou, 1955, v-vi). The Veil of Money (1949a) was reprinted in 
1950, 1956, and after his death in1960 and 1962.  
The Pigouvian public seems most closely comparable to the read-
ership of the political press where he occasionally published, periodi-
cals such as the Edinburgh Review, the Contemporary Review, and the 
Speaker—which became the Nation in 1907, later the Nation and Athe-
naeum, and still later the New Statesman and the Nation. Based predom-
inantly in London, they targeted a middle class of reform-minded 
readers: largely metropolitan, broadly liberal, and progressive (Koss, 
1984). In sum, the Pigouvian public should not be conflated with the 
British public, conceived as citizens of Britain eligible to vote. The 
public Pigou attempted to enlighten was limited to men and women 
with the disposition and intellectual faculties to follow analyses of 
economic policy that were simple and lucid but generally spelled out 
in some detail. A socioeconomic status that supplied resources ade-
quate to support periodical subscriptions, book purchases, and the 
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leisure to read them was also necessary; or, failing that, access to li-
braries where patrons could find his books and articles. Pigou 
claimed that he entered economics to solve the social and human 
problems created by unemployment (Pigou, 1912, vii), an important 
cause of poverty. Neither the unemployed nor the impoverished en-
joyed the income or leisure presupposed by the project of public eco-
nomic enlightenment. Pigou’s low and middle-brow readers fell into 
a much smaller and more fortunate class.  
Did Pigou suppose that only the economic judgments of the Brit-
ish Bildungsbürgertum carried weight in influencing the decisions of 
the political class? Or did he perhaps think that an increasing sophis-
tication in the economic reasoning of the middle class would also ele-
vate the economic sentiments of the working class and the poor, 
translating into a more propitious effect on policy making? Pigou did 
not address these questions. 
4. How to Think About Economic Policy  
4.1. Lessons in Labor Problems following the Great War 
By early 1915, expectations on the part of all major belligerents of a 
short European war of only a few months had been shattered. The 
rapid mobility that marked the early weeks of the war was succeeded 
by relative stasis: hundreds of kilometers of fixed and deeply en-
trenched forces on both sides of the Western Front and a system of 
industrialized killing and destruction with no end in sight. In Febru-
ary and December 1915, Pigou published two articles for a general 
readership explaining the anticipated costs of the war (Pigou, 1915a; 
1915b). They were followed by two public lectures at Cambridge on 
the same theme in January-February 1916 (Cambridge University Re-
porter, 25/1/1916, 469) and an article in the Contemporary Review on 
the distributive impact of the costs (Pigou, 1916b). In spring 1916, he 
published a “little book”—The Economy and Finance of the War—that 
drew heavily on the earlier material and provided a more thorough 
account of the costs of the war and how they might be covered 
(Pigou, 1916c, 5).6 The book concluded with a brief chapter, “After the 
War,” sketching the critical problems Britain would face once a peace 
accord had been reached: demobilization, an immense national debt, 
redistribution of national income to the disadvantage of workers, and 
a vigorous economic boom that would surely be followed by a disas-
trous economic collapse (ibid., 84-89). Still optimistic that the war 
                                                            
6 The economy and finance of the war became leitmotifs of Pigou’s writings for 
the public during and immediately after the war, eventually morphing into his 
classic work: A Study in Public Finance (Pigou, 1928). We have explored this body 
of work, which lies beyond the scope of the present paper, elsewhere 
(Aslanbeigui and Oakes, 2016). 
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would end soon in spite of the continued stalemate on the Western 
Front and the British introduction of conscription in January, he pub-
lished two papers in quick succession on how to understand these 
problems. The first (Pigou, 1916a) was written for leaders of working 
class organizations, the second (Pigou, 1916d) for policy makers. 
On July 21-23, 1916, the Working Class Associations held a confer-
ence at Ruskin College. Established in 1899, named after John Rus-
kin—renowned Victorian art critic and author—and located in Ox-
ford although not one of the Oxford colleges, it offered educational 
opportunities to workers who did not enjoy access to British universi-
ties. Eighty-two delegates from fifty-two working-class organiza-
tions—representing societies of workmen, cooperatives, unions, op-
eratives, managers, and clerks—attended lectures on postwar reor-
ganization of industry, commerce, and finance. In his contribution on 
“The Disorganization of Industry, Commerce, and Finance: The Prob-
lems to Be Faced,” Pigou considered the postwar predicament of Brit-
ish workers.7 The economic transition to peace, he explained, would 
not be comparable to the economic mobilization for war. The British 
declaration of war was immediately followed by a brief period of 
“shock, confusion and uncertainty.” Stock and foreign exchange mar-
kets collapsed, trade was disrupted, and unemployment ensued. 
However, the war created an enormous demand for personnel and 
military goods, causing a rapid economic rebound (Pigou, 1916a, 5-6). 
Transition to peace would be less simple and more protracted, and 
for several reasons. The immediate postwar increase in consumer 
demand would not offset the extraordinary contraction in demand 
that would follow demobilization. Pervasive unemployment would 
be inevitable, and because the institutional structure of labor ex-
changes that matched job vacancies with labor supply was in its in-
fancy, it could prove durable. Although it was not Pigou’s intention 
to propose policies—he was at the conference to elucidate problems, 
not to offer solutions—he suggested that strengthening the network 
of exchanges could clear labor markets more expeditiously. The eco-
nomic needs of the long-term unemployed could be alleviated by un-
employment insurance, with the understanding that their situation 
was a well-deserved holiday financed by the state (ibid., 6-8).  
Pigou anticipated that at a later stage of demobilization, the econ-
omy would reach a relatively normal state. The economic welfare of 
                                                            
7 In addition to Pigou, three other illustrious presenters were on hand. Arthur 
Greenwood was a civil servant, a Labour Party activist, and the editor of the Ath-
enaeum.  Sidney Webb was a prominent Fabian socialist, one of the founders of 
the New Statesman and the London School of Economics, and a member of the 
governing committee of the Labour Party. Alfred Zimmern was a historian and 
one of the first British academic specialists in international relations. The pro-
ceedings of the conference met with “widespread appreciation.” After the first 
and second printings sold out, demand still remained strong (N.A., 1916, 2). 
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workers during this phase would depend on how the government 
chose to finance the war. He asked his audience to consider two 
modes of financing and explore their implications with him: taxation 
and loans, which he had analyzed in earlier publications (see for ex-
ample Pigou, 1916c, 66-83). A heavy reliance on taxes during the war 
would leave insignificant debt to be repaid through postwar tax rev-
enues. On the terms of this policy, the position of workers would de-
pend on the strength of labor supply and demand. Pigou predicted 
that labor supply would approximate immediate prewar levels. Re-
duction in the number of male workers due to wartime casualties 
would be offset by the number of women who, having entered the 
labor force during the war, would continue to work after an armistice. 
Postwar labor demand could also be expected to return to prewar 
levels. Because the war was not fought on British soil, widespread 
destruction of British capital stock was unlikely. Nor did Pigou antic-
ipate substantial depreciation. Capital stock, which was indispensable 
to the prosecution of the war, would be protected from wear and tear. 
Ruling out major shifts in labor market conditions and assuming in-
dustrial peace, he predicted average postwar real wages to settle 
around prewar levels, forming a basis for peacetime wage negotia-
tions. Strikes and lockouts, however, were very likely. Thus the ma-
chinery of industrial peace—an institutional structure that established 
systematic procedures for conciliation, mediation, and arbitration—
would be critical. Failure to create such a structure would mean that a 
new era of European peace would be marred by industrial war in 
Britain (Pigou, 1916a, 8-10).  
Pigou also spelled out in simple and stark terms the implications 
for workers of accumulating a large national debt. If the state fi-
nanced the war by borrowing, it would be compelled to repay loans 
through increased postwar tax revenues. Indirect taxes—a regressive 
mode of taxation—would punish workers disproportionately. If, on 
the other hand, the state raised revenue through a progressive tax 
system, the rich and the middle classes would pay, sparing the work-
ing class from the debt burden (ibid., 11). 
Shortly after his appearance at Ruskin College—it seems that this 
is the only conference of any kind that he attended in the years of his 
professorship—Pigou published “Labour Problems after the War” in 
Contemporary Review (Pigou, 1916d). Addressing policy makers, he 
foresaw three dangers on the postwar horizon and offered sugges-
tions on how to avert them. The most serious was the prospect of 
widespread labor disputes, an issue he had discussed at Ruskin Col-
lege. Underscoring the importance of creating “tribunals” that would 
resolve such disputes long before they led to strikes or lockouts, he 
argued that legislation was needed to regulate labor relations in “all 
industries of national importance” (ibid., 334). However, legislation 
alone would not be sufficient. The effectiveness of labour tribunals 
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would depend on whether the state provided them with basic guide-
lines on how to arrive at recommendations. Pigou believed that wage 
disputes were the most disruptive of all labor problems and consid-
ered in some detail how the tribunals should proceed after the war. 
Adding more particulars to his Ruskin College presentation, he pro-
posed that immediate prewar real wages form the basis of postwar 
wage negotiations (ibid., 335-340). Although he recognized that post-
war conditions could invalidate any forecast of labor demand and 
supply, he regarded this contingency as inconsequential. It was only 
essential that tribunals accept some level of wages as a preliminary 
basis for negotiations. Otherwise, chaos would ensue. Prewar wage 
levels had a “far better chance of acceptance with goodwill by people 
in general,” he supposed, than any alternative. The benefits of pre-
venting strikes and lockouts would far outweigh the cost of imperfect 
forecasts (ibid., 340). 
The second major problem that merited the attention of policy 
makers was postwar labor immobility. Reallocating the demobilized 
workforce would be complicated and most likely hampered by igno-
rance of market conditions on the part of economic agents and the 
costs they would incur in moving from one occupation or industry to 
another. Pigou believed that, in principle, labor exchanges could facil-
itate postwar mobility. Because many labor decisions took place out-
side the exchange system, however, the Labour Exchanges Act of 
1909 had been relatively ineffective. A new parliamentary act was in 
order to perfect the system, ensuring that it would be “in complete 
readiness to act” when needed, and Pigou offered several suggestions 
on how parliamentarians might approach this problem (ibid., 342). 
The act would require all businesses in an area to register with the 
local labor exchange, listing jobs for their workers who had served in 
the war. In the first six months of transition, businesses would also be 
required to employ any additional workers through the exchanges or 
inform them immediately of any labor contracts made without their 
assistance. In addition, the act would direct workers to register with 
the local exchange in their last place of employment. Any war bonus 
or gratuity intended for returning war veterans would be paid 
through the exchanges. A list of registered workers classified accord-
ing to their industrial background and the date they registered would 
be maintained by the exchanges and distributed to prospective em-
ployers. Exchanges would also share lists of local labor shortages or 
surpluses. Pigou did not believe that the institutional arrangements 
he proposed would eliminate the threat of unemployment altogether. 
Those who failed to find jobs would receive state-sponsored unem-
ployment benefit paid through the exchanges until the system offered 
them employment suitable for their skills and at commonly accepted 
wage rates (ibid., 342-343). At a minimum, his legislative primer gave 
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parliamentarians rudimentary but indispensable ideas they could use 
in planning how to draft legislation.  
A third postwar problem was tied to the generally accepted belief 
that the war would be followed by “an enormous volume of unem-
ployment.” Based on this belief, the public called for the implementa-
tion of job creation programs immediately after the advent of peace, 
to be sponsored by both local authorities and the central government. 
Pigou thought that a postwar phase of national pessimism and mass 
unemployment was exceedingly unlikely. Excessive optimism was 
much more probable, with the potential of “a tremendous industrial 
boom” and a vast misallocation of resources. In Pigouvian economic 
logic, postwar enthusiasm to repair and renew assets neglected dur-
ing the war would create a fleeting but robust demand in engineering 
and construction. National and local public work projects would ex-
acerbate this demand and attract more men into these lines of work. 
However, the demand would fall in two to three years, resulting in a 
“serious slump” for builders, construction workers, and engineers. A 
“cautious and conservative banking policy” was the more prudent 
course, forestalling a boom by “mercilessly” deterring “wild-cat 
schemes.” Public economic welfare would be best served by ignoring 
the “inevitable popular clamour” for public works, delaying them 
until the boom in the industries affected had evaporated (ibid., 344-
345). 
Although Pigou offered qualified and contingent policy proposals 
in his writings and addresses on the economics of the war in 1915-
1916, they were ancillary to his main objective: to elevate the level of 
public economic discourse on the war by engaging audiences with 
plainspoken argument. He regarded the problems raised by postwar 
fiscal policy as fraught with dangers. Ill-founded decisions by policy 
makers acting on misguided public expectations would damage Brit-
ish interests for years by obstructing a smooth transition to a robust 
peacetime economy. In his speeches and writings on the transition to 
peace, Pigou addressed both the public and their political representa-
tives in order to illuminate the difficulties that could be anticipated.  
4.2. Elucidating Interwar Austerity Policy  
In autumn 1931, Neville Chamberlain, British Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer, was struggling with the consequences of the European fi-
nancial crisis precipitated by the collapse in May of Credit-Anstalt, 
the largest Austrian commercial bank. In June and July, its failure had 
caused a run on German banks, which had borrowed heavily from 
British financial institutions. The judgment in Whitehall was that na-
tionalization of several German banks and standstill arrangements 
that protected debtors and postponed debt amortization had dam-
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aged British finance, resulting in a loss of confidence in the sterling.8 
With a view to reestablishing the standing of the pound, Chamberlain 
proposed several measures—chiefly protective and preferential tariffs 
as well as deep cuts in public-sector wages and unemployment insur-
ance—but he declared himself at a loss to know where additional 
public economies might be found.9 Existing austerity measures were 
deeply unpopular. Pensions for war veterans, the aged, and widows 
were generally regarded as politically untouchable; the same might 
hold true for health and unemployment insurance. In the end, he reg-
istered a vague hope that two government committees appointed to 
investigate local public works expenditure would shortly determine 
whether substantial savings in providing local services were feasible 
(The Times, 1932a).  
On October 12, The Times published a letter from Francis Wrigley 
Hirst, a free-trade journalist and former editor of The Economist (1907-
1916). Was it not, Hirst asked, the job of the Chancellor to determine 
where and how it was prudent to cut expenditure (Hirst, 1932)? 
Hirst’s letter became grist for an editorial leader that same day. In the 
view of the editors, British public policy, routinely oscillating be-
tween indefensible extremes of enthusiasm for state expenditure and 
zealous advocacy of parsimony, had no basis in careful analysis. They 
issued an invitation to all economists to specify the circumstances 
under which expansionary or contractionary measures would benefit 
the public, hoping that it was “not too late to think out and apply 
consistently over a period of years a policy combining wise saving 
with wise spending” (The Times, 1932b).  
Into the breach created by this challenge stepped Pigou, who 
drafted a response and contacted Keynes on tactics for recruiting sig-
natories whose endorsement would carry weight, “creating an im-
pression of authoritative opinion.” The public, Pigou thought, would 
see a well-crafted consensus statement made by leaders of the field as 
incontrovertible. To maximize the public impact of the letter, he sug-
gested several economists of great repute. Edwin Cannan was the 
president of the Royal Economic Society. D.H. Macgregor held the 
Drummond Professorship in Political Economy at Oxford, and Wil-
liam Beveridge was director of the London School of Economics 
(LSE). Robertson was a reader at Cambridge, and G.D.H. Cole held 
the same position at Oxford. Walter Layton was editor of The Econo-
mist, and Henry Clay was an advisor to the Bank of England. And of 
course there was Pigou himself. He also proposed three economists 
who enjoyed a substantial reputation as “men of affairs:” Keynes, Jo-
                                                            
8 On the Austrian, German, and British financial crises of 1931, see Accominotti 
(2012), Eichengreen and Jeanne (2000), Forbes (1987), James (2002), Schubert 
(1992), and Williams (1963). 
9 On the British imperial preference system in the interwar period, see Glickman 
(1947) and Drummond (2006). 
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siah Stamp, and Arthur Salter. In his thinking, reception of the state-
ment would depend not only on substance, style, and rhetoric. The 
prestige of the signatories might be paramount. Since men of affairs 
were well-known, it was best to place the name of Beveridge or 
Stamp in first place. As for academics, “it is not the names, but the 
positions that would carry weight” (two letters from Pigou to Keynes, 
October 12, 1932, JMK/CAC/1). 
Keynes found Pigou’s draft “excellent” and dispatched it to all the 
economists on his list except Clay, Cole, and Robertson. In the end, 
Layton, Salter, Stamp, and Macgregor signed (letters from Keynes to 
Pigou and Cannan, October 13, 1932, JMK/CAC/1). Macgregor’s 
name was placed first, followed by Pigou, Keynes, Layton, Salter, and 
Stamp. Although the signatories acknowledged that they did not 
speak for all economists, they doubted that many economists would 
dispute their position. Noting that during the Great War voluntary 
reduction in private consumption had released resources that could 
be spent more fruitfully in waging the war, they argued that circum-
stances were markedly different in 1932. If households increased sav-
ings, resources they released would not be consumed by “an insatia-
ble war machine” or invested in capital construction by either the 
public or the private sector. On the contrary, a reduction in consump-
tion would exacerbate the pessimism of investors planning to build 
factories and equipment with the objective of producing consumer 
goods. The same argument held for local authorities, who generally 
built swimming pools, libraries, and museums. By foregoing expendi-
ture, those who practiced austerity would become “martyrs by mis-
take,” damaging themselves as well as others. The principal conse-
quence of this error in economic reasoning was clear. “Through their 
misdirected good will the mounting wave of unemployment will be 
lifted still higher” (Macgregor et al., 1932a) 
The letter, published October 17, 1932, generated considerable con-
troversy. Sympathetic readers made various suggestions for expendi-
ture. Edwin Thompson, who had been Lord Mayor of Liverpool in 
1930-31, estimated that half a million British men could afford to buy 
new suits, hats, or shoes on the following day or at least for Christ-
mas. “What a miniature boom in trade would be created!” Cecilia 
Boston of Compton, Guilford, in Surrey, proposed that each affluent 
individual spend modest sums on families who were struggling eco-
nomically. And Raymond Unwin, an influential architect and social 
reformer, recommended that local authorities borrow idle bank de-
posits for building construction to alleviate the perennial British 
shortage of adequate housing (Thompson, 1932; Boston, 1932; Unwin, 
1932).  
Pigou’s plan also came under attack from both professional and 
arm-chair economists. Ernest Benn, publisher and laissez-faire publi-
cist, and one W.W. Paine co-authored a response that registered a 
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profound distaste for reasoning by analogy from expenditure by pri-
vate citizens to expenditure by local authorities. Private spending, if 
devoted to “fruitful and worthy objects” and not “mere luxuries,” 
was indispensable in creating employment. Expenditure on libraries, 
museums, and swimming pools, on the other hand, was a futile way 
to address the nation’s unemployment problem. Writing on the as-
sumption that the magnitude of loanable funds was fixed, they fault-
ed the signatories for failing to grasp that all spending for public 
works inevitably reduced available funds once business confidence 
returned. At that point, expenditure on plant and equipment would 
produce “50 or 100 times the amount of employment” that could be 
expected from public works (Benn and Paine, 1932).  
A joint letter from four distinguished economists at LSE—T.E. 
Gregory, F.A. von Hayek, Arnold Plant, and Lionel Robbins—took 
essentially the same line, arguing that the analysis of unemployment 
policy must answer three questions: Was it wise to hoard money? If 
not, was it preferable to spend or to invest? Finally, were private and 
public investment equivalent? The LSE answer to the first question 
was consistent with Pigou’s. Hoarding money was deflationary and 
economically unsound in a depression. There was disagreement on 
the other questions. Pigou and his co-signatories seemed to think that 
all expenditure—whether on consumption or investment—was  
equally productive, a view the LSE economists rejected. The world 
economy faced the daunting problem of a depression in investment. 
They argued that buying existing securities, a form of saving, would 
increase bond prices and, following a time lag, stimulate new issues 
of securities that would support investment in plant and equipment. 
It was “little short of disaster” for Pigou and company to suggest that 
purchasing securities or depositing money in building societies 
would damage economic recovery. In their view, the most egregious 
error of the letter of October 17 was its support for deficit spending. 
Creating additional public debt would increase interest rates and re-
duce investment. The most effective policy for unemployment lay in 
eliminating obstacles to “trade and free movement of capital” (Grego-
ry et al., 1932; see also Cannan, 1932). 
The LSE letter demonstrated that one of Pigou’s cherished convic-
tions about the discipline of economics was naïve at best. There was, 
he thought, a large “central core of economic truth” essentially un-
contested by professionals. Disagreements arose at the margins or on 
issues of relative unimportance, such as the choice of more or less 
equivalent analytical techniques or terminological preferences. The 
LSE letter showed that the scope of consensus was much narrower 
than Pigou had supposed. If that was the case, the project of public 
economic enlightenment might prove to be contentious and protract-
ed, a possibility he had not anticipated.  
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In a subsequent letter to The Times, Pigou and his colleagues tried 
to clarify “a fundamental confusion” that could “render discussion 
futile and paralyse remedial action.” The confusion lay in an implicit 
but decisive assumption underpinning the objections of critics: the 
premise that the economy was always at full employment. If that 
were the case, increased expenditure on public pools and museums 
would indeed reduce funds available for private investment. Howev-
er, the premise was catastrophically mistaken. As “conclusive evi-
dence of unemployment statistics” demonstrated, current resources 
were far from being fully employed. It followed that under prevailing 
conditions, deployment of idle resources would increase national in-
come and hence the funds needed for private investment. The as-
sumption of full employment in an era of unemployment, Pigou and 
his colleagues wrote, “misses the whole point of our contention” 
(Macgregor et al., 1932b). 
In “Economy and Waste”—a public lecture delivered at LSE in 
1934—Pigou examined the implications of the above arguments for 
austerity. Confusions and misunderstandings, in his view, had bela-
bored an essentially straightforward matter, with “disastrous conse-
quences” for policy. The controversy over austerity, therefore, gave 
Pigou an ideal occasion to make a case for public economic enlight-
enment: “the need for popular expositions of very simple truths, 
about which among serious students there is little or no dispute”—a 
curious observation in light of the joint LSE letter two years earlier 
(Pigou, 1935, 26). Pigou hoped to clarify the issues at stake by a series 
of rudimentary, step-by-step analyses. He began by identifying land, 
labor, and capital as productive resources. In a market economy such 
as Britain, resources were allocated by millions of independent deci-
sions made by private economic actors as well as public authorities. 
Although the outcome of these decisions was clear, the process that 
led to them was not. It was the complexity of the process of resource 
allocation that led to confusion. Once this process began, “the fog of 
misunderstanding” enveloped not only resource allocation decisions, 
but “the simple fundamental facts as well” (ibid., 31).  
The effects of an economizing campaign depended on the state of 
the economy. Pigou asked his audience to distinguish a long-run 
economy, defined by full employment, from an economy in the short-
run, in which unemployment is a distinct possibility. In the long run, 
or during a war, there were three types of waste: (1) technical ineffi-
ciencies due to incompetence; (2) allocation of resources to sectors 
that employ them less productively than they could be used else-
where; (3) and allocation of resources that responded to the demands 
of “plutocrats,” neglecting the needs of the poor. Assuming full em-
ployment and no waste, a governmental economizing campaign 
would allow the private sector to employ more resources and in-
crease production. In the short run, on the other hand, the economy 
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could easily experience a fourth type of waste: unemployment. In that 
case, an economizing campaign would have quite different conse-
quences. Cutting public expenditure by reducing either public bor-
rowing or taxation would increase the size of idle balances. Because 
the funds released would not be used by the private sector, re-
sources—especially labor—would become idle. Pigou believed that 
the case against economizing in the Great Depression was as clear as 
the argument in its favor during the Great War. Increasing public ex-
penditures in recessions would create economic benefits as long as 
their rate of return was higher than zero (ibid., 36, 48). 
If Chamberlain’s austerity campaign was so obviously wrong-
headed, how had it become official policy? Pigou blamed the highly 
complex nature of the Depression, the consequences of which were 
magnified by a government deficit, a run on the pound, and a politi-
cal crisis. The austerity campaign began when the government at-
tempted to establish fiscal discipline, balance the budget, and restore 
confidence in the sterling—all necessary to maintain the gold stand-
ard. Although economizing at the local level had no bearing on this 
objective, it was quickly adopted; nor did it end in 1931, when the 
gold standard was abandoned and the need for balanced budgets 
disappeared. A simple confusion had led to a deeply flawed policy. 
Policy errors, economic damage, and incalculable human suffering 
could have been avoided if political leaders and the public had 
achieved a proper understanding of basic economics. “Our national 
education in elementary economics,” Pigou concluded, “is still in-
complete” (ibid., 49-50). 
4.3. A Public Tutorial on the British Economy  
following World War Two 
In the 1930s, Pigou wrote chiefly about unemployment, which ranged 
between 8.5 and 17 percent. For most of the decade, inflation was in-
significant, and he ignored it. The economic landscape of the decade 
following World War II differed dramatically, with the average un-
employment rate a mere 1.63 percent and the actual rate never ex-
ceeding 2.2 percent. These historically low rates can be explained by a 
number of factors, including the commitment of the government to 
maintaining full employment. The average inflation rate, on the other 
hand, was over 5 percent during the same decade. In February 1948, 
Sir Stafford Cripps, Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced a policy 
of wage restraint that enjoyed trade union support and stabilized the 
inflation rate for two years. However, that policy could not withstand 
the cost pressures created by the 1949 devaluation of the sterling by 
30 percent. After their full impact on the economy, the inflation rate 
rose above 9 percent for two consecutive years (1951-1952). Pigou’s 
worries over the conjunction of a policy of full employment, wage 
increases, inflation, staggering balance of payment problems, and fur-
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ther damage to the country’s currency seemed to have been con-
firmed.10  
In 1949, Pigou delivered the Stamp Memorial Lecture at LSE, 
choosing as his theme “Wage Statistics and Wage Policy.” Taking 
note of trends in wages over the previous seven decades, he explored 
two questions with his audience of economics students and members 
of the public: Under what conditions could workers increase their 
wages without creating adverse economic consequences? And what 
could be expected if these conditions were not met (Pigou, 1949b, 26)? 
In considering the first question, he employed standard neoclassical 
reasoning. If markets were imperfect and labor was exploited—wages 
falling below the value of the marginal product—higher nominal 
wages would increase real wages without creating unemployment. In 
perfectly competitive markets, a nominal wage increase would have 
the same effect, at least on the assumption that the wage increase was 
followed by a proportionate increase in labor productivity. In all oth-
er cases, a real wage increase would lead to higher unemployment 
rates.  
In 1949, Britain was in a liminal state, executing a protracted tran-
sition from total mobilization for war to a peacetime economy. Gain-
ing new powers during the war and energized by the monumental 
victory of the Labour Party in the general election of July 1945, work-
ers had strengthened both their absolute and relative economic posi-
tion through large increases in real wages (Pigou, 1949b; Bowers, 
1985; Rollings, 1988). And yet higher rates of unemployment were not 
in sight. How could this apparent anomaly be explained? Pigou be-
lieved that the explanation lay in political expectations of the public. 
The postwar British citizen had imposed a “primary duty” on the 
government to avert high rates of unemployment. However, this ex-
pectation entailed dangers that had not been understood. Without the 
deterrent of unemployment, a wage-price spiral could ensue, result-
ing in uncontrolled inflation that would punish people on fixed in-
comes and damage creditors. Such an eventuality would also make 
British exports more expensive, exacerbating balance of payments 
difficulties that threatened to reduce Britain to penury (Pigou, 1949b, 
30-31). The Stamp Memorial Lecture was only one entry in a public 
tutorial that Pigou conducted in lectures and in print during the years 
following the war. His theme was to explain how wages, inflation, 
and balance of payments were connected. The public had not grasped 
the risks inherent in these connections, which were invisible in the 
political discourse of the time. However, they could be exposed by 
elementary economic arguments. 
                                                            
10 On the economic history of Britain in the interwar years and after World War II, 
see Matthews (1968); Welles (1950); iCalculator (2009-2018); and Social Democra-
cy for the 21st Century (2013). 
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In 1948, Pigou had addressed these problems in The Economic Jour-
nal by considering food subsidies and the question of their elimina-
tion.11 Between November 1947, when Cripps became Chancellor, and 
July 1948, the estimated annual cost of subsidies had risen by 17.5 
percent to a sum of £470 million (The Times, 1948). What, Pigou asked, 
“ought to be done about these subsidies now” (Pigou, 1948, 204-205)? 
He claimed that economists generally agreed that food subsidies had 
no place in “normal peace-time policy.” Firstly, they were a mode of 
income redistribution; but there were more effective methods for 
transferring income from the rich to the poor—allowances for chil-
dren, health insurance, and old-age pensions among them. Secondly, 
they misallocated resources, drawing them into a sector that became 
spuriously profitable. However, the decision on whether to retain 
food subsidies did not rest on an assumption of economic normality. 
Under the extraordinary circumstances of postwar Britain, the chief 
question to consider was the consequences that would follow if the 
subsidies were eliminated or substantially reduced (ibid., 205). 
In answering this question, Pigou examined two policies: reducing 
both subsidies and taxes, and reducing subsidies and using the pro-
ceeds to increase the state budget surplus (ibid., 206-207). Assuming a 
fixed exchange rate and no demands for wage increases following the 
reduction, Pigou analyzed the consequences of both policies. By cut-
ting taxes, the government would weaken the disincentives of a 
steeply progressive tax system that had benefitted workers enor-
mously at the price of penalizing investors. Workers, who stood to 
gain from higher economic growth, could tolerate higher food prices. 
On the other hand, if the government used its savings to increase its 
budget surplus, a “considerable disinflationary effect” would follow. 
Consumers would not dramatically reduce their consumption of 
food, a necessity for survival. Instead they would cut discretionary 
consumption, thereby reallocating resources to the export sector and 
alleviating the current-account deficit (ibid., 208). Thus each policy 
had merits. 
In Pigou’s analysis, the crux of the policy decision was not a choice 
between cutting taxes and increasing the budget surplus. On the con-
trary, it was the question of how workers would respond to the with-
drawal of subsidies. If they acquiesced in a policy of wage restraint, 
food subsidies could be cut immediately regardless of how the sav-
ings might be invested. But if they demanded generous wage increas-
es to cover higher food prices, he was reasonably certain that the 
weight of public opinion would support them. In light of the prospect 
of worker intransigence, the prudent course was to retain subsidies 
because of their anti-inflationary effect (ibid., 209). 
                                                            
11 Although Pigou’s article “The Food Subsidies” was initially published in The 
Economic Journal (1948), it was reproduced in his Essays in Economics (1952), a 
compilation intended for the general reader. 
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In “The inflationary Gap,” an article Pigou wrote in 1951 and pub-
lished in Essays in Economics (1952), he considered how the war and 
its aftermath had transformed the office of the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer. Before the war, he claimed, the primary obligation of the 
Chancellor was to forecast government expenditures and ensure that 
revenues sufficient to cover them would be in place. Following the 
war, the job had become much more complex, requiring forecasts of 
the magnitude of national income and foreign loans as well as their 
allocation among private and public consumption and investment. In 
addition to meeting the expenses of the state, the Chancellor was re-
sponsible for preventing three economic perils: mass unemployment, 
sustained high inflation—which could end in monetary collapse and 
socioeconomic chaos—and continuous balance of payments problems 
on a scale that would place the nation “under the continuing threat of 
a large crisis” (Pigou, 1952, 167-169). Pigou ruled out the possibility of 
mass unemployment on the grounds of “a general conviction” that it 
was “an intolerable social evil” (ibid., 168). Thus his focus on inflation 
and current-account deficits.  
In Pigouvian economics, an inflationary gap appeared when ag-
gregate demand consistently outstripped aggregate supply. Two 
forces could create such a gap: chronic increases in government 
spending that were not offset by reductions in private expenditure; 
and large increases in nominal wages in the absence of rising produc-
tivity or a threat of mass unemployment (ibid., 170-171). The Chancel-
lor, who assumed that government expenditure was the real cause, 
faced several strikingly unattractive options. Reductions in public 
expenditure on education, housing, the civil service, or the judiciary 
would “arouse a violent outcry” (ibid., 174). The public would also 
strenuously oppose cuts in transfer payments such as retirement ben-
efits, food subsidies, or health expenditures for the poor. Finally, a 
monetary policy that cut private spending by raising interest rates 
would have the unpalatable consequence of increasing the cost the 
Treasury incurred for borrowing. If the inflationary gap was caused 
by wage policy, the Chancellor’s options were no better. He could try 
to contain wage increases by persuasion—essentially bargaining with 
trade union leaders. Although the Chancellor’s 1948 policy of wage 
restraint had been supported by trade unions for a few years, Pigou 
regarded this tactic as unreliable, particularly when wage pressures 
were caused by factors over which workers had no control such as 
higher costs of food due to bad harvests or higher prices of imports 
(ibid., 167-177). Suppose that the Chancellor attempted to appease 
workers by means of a quid pro quo agreement of wage restraint in 
exchange for higher transfer payments or reduced tax rates. Pigou 
had no confidence here either, since workers regarded the latter bene-
fits as “their due in any case” (ibid., 178-179). A more radical measure 
would force wage rates down by increasing unemployment, a hope-
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lessly unrealistic idea. “In the present climate of opinion a Chancellor 
who brought this about would soon lose his office” (ibid., 179-180). 
Pigou, therefore, guided readers through a thicket of modestly diffi-
cult arguments, each of them suggesting that current inflationary 
problems were essentially irresolvable. Pigouvian public economic 
enlightenment could obviously lead to cheerless results. In his view, 
the postwar British state had created an institutional structure and 
validated public economic expectations that made the execution of 
sound economic policy impossible.  
Pigou’s contemporary reputation is based largely on his analyses 
of circumstances under which the state can improve on market out-
comes. In writing for the public on how to think about policies in-
tended to improve economic welfare, he invariably employed the 
case-by-case logic that forms the methodological basis of his academic 
economic analyses, arguing that a policy that might succeed in some 
historical conditions would be likely to fail in others. This historicist 
premise and its commitment to the contingency and relativity of eco-
nomic life are evident in what he wrote on Chamberlain’s economiz-
ing campaign in the 1930s. He was convinced that the immanent dy-
namic of markets operated on a long-run, self-correcting mechanism. 
Thus policies that he believed might undermine the efficient opera-
tion of this mechanism were never on his agenda. However, he was 
also convinced that the conditions under which markets could be ex-
pected to self-correct varied with historical circumstances. Policies 
favorable to self-correction in peacetime might fail badly in wartime. 
The same consideration held for the efficacy of policies in periods of 
high and low unemployment. The latter conviction was prominent in 
his account of the dangers of a post-1945 wage-inflation spiral. If Brit-
ain allowed political management of economic policy to override the 
inner logic of market mechanisms, elimination of the threat of unem-
ployment would destroy the ability of markets to self-adjust. In that 
event, economic havoc would ensue. 
5. Public Economic Enlightenment and the  
Principle of Nonpartisanship 
Our analysis explores Pigou’s conception of the responsibility of 
economists to educate the British public on the fundamentals of eco-
nomic policy. However, he also considered a larger question regard-
ing the role of economists in public life. The British polity, as Pigou 
understood it, was a sphere of perpetual conflict in which political 
parties contended for ascendancy on issues of both principle and 
power. In the Pigouvian project of public enlightenment, what was 
the proper role of the economist in this struggle?  
In “An Economist’s Apologia,” one of the public lectures Pigou 
gave at LSE in 1934, he noted the increasingly important role that 
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economics had come to play in political controversy—“partisan polit-
ical debate,” as he called it. If he took a jaundiced view of this phe-
nomenon, it was because he believed that politicians first decided on 
a course to pursue, only then considering arguments that were favor-
able to their position. British politicians, it seemed, did not employ 
economic reasoning as a way to arrive at the truth but as “a kind of 
brickbat useful on occasion for inflicting injury on their opponents.” 
Pigou counseled economists not only to establish distance from polit-
ical controversy, but to cultivate a “detached mind.” Young econo-
mists ambitious to play a role in public affairs should not be tempted 
to trim their conclusions in order to conform to the interests of a polit-
ical party. Borrowing from the biblical story of Jacob’s older twin 
brother Esau, who traded his birthright to Jacob for a bowl of lentils, 
Pigou’s lesson was severe: the economist who yields to this tempta-
tion commits “an intellectual crime” by selling “his birthright in the 
household of truth for a mess of political pottage” (Pigou, 1935, 8-9). 
This uncompromising ethic was reaffirmed in the lecture “One Way 
of Looking at Economics,” delivered at the University of London in 
1950. Here he insisted that the economist not become an advocate of 
political ideology or an apologist for a political party, faction, or 
movement. Economists were bound by “one clear duty”: commitment 
to truth, an unconditional imperative demanding “single-minded ve-
racity.” Above all, “they must not look about for arguments designed 
to support some particular set of politicians.” Thus the Pigouvian 
prescription against political partisanship on the part of economists. 
Because the economist was a “servant of society,” he “must own no 
unconditional allegiance to any party” (in Pigou, 1952, 82, 84).12 
Can Pigou’s principle of nonpartisanship accommodate the project 
of public economic enlightenment? Is public economic enlightenment 
situated beyond political values, transcending all interests that might 
jeopardize a commitment to the truths of economic science? Partisan-
                                                            
12 Is it paradoxical that Pigou had full confidence in the British state but was skep-
tical of the competence of British politicians and not averse to cutting observa-
tions on their powers of reasoning and integrity? Can his celebration of the Brit-
ish polity be reconciled with the disdain he sometimes expressed for its politi-
cians? Before convicting him of inconsistency on this point, we should consider 
that Pigou made an implicit but unequivocal distinction between the institutions 
of political power and the persons who held political office. He had no doubts 
about the soundness of the British political order. After centuries of evolution, its 
structures and performance had improved immensely, especially since the Victo-
rian era, producing corresponding benefits for the public. However, he believed 
it was a mistake to conflate political institutions with political actors, which he 
seems to have regarded as a fallacy of composition. The British state set interna-
tional standards for expertise and probity. British political leaders, on the other 
hand, were susceptible to commonplace human frailties—incompetence, indiffer-
ence, avarice, and venality. Although this distinction seems facile and may be 
indefensible, it is Pigou’s distinction, and it explains his firm belief in British po-
litical institutions even as he sometimes found their personnel wanting. 
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ship is an epistemological concept, and its roots lie deeper than the 
policies of British political parties. As a method for enlightening the 
public, Pigouvian economic reasoning is an assessment of policy. An 
assessment presupposes an epistemic locus or premise from which it 
is produced and its merits judged. In his work on the economic dislo-
cations following the Great War, the austerity policy of the 1930s, and 
wage increases and inflation following World War II, Pigou’s premise 
was always the British social order of the day and the welfare of the 
British public. In his view, the existing regime of established institu-
tions could not be uncoupled from public well-being: the latter was 
anchored in the former. This was not a politically neutral or nonparti-
san position. The merits of the policies that Pigou assessed could have 
been evaluated from other perspectives that were not only independ-
ent of the established order but inconsistent with it. Consider econo-
mists who yielded to the temptations of the sirens of power and pres-
tige and sold their place in the household of truth. What was the epis-
temic locus of that household? Even if the basis of Pigouvian nonpar-
tisanship were granted—the economist as servant of society—there is 
no politically neutral conception of the British social order of his era. 
It can be understood from a variety of divergent positions, each of 
which is arguably consistent with the facts of British life. Should Brit-
ish institutions be conceived from the standpoint of the New Liberal-
ism or the Fabianism of Pigou’s early career? Toryism in its various 
incarnations? The Labour Party of the 1920s, the shop-floor socialism 
of the Trade Union Congress, or the political philosophy of the wel-
fare state? There are other possibilities. Each potentially legitimate 
but contestable conception of British society defines a political space 
in which the work of public economic enlightenment can take place. 
But none of these positions is politically neutral. 
The principle of nonpartisanship seems to entail two possibilities 
for publicly engaged Pigouvian economists, and neither is appealing. 
Either economists who labor in the household of truth serve some 
version of the established order, in which case they violate Pigou’s 
principle of nonpartisanship. Or they serve in some politically trans-
cendent world, occupying a household of truth situated in a meta-
physical sphere beyond partisanship. In the latter case, they are mys-
terious godlike analysts, “detached minds” hovering over the contin-
gencies of economic and political life. If this argument is sound, Pigou 
has dug an epistemological pit and fallen into it. His conception of 
public economic enlightenment ends in the choice: partisanship or 
metaphysics.  
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Wisconsin Institutionalism, Public 
Persuasion, and Public Science  
Marianne Johnson* 
 
This paper makes use of the wealth of materials left by Wisconsin institu-
tionalists to consider how they thought about economics as public science 
and as public persuasion. Considered is how the philosophy of pragma-
tism and an emphasis on empiricism manifested in economics practice at 
Wisconsin. To understand why the empirical method—encompassing 
field studies, data collection and organization, and case studies—was so 
important to the Wisconsin institutionalists requires recognizing that their 
work was empirical in a very specific way. The Wisconsin economists 
chose their studies with definite reform goals in mind—reforms that could 
be achieved either through regulatory changes or by a change of law. 
They engaged in constructive research—research specifically designed to 
identify problems and potential solutions. That the Wisconsin institution-
alists generated substantial amounts of materials that repeatedly demon-
strated the same findings was an artifact of what they wanted to accom-
plish. 
Keywords: Wisconsin institutionalism, Commons (John R.), Ely (Richard 
T.), field work, persuasion, policymaking, public engagement, public 
science 
L’institutionnalisme du Wisconsin, la persuasion et la science publique 
Cet article profite de la richesse des archives des institutionnalistes du 
Wisconsin pour étudier leur conception de l’économie comme science 
publique et comme outil de persuasion publique. Dans leur pratique de 
l’économie se manifeste un usage de la philosophie pragmatique avec un 
accent sur l’empirisme. Afin de comprendre la centralité de la méthode 
empirique – études de terrain, collecte et organisation de données, études 
de cas – pour ces auteurs institutionnalistes, il est nécessaire de 
reconnaître la spécificité du caractère empirique de leurs travaux. Les 
économistes du Wisconsin choisissaient leurs études en ayant déjà en tête 
des objectifs de réformes précis, et qui pouvaient prendre la forme de 
modifications réglementaires ou légales. C’est dans cette optique qu’ils 
s’intéressèrent à la « recherche constructive », une recherche conçue pour 
l’identification des problèmes et des potentielles solutions. Le fait que ces 
institutionnalistes aient généré des quantités importantes de documents, 
qui démontraient toujours les mêmes conclusions, indique que ces études 
constituaient un artefact de ce qu’ils voulaient réellement accomplir. 
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Wisconsin Institutionalism was always part political economy and 
part public persuasion.1 How they persuaded is a sweeping story that 
covers more than sixty years, from Richard T. Ely’s admonishment to 
“look and see, ask, listen and learn” (Morehouse, 1969, 18) to Edwin 
E. Witte’s dismay over economists who “think, talk, and write” but 
whose “participation and influence is quite limited” (1957, 2). Rising 
in concert with the Progressive movement, Wisconsin Institutional-
ism articulated an ambitious program of economic and social reform, 
underpinned by ‘the new economics.’ Defined by its empirical focus, 
pioneering statistical data collection, and the use of case studies and 
legal-historical analyses, Wisconsin Institutional economics “had a 
strong empirical bent, rating experience above abstract theory, favor-
ing first-hand investigations and staring with the concrete, practical, 
important near-at-hand” (Groves, 1969a, 4). Wisconsin’s approach to 
economics was deeply intertwined with the ‘Wisconsin Idea’—the 
belief that university-produced knowledge should be used to solve 
problems and improve the lives of citizens of the state (McCarthy, 
1912). An important feature was a close relationship between the uni-
versity and the government. Wisconsin’s economists leveraged their 
expertise to enact legislation and regulatory policy. Though primarily 
associated with labor reforms, they also advocated for social welfare 
legislation, progressive tax reform, government land-use manage-
ment, and public ownership of utilities. In this “the school was dis-
tinguished as much by its attitudes and methods of investigation as 
by its doctrine. It was imbued with a sense of moral purpose and 
aimed at improving the quality of American life” (Groves, 1969a, 4).2 
                                                            
1 Prior to the 1940s, American economics was theoretically and methodologically 
diverse. Institutionalism constituted one important approach, with variations 
centered at Columbia University and the University of Wisconsin, as well as that 
which was associated with Thorstein Veblen but locationally disperse. 
Institutionalism generally has been characterized by (1) emphasis on institutions 
and institutional change, (2) rejection of utility maximization in favor of social 
psychology, (3) empiricism, (4) emphasis on social control, and (5) rejection of 
traditional theories of value and efficiency (Rutherford, 2011). Though 
Institutionalism was only so named in 1918, there is enough similarity in method 
and approach to include Ely and those at Wisconsin during the Progressive era 
and 1910s as proto-Institutionalists. John R. Commons, who would undoubtedly 
qualify as an Institutionalist, arrived at Wisconsin in 1904. 
2 Witte cataloged his fellow Wisconsin Institutionalists “among university 
professors … Harry Mills, Ira Cross, Theresa McMahon, Willian Haber, Ellison 
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A particular feature of Institutionalism was the volume of research 
materials generated.3 The sheer quantity lead Ronald H. Coase to de-
scribe Institutionalism as “a mass of descriptive material waiting for a 
theory, or a fire” (1984, 230). Rather than Coase’s fire, I attempt to 
make sense of these materials as public science. Public science has 
two defining aspects. The first is that the research conducted amongst 
the public, sometimes called participatory action research. This mani-
fested at Wisconsin in voluminous case studies, field researches, in-
terviews, and onsite data gathering. The Institutionalists believed the 
laissez-faire approach that dominated economic theory and practice 
during the previous century had led to vast injustices. Yet, they had 
very little reliable evidence that could confirm convictions or guide 
reform.4 They responded by elevating practical problem solving as 
the central focus of economics study. Rather than be concerned “with 
the explanation of all economic phenomena,” they instead chose to 
focus on “the solution of particular economic problems of immediate 
significance” (Witte, 1954, 133). Wisconsin’s economists believed they 
were called to actively “do something toward directly the great forces 
shaping our lives, and directing them in such a way as to bring im-
provement” (Ely, 1938, 155-156). To do so, they engaged in “construc-
tive research” that would contribute to “constructive democracy” 
(Commons, 1932). Within this public science framework, the “mass of 
                                                                                                                                     
Chambers, Selig Perlman, Don Lescohier, Elizabeth Brandeis, Kenneth Parsons, 
and Harold Groves … of those whose careers were mainly in the public service 
Arthur Altmeyer, William Leiserson, Katharine Lenroot, Ewan Clague, Paul 
Raushenbush, Maud Swett, and Meredith Givens.” A third generation included 
Theodore W. Schultz, Walter Heller, Warren J. Samuels, C. Lloyd Francis, John 
Gronouski, and Robert Lampman (Witte, in Lampman, 1993, 116). One should 
add Wisconsin faculty Thomas S. Adams and Martin Glaeser and students John 
B. Andrews, Irene Osgood Andrews, J. Roy Blough, Florence Peterson, and Helen 
Sumner Woodbury to the list. Historians Charles McCarthy and Frederick 
Jackson Turner and sociologist E. A. Ross also made substantial contributions. 
Not everyone who trained or taught at Wisconsin should be classified as an 
Institutionalist; exceptions include Charles Bullock, Balthasar Meyer, Allyn 
Young, Max Lorenz, Ethel Dietrich, and Alvin Hansen. 
3 Ely published more than 324 articles, books, editorials, and book reviews; he left 
198 boxes of archival documents to the Wisconsin Historical Society (WHS). 
Groves left 48 boxes; Witte left 276 boxes. Altmeyer deposited 36 boxes, and 
Commons 17 boxes. Nearly all of the economists listed in the previous footnote 
left ten or more boxes. Documents include government reports, case studies, field 
research reports, journals, notebooks and histories as well as speeches, editorials, 
journal articles, and correspondence. Ely (1938), Commons (1963), Groves 
(1969b), Lescohier (1960), McMahon (undated; in Theresa Schmid McMahon 
Papers), Ross (1936), and Witte (1963) wrote autobiographies. Because of the 
volume of materials, the approach taken here is necessarily prosopographic. 
4 Data was desperately needed. For example, while working to improve living 
conditions in tenement housing through minimum regulatory standards, 
Commons bemoaned the lack of “any authentic standards of food and prices, 
housing and rents, that would disprove [erroneous] claims” (1908, 319). 
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descriptive material” can be understood as the scientific knowledge 
needed to motivate socioeconomic reforms. 
The second aspect of public science is outreach education. The 
Wisconsin economists understood the importance of this and devoted 
much energy to it. They believed the study of economics would im-
prove the ability of citizens to participate in the democratic process. 
Their work with Chautauqua, the University of Wisconsin Extension, 
labor unions, and civic groups, as well as their drafting of civil service 
and anti-corrupt practices laws, worked to empower the “average 
voter” (McCarthy, 1912, 100). The Wisconsin Institutionalists’ “mass 
of descriptive material” thus includes copious public lectures, syllabi 
and texts for workers schools, and curricula for extension programs. 
Combined with empirical research, the materials can be seen as an 
articulation of how social science should influence politics—
knowledge leading to action, experts showing the way to the public. 
In this, science and persuasion were not wholly separate. 
In the next section, I consider how the philosophy of pragmatism 
and an emphasis on empiricism manifested in economics practice at 
Wisconsin. The ways in which empirical studies were used to stimu-
late legal and regulatory changes is considered in the following sec-
tion. The remainder of the paper examines how the Wisconsin Institu-
tionalists commingled public education and public persuasion to 
achieve their political goals and how this can be understood through 
their vision of economics as a public science. 
1. Knowledge, Science, and Expert Authority 
Several masterful studies have documented the rise of Pragmatism 
and the preference for empirically validated knowledge at the end of 
the 19th century in the United States (Dorfman, 1969; Furner, 2001; 
Leonard, 2016; Ross, 1991). Influenced by Pragmatic thinkers such as 
Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, Institutionalists es-
chewed the natural laws of classical political economy and the deduc-
tive mathematics of neoclassical economics. Instead, they emphasized 
scientific investigation as the basis of logical reasoning combined 
with evaluation and re-evaluation of the consequences. Institutional-
ists such as Morris Copeland and Walton Hamilton emphasized that 
knowledge construction was a process; institutions and laws were 
changeable and indeed should be reconsidered and reformed as 
needed (Rutherford, 2011). Hamilton, in particular, placed enormous 
emphasis on problem solving and producing students who knew 
how to go about solving problems (Rutherford, 2011). 
Wisconsin’s John R. Commons explained that it was not the case 
that “the individualistic philosophies and economics were untrue—
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they were [just] inadequate” for modern industrial society (1939, 32).5 
Eschewing economic treatises in favor of practical evidence, the Wis-
consin Institutionalists saw field reports, case studies, legal histories, 
and statistical summaries as constituting confident scientific 
knowledge (Mitchell, 1924; Samuels, 1991). Though Commons left 
more room for theory than other Wisconsin economists, his approach 
relied on facts to drive action: “theories are broken down into hy-
potheses for particular problems; the hypotheses are tested by exper-
iments to see which of them best fits the facts. If all who investigate 
and are competent can verify the experiments, their agreement is a 
‘science’ … science itself grows to fit the changes and discoveries in 
the facts” (Commons, 1939, 31).6 Institutionalists believed their ap-
proach to economics was therefore more scientific than that adopted 
by deductive economists (Clark, 1927, 221; 271). 
A legacy from the Progressives who venerated science as a mech-
anism to improve all aspects of human life, one particularly appealing 
aspect of Pragmatism was the belief that knowledge should be useful 
(Commons, 1939). For the Wisconsin economists, the starting point of 
analysis was the identification of a problem or problem situation. This 
was followed by investigation of the problem and the proposal of a 
solution—what they called “action research” (Raushenbush and 
Raushenbush, 1979). Both the initial investigation of the problem and 
the experience implementing the solution could produce additional 
knowledge that would lead to a refinement of either the solution or 
the understanding of the initial problem. Thus, both the ends and the 
means were subject to reappraisal as the result of the problem solving 
effort. This sort of thinking led Witte to conclude that Wisconsin Insti-
tutional economics was “not so much a connected body of economic 
thought as a method of approaching economic problems” (1954, 133). 
While the approach was not unique to Wisconsin, being widely 
                                                            
5 Commons was the defining individual of Wisconsin’s Institutionalism. As the 
epicenter of the department for nearly thirty years, he oversaw an expansive 
research agenda and orchestrated nation-wide political advocacy. While 
Commons is perhaps best remembered for his theoretical work, at the time he 
was an active social reformer and nearly all of his students worked on empirical 
problems. His empirical bona fide and his commitment to the study of legal 
precedents cannot be doubted. He was however distinct from other Wisconsin 
Institutionalists in that he “cherished a deep interest in, a certain reverence for” 
economic theorizing. “No economic system was complete in his eyes until it is 
tied into a system of concepts related organically to the reinterpreted concepts of 
the theorists;” this combination of practical study and theory made Commons “a 
bewildering person” (Mitchell, 1924, 240). 
6 The focus of this paper is understanding the volume of Wisconsin 
Institutionalist empirical work as public science. Therefore no consideration is 
given to Commons’ theoretical work (e.g. Commons, 1912), which had little 
contemporary influence. Wesley C. Mitchell argued that even Commons’ theories 
had to be understood in the context of a “historian, reformer, teacher turns 
theorist” (1924, 240). 
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shared by the different variants of Institutionalism, what differentiat-
ed Wisconsin was an emphasis on ‘scientific’ administration as a solu-
tion. Commons argued that “the pragmatic application” of the social 
sciences was “in the new field of Administration” (1939, 33). This 
“fourth branch of government” (ibid) could be more easily be adjust-
ed than could legislation and may have been one reason so many 
Wisconsin-trained economists were attracted to administrative posi-
tions in government.7 
Institutionalists envisioned that expert administrative manage-
ment, informed by scientific study, could improve living standards 
and create a more harmonious society than that which would arise 
under laissez-faire (Furner, 2011; Leonard, 2016). At Wisconsin, E. A. 
Ross (1916) invoked the idea of social engineers. Frederick Jackson 
Turner, a student of Ely’s from Johns Hopkins and his colleague at 
Wisconsin, similarly claimed “general experience and rule-of-thumb 
information are inadequate for the solution of the problems of a de-
mocracy … the very discoveries of science … have made it necessary 
to depend upon the expert” (in McCarthy, 1912, 125). The University 
of Wisconsin quickly became a leading center in the training of such 
experts. Ely joined the faculty in 1892 as the head of the School of 
Economics, Political Science, and History; his hiring of Commons in 
1904 and Ross in 1906 launched the Institutionalist era. Wisconsin 
maintained a position of national importance through the 1940s, op-
erating the fourth largest doctoral program in the country, emphasiz-
ing pragmatic action research.8 
 “Look and see” first manifested in Ely’s Tuesday-night round ta-
ble for graduate students, where he encouraged them to take up his-
torical and investigative studies rather than theoretical subjects (Ely, 
                                                            
7 “To the young Wisconsin Institutionalist … a position in government likely 
seemed more exciting and important than it would have seemed to a graduate 
student trained in a more orthodox program” (Biddle, 1998, 113-114). This was 
particularly true for Wisconsin’s women economists. Katherine Lenroot was 
Chief of the Children’s Bureau, and Helen Witmer was the Director of its 
Division of Research. Elizabeth Paschal was the first female division chief at the 
Social Security Administration. Florence Peterson was the director of industrial 
relations at the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Gertrude Schmidt Weiss served at the 
Department of Labor along with Ruth Scandrett, who was their senior industrial 
economist. Wisconsin economists also had a high profile at the U.S. Department 
of Labor, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Social Security Administration as 
well as at the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin (Johnson, 2018). 
8 Ely’s clever phrasing of “look and see” has obscured the fact that many of the 
19th century laissez-faire economists also engaged in data collection and statistical 
study (Maas and Morgan, 2012). The extent of empirical analysis among different 
schools of economic thought does not obviate the uniqueness of the Wisconsin 
approach; for this group the collecting and recording process was fundamental to 
theory and practice, not ancillary or expository. 
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1923, 12).9 “While we appreciate the work of former economists … 
[we] look not so much to speculation as to the historical and statistical 
study of actual conditions of economic life” claimed Ely (1909, 49). 
Wisconsin’s faculty thus sought to train experts who had “been tried 
the laboratory of public life;” they required the “study of actual prob-
lems rather than study of theory” (McCarthy, 1912, 189). Doctoral dis-
sertations from the early Wisconsin period reflect this focus on fact-
finding as did course work.10 
As early as 1901, the department offered courses where “the statis-
tical method will be applied to the treatment of selected economic 
and social problems … Students are required to do a thorough piece 
of statistical investigation” (University of Wisconsin Bulletin, 1903-
1904, 105). A course in field work appeared in the curriculum from 
1902 to 1905; beginning in 1921, the topic was offered regularly as 
Technique of Field Investigation. More generally, field work was em-
bedded throughout the curriculum, reflecting the departmental belief 
that “continuous study, followed by field work, yields the best re-
sults” (University of Wisconsin Course Bulletin, 1903-1904, 107-108). 
Current events and popular social movements were seen as funda-
mentally important to the study of economics at Wisconsin. Academ-
ic economists were expected to take a stand on contemporary issues, 
addressing policy and practice in the classroom and in public (Kie-
khofer et al., 1935). “Theories that do not influence action” were con-
sidered “arid and useless cerebration” (Arthur Altmeyer Papers, 7 
May 1954, Box 10). 
The earliest Wisconsin economists were preachers who believed 
that experts should not only instruct on how to achieve society’s 
goals, but on what the goals should be. Experts possessed the “divine 
spark” of science, and therefore were uniquely loyal and incorrupti-
ble (Ross, 1916). These Progressives cum proto-Institutionalists 
claimed not only scientific knowledge, but scientific virtue. This shift-
ed in the years following the First World War. The religious drive 
paled and was replaced by a more conventionally technocratic con-
                                                            
9 “Ely made sure that the students at Wisconsin were exposed to exactly the 
opposite type of training [of students at the University of Chicago]. By building a 
staff of former students loyal to his discipleship … he could be certain that the 
instruction at the school was of a reformist type” (Lampman, 1993, 53). 
“Institutional economists have always been very much concerned with the 
discovery and presentation of facts. Institutionalists have a great regard for 
statistics and field studies … Institutional economists have relied far more on 
direct observations than model building” (Witte, 1954, 135). 
10 In Lampman (1993), see Balthasar Meyer’s Railway Legislation in Wisconsin 
(1897), Albert Jenks’ Wild Rice Gathers of the Upper Lakes (1899), George Ray 
Wicker’s Financial History of the New York Colony (1900), B. H. Hibbard’s History of 
Agriculture in Dane County (1902), Raymond Phelan’s Financial History of 
Wisconsin (1906), and Benjamin Rastall’s Labor History of the Cripple Creek District 
(1906). 
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ception of the economic expert. This can be seen as Ely’s Round Table 
gave way to Commons’ Friday Nighters. The emphasis remained on 
pragmatic, investigative work. Commons “had all of his graduate 
students work on some aspects of these [labor] problems … [and] in-
spired work on the practical questions” (Witte, 1954, 131). Even 
through the tenure of Witte in the 1950s, graduate training centered 
on “a thesis devoted to a practical public policy problem” (1954, 140). 
Field work was a common component of dissertation research; the 
process was highly empirical, “collection, classification, and interpre-
tation of the facts” (Furner, 2011, 14).11 The emphasis on field work 
grounded in the historical and contextual evolution of institutions 
sometimes meant that Wisconsin economists were sometimes loath to 
generalize. New situations required new data to correctly formulate 
ameliorative policy; this contributed to the volume of empirical work 
generated. 
Wisconsin’s action research frequently combined field work and 
social reform.12 Commons argued that unlike natural scientists, “eco-
nomic and social scientists cannot be disinterested” (1939, 2). Helen 
Page Bates, Irene Osgood Andrews, Jean Scobie Davis, and Theresa 
Schmid McMahon worked in settlement houses where the data col-
lected was used to argue for social reform, and the inhabitants trained 
to advocate for change. Harold Groves’ work with education unions 
and Don Lescohier’s efforts organizing stove workers were undertak-
en with similar goals. Selig Perlman (1928) maintained that the only 
way to make progress in labor reform was to understand the psy-
chology of the laborer; this could only happen through field research 
and personal interaction. For Perlman, the expert “educated non-
manualists” were “most useful when investigating specific subjects, 
which have definite and calculable bearings upon the workers’ wel-
fare” (1928, 280). 
To understand why the empirical method was so important to the 
Wisconsin Institutionalists requires recognizing that their work was 
empirical in a very specific way. The Wisconsin economists chose 
their studies with definite reform goals in mind—reforms that could 
be achieved either through regulatory changes or by a change of law. 
Commons’ constructive or action research was specifically designed 
                                                            
11 In Lampman (1993), see Frederick Deibler’s Amalgamated Wood-Workers 
International Union (1909), Thomas Crafer’s The Administration of Public Poor Relief 
in Wisconsin and Minnesota (1910), Alex Johnson’s Unemployment in Milwaukee 
During 1908-1909 (1912), Alonzo Cox’s The Milltown Agricultural Community, Polk 
County, Wisconsin (1920), Hirim Jome’s Radio Industry (1925), Harold Groves’ 
Machinist in Industry: A Study of His Craft (1927), Edward Morehouse’s Study of the 
Rochester Clothing Market, 1919-1922 (1927), and Arthur Altmeyer’s Industrial 
Commission of Wisconsin: A Case Study (1931). 
12 This is the tension that Furner (2001) identified between advocacy and 
objectivity, or between economists crusading activism and the necessity of 
scientific, professional standing. 
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to identify problems and potential solutions. “We must bend our en-
ergies as directly as possible toward such studies and investigations 
as will bring about the changes in laws and enforcement that are ob-
viously needed” (O. R. Lovejoy to H. Sumner, 18 July 1911, Helen 
Sumner Woodbury Papers, Box 2, Folder 11). Commons distin-
guished this action research from academic research which sought 
truths but had no concern for practical application and from journal-
istic research which identified problems but did not consider solu-
tions (Chasse, 2017, 135). That the Wisconsin Institutionalists generat-
ed substantial amounts of materials that repeatedly demonstrated the 
same findings was thus an artifact of what they wanted to accom-
plish. 
2. Institutions of Change 
2.1. Regulatory Administration 
The Wisconsin economists were elitists rather than social radicals. 
“The equality of men is a chimera” Ely argued; only a few have “ex-
traordinary capacities” as experts for socio-political leadership (1886, 
97).13 These “Christ-like men” with their “all-encompassing love for 
humanity” had a duty to educate and care for “those beneath them in 
their intellectual, ethical, and social natures” (Ely, 1886, 161). This re-
quired that the state actively work to correct injustices: “the position 
of the strong and the weak must be equalized by a powerful state in-
tervention” (McCarthy, 1912, 46). The necessity of state intervention 
carried over into the Commons’ era, though the motivation shifted 
from the sectarian to the bureaucratic. For Commons, the solution lay 
in “‘Administration’ … the meeting place of social philosophy and 
the collective action that distinguishes present-day economics from 
the nineteenth century abstract philosophies” (1939, 38). Regulatory 
agencies and commissions staffed by experts provided a way to recti-
fy the injustices that arose under laissez-faire. Commons referred to 
this as “the fourth branch of government … an investigational branch 
… [whose] investigations are not the mere search for truth, they are 
designed to improve the conditions within the field” (1939, 38). For, 
as Commons claimed, “administration is investigation” (Commons 
and Andrews, 1916, 416). 
The success of Commons’ Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 
(ICW) provided a roadmap for state and national administrative re-
form. Prior to 1911, various state agencies had existed to oversee Wis-
consin’s labor laws, but enforcement was inconsistent and many as-
pects of working conditions went uncovered. Under Commons’ lead-
ership, the ICW became the dominant labor relations institution in the 
                                                            
13 See Commons (1939, 38) on why experts should not be elected by popular vote. 
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state, its frequent interventions informed by extensive scientific stud-
ies. Empirical research, often undertaken by Commons’ students, lead 
to worker safety regulations, limited working hours for women and 
children, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The ICW served as 
the basis of the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, which was 
well staffed with Wisconsin economists throughout its first decade. 
Later, as American politics became more conservative, regulatory 
administration was used to protect Progressive reforms. 
Wisconsin-trained economists were disproportionately represent-
ed at all levels of government (Biddle, 1998; Johnson, 2018; Ruther-
ford, 2011), as the Wisconsin Institutional method was well-suited to 
the day-to-day work of government economists. Many of the econo-
mists who trained at Wisconsin started their careers as government 
researchers, hired based on their field work experience. Katharine 
Lenroot and Emma Lundberg oversaw extensive surveys of the juve-
nile court system for the Children’s Bureau. Lundberg’s Public Aid to 
Mothers with Dependent Children (1928) collected data on women and 
children enrolled various government programs. Her study laid the 
ground work for the Social Security Administration’s provision of 
cash benefits to children. Florence Peterson wrote the definitive histo-
ry of strikes in the United States, chronicling more than 80 separate 
incidences for the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1938); her study estab-
lished the BLS policy on strikes during the subsequent decade. 
Field research was considered particularly persuasive because 
“most of the work they [policy makers] do makes little use of abstract 
economic theory” (Witte, 1954, 138). The Institutionalists’ government 
reports often included copious tables summarizing quantitative data 
gathered through various types of field research. “Scorecards” of 
questions, along with training and the use of consistent instructions 
helped to reduce the discretionary influence of field agents (e.g., 
Commons, 1908). Standardization and uniformity lent the impression 
of objectivity. From such surveys, statistical measures were generated 
which helped “to understand the most important economic rela-
tions—the relative importance of the parts in making up the whole” 
(Commons, 1970, 188). Meta studies collated ‘typical’ activities 
and/or categorized findings by ‘type.’ Economic policies were there-
fore to be based on “accurate observation and reasoning from ob-
served facts” (Witte, 1957, 12). 
The Wisconsin economists were “studying facts, not for their own 
sake, but to solve problems and to make this a better world to live in” 
(Witte, 1954, 132). This was achieved by strategically pursuing regula-
tory changes at the state and federal levels. Roughly half of Groves’ 
archives are devoted to expert reports and testimony for government 
agencies, including commissions on the health needs of the nation, 
rural schools, teacher federations, regional accounts, and environ-
mental conservation. Also included are reports for the U.S. Depart-
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ment of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development and the Secretary of State. Nearly all of Altmey-
er’s archival boxes contain government reports, speeches, testimony, 
data, case studies, proposals, and actuarial reports; the same is true 
for the Sumner Woodbury and Glaser papers. Government work also 
constitutes substantial portions of the Ely, Commons, Witte, and 
Lescohier papers, a reminder that much of the empirical research 
produced by Wisconsin economists was meant to achieve specific 
regulatory outcomes. 
2.2. Change of Laws 
Ely’s vision for a documentary history of labor began with the prem-
ise that laws must adapt to historical circumstance and hence were 
changeable. Studies by Ely, Commons, and their students suggested 
that new laws, changes in laws, or changes in the court interpretation 
of laws were more effective strategies to achieve labor reform than 
radical unionization. Legal changes and legislative amelioration of 
social ills were fundamental to the Wisconsin Institutionalist reform 
efforts, epitomizing Commons’ constructive research and the Institu-
tional emphasis on working from within the system. Wisconsin’s In-
stitutionalists placed great value on studying law and jurisprudence 
as a way to anticipate and precipitate social change. “In many of his 
historical studies and in all of his reformist campaigns, Commons had 
to consider what the judges decided or what they would decide un-
der given circumstances. The study of legal precedents became as 
much his business as the making of economic analyses” (Mitchell, 
1924, 240). 
One powerful tool developed and deployed by the Institutionalists 
was the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, a forerunner of the 
Congressional Research Service. Operating in part as a research li-
brary, the bureau also assisted with drafting legislation, working to 
improve both the speed and quality of proposals. A partnership be-
tween the bureau’s chief, Charles McCarthy, Commons, and the Pro-
gressive Governor, Robert LaFollette, produced Wisconsin’s Civil 
Service Law (1906) and the Public Utilities Act (1907). Additional leg-
islative reforms included workers’ compensation, limits to the work-
ing hours of women and children, minimum wages, and the first 
modern apprenticeship law. Groves, Raushenbush and Brandeis 
Raushenbush wrote the nation’s first unemployment insurance pro-
gram, the Wisconsin Unemployment Reserves Act (1934), with help 
from the bureau. Numerous Wisconsin graduate students in econom-
ics, history, and political science worked for the bureau, including 
Groves, Brandeis Raushenbush, Selig Perlman, David Saposs, Peter 
Speek, and Witte. The bureau’s bill drafting service produced so 
many legislative items, that they were accused of being a ‘bill factory’ 
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for the Progressive Party. Bureau alumni also contributed significant 
pieces of national legislation; perhaps most notable, Witte crafted the 
Social Security Act and Lundberg added the child welfare provisions. 
 Some of the Wisconsin Institutionalists took the study of legal re-
form a step further, requiring their students to conduct research spe-
cifically in support of new legislation and to testify at local or state 
hearings. Brandeis Raushenbush required students to “attend hear-
ings and legislative sessions and follow the progress of bills dealing 
with labor issues.” Schmid McMahon and Lenroot did as well.14 
Groves wrote “I early had hit upon the idea of undergraduate papers 
featuring field work and a geographic orientation. The favorite sub-
ject was ‘the tax problem in my home town’” (1969b, 146). Courses in 
Commercial Law and Labor Legislation and Administration were of-
fered regularly as part of the Wisconsin Economics Department cur-
riculum from 1903 onward; in political science, McCarthy taught 
courses on practical bill drafting and the theory and practice of legis-
lation (Rutherford, 2011). 
Commons and John Andrews’ Principles of Labor Legislation (1916 
and four subsequent editions) best captured the Wisconsin Institu-
tional approach to reform through legislation. The book was “un-
doubtedly the most notable work upon its subject;” it seriously “ana-
lyzed innumerable laws and their working and compared them with 
their counterparts abroad” (Foerster, 1916, 566). A textbook in the 
study of writing and enacting labor legislation, the book exemplified 
the action-research paradigm of the Wisconsin Institutionalists. De-
veloped from their work for Ely’s American Bureau of Industrial Re-
lations (ABIR) and its labor histories, the book was reviewed by all 
the major economics journals, becoming “the American standard” 
(Montgomery, 1928, 746). Despite repeated accolades for its compre-
hensive listings of labor laws many reviewers were critical of its 
“meagre” treatment of the theoretical “principles of labor legislation” 
(McCabe, 1916, 411). The last chapter of the book illustrates how its 
purpose was not theoretical, but constructive. The book reflected the 
Wisconsin view that “administration” included “investigating, draft-
ing, and adopting enforceable laws,” sorting and determining facts, 
and “getting and keeping competent officials” (Commons and An-
drews, 1916, 416). Commons and Andrews argued that investigation 
of the facts was the cornerstone of the democratic functioning of gov-
ernment (ibid); legislatures and the courts should accept such data 
and follow the recommendations of experts (McCabe, 1916, 412).15 
                                                            
14 See Raushenbush and Brandeis Raushenbush (1979, 15), the Theresa Schmid 
McMahon Papers (Box 1, Folder 1) and the Biographical Note of the Katharine 
Lenroot Papers. 
15 Much of this practical thinking on legal change of law was reconceived by 
Commons in his theoretical Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924). 
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Much like Wisconsin’s work on administration, contributions to legis-
lative reform propagated voluminous investigative researches. 
3. Public Education and Public Persuasion 
The Wisconsin Institutionalists were nationally renowned econo-
mists. They regularly presented papers and participated in discus-
sions at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association 
(AEA).16 Prior to 1940, the department ranked seventh, nationally, for 
publications in leading journals (Backhouse, 1998). They held im-
portant positions at the National Bureau of Economic Research and 
on governmental commissions. Much of this activity was designed to 
influence their peers and high-ranking government officials. It also 
credential their legal testimony and their outreach to the public. Their 
effectiveness persuading politicians has been well considered (John-
son, 2018; Kaufman, 1993; Rutherford, 2011). The focus here is on how 
their volume of work can be understood to have influenced the pub-
lic. Wisconsin Institutionalists segmented the public into various 
groups as a way of facilitating their reform program through a com-
bination of education and persuasion. Considered in turn are the 
strategies employed to reach the educated public, the general popula-
tion, the working classes, and ‘inferior’ groups. 
3.1. The Thinking Public 
The Wisconsin Institutionalists used their position as academic ex-
perts to convince the “thinking public” of the necessity of a broad 
range of regulatory and legal reforms.17 They targeted this public 
primarily through textbooks and other academic publications.18 The 
writings evidence their belief that data, histories, and field work were 
persuasive: “something more than abstract economic theory be in-
cluded in our economics courses in colleges” (Witte, 1954, 139). Ely’s 
An Introduction to Political Economy (1889) “probably outsold all com-
petitors combined until well into the thirties” (Rader, 1966, 160). The 
book was popular for its “lucid style, graphic illustrations, and sym-
pathies for the underprivileged” (ibid). Initially prepared for use in 
the Chautauqua Summer School, the text was not exclusively targeted 
                                                            
16 Ely helped found the AEA in 1885. Commons served as president in 1918 and 
Witte in 1956. 
17 King wrote to Sumner Woodbury: “I am anxious to get out a volume that will 
place before the thinking public of this country the very best facts and thoughts 
in the solution of labor problems” (L. King to H. Sumner, 11 Sept. 1916, Sumner 
Papers, Box 2, Folder 14). 
18 While it is likely that the thinking public also read academic journal articles 
published by the Wisconsin Institutionalists—e.g. especially those in the legal 
profession—these are less transparent in their efforts to identify a specific 
audience to persuade and do not fit the goal of “public science” as cleanly. 
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at college students but was intended to reach the broader intelligent 
public. Similarly, Commons and Andrews’ Principles of Labor Legisla-
tion (1916) was “intended partly for the citizen” (Foerster, 1916, 567), 
as well as “for college students and the general reader” (McCabe, 
1916, 411). Ely’s Outlines of Economics (1893; revised Ely, Adams, Lo-
renz, and Young, 1908 and subsequent editions) sold upward of one 
million copies and was used by more than 250 colleges and universi-
ties. Arguing for social reform over socialism, the textbook reflected 
Ely’s historicist, proto-institutional approach with chapters on the 
“Evolution of Economic Society” and the “Economic Development of 
the United States.” The book also offered a typically Institutionalist 
“collection and critical examination of statistics” (Ely, 1893, v). As 
such, “Outlines continued to embody the most progressive views of 
any text in the field” (Dorfman, 1969, 256-257). 
The most popular labor textbook during this period was Labor 
Problems (1905) by Wisconsin’s T.S. Adams and Helen Sumner, going 
through nine editions by 1920. An “excellent textbook,” it covered 
women and child labor, immigration, poverty, unemployment, 
strikes, cooperatives, and labor laws (Cummings, 1906, 396) and did 
much to advance the Wisconsin Institutionalist position on labor re-
form. Florence Peterson provided an updated version in her Survey of 
Labor Economics (1947). By “historically and descriptively” treating the 
institutions of labor, the book was an “outstanding success” 
(Kirkaldy, 1948, 200). The historical approach of Martin Glaeser’s Out-
lines of Public Utility Economics (1927) “reveals at all points the au-
thor’s broad experience” outside the classroom and “deals with the 
more recent trends in public policies;” the most “distinctly original 
feature of the book” was its case study of Milwaukee (Armstrong, 
1928, 121-123). Harold Groves’ Financing Government (1939) was 
“progressive” (Arant, 1939, 625); it “was an institutionalist’s study 
[that] became the top seller in the field and went through six edi-
tions” (Groves, 1969b, 14), though dense with tables of data and case 
studies. 
Beyond textbooks, the Wisconsin Institutionalists were sensitive to 
what the intelligent public would willingly consume. Early in his ca-
reer, Ely embraced rapid and frequent publishing, believing “it is a 
fatal mistake to wait too long” (in Dorfman, 1941, 280).19 His ap-
proach became the modus operandi of the Wisconsin economists. 
Commons knew that the “nineteen volumes of the Industrial Com-
mission’s hearings could never be read by the people at large. What 
                                                            
19 “I recognized this as good counsel [from Cornell President Andrew D. White], 
and I followed it. Some may say that I followed it too unreservedly, but, at any 
rate, I transformed my various ideas into numerous books and articles. They 
have been criticized, and justly so … But I believe that in writing them I have 
served, even if in small measure, as a clarifying influence on economic thought” 
(Ely, 1938, 59). 
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was needed was a one-volume resume of the testimony of witnesses” 
(1963, 79). Ely served as general editor for a series of Macmillan social 
science textbooks as well as for their Citizens Library, the latter de-
signed to provide “information on topics of importance to every citi-
zen.”20 
The character of the writers and the management of the Library 
will be such as to inspire confidence. The utmost pains will be taken 
to secure the greatest possible accuracy in all statistical tables and 
statements of fact and theory, and no partisan bias will disturb the 
conclusions. It is the conviction of the Editor that scientific work in 
the field of the humanities may generally be made interesting to intel-
ligent citizens. (Ely, 1900, ix-xi) 
Ely’s ABIR viewed its labor histories as another way to influence 
contemporary labor debates. “A true history, such as we hope to 
write, will disclose the lines of constructive effort and encourage 
movement along these lines” (Ely, 1904, 12). And Commons promised 
in the introduction to A Documentary History of American Industrial 
Society that “an accurate and precise knowledge will help forward the 
better forces” (1910, 31). 
3.2. The Broader Public 
The expert’s responsibility to public education is a reoccurring theme 
in the work of the Wisconsin Institutionalists. To meet their obliga-
tion, they employed a variety of public education programs designed 
to influence a much wider audience than the elite intellectuals or in-
telligent citizens associated with the universities. The Wisconsin 
economists maintained voluminous correspondences. The Wisconsin 
Historical Society archives are replete with requests for reports and 
data and contain the detailed responses provided. “In almost every 
major American city and hundreds of smaller ones, Ely corresponded 
with reform-minded citizens. He presented the arguments favoring 
municipal ownership and, perhaps more important, the facts and fig-
ures from the experience of other cities” (Rader, 1966, 90). 
The belief that facts and educational materials would persuade the 
population to accept reforms manifested in various types Institution-
alist projects. If people properly understood the nature and scope of 
problems, then “vital public education … [would] render rapid pro-
gress in social and other important legislation possible” (H. Sumner 
to J. King, 24 October 1914, Sumner Woodbury Papers, Box 3, Folder 
4). As such, Sumner Woodbury contributed to legislation to fund the 
publication and distribution of campaign bulletins by state govern-
                                                            
20 Irwin Collier’s Economics in the Rear-view Mirror webiste. Available at : 
http://www.irwincollier.com/citizens-library-economics-politics-sociology-
richard-t-ely-ed-1900/ 
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ments. While the ostensible purpose of the bulletins was educational, 
she also thought they would facilitate reform legislation. 
It will mean a public and impartial channel of communication, un-
influenced by the forces which control the privately owned press, and 
by bringing an adequate presentation of the issues to be decided by 
the ballot directly to the attention of each voter, will not only vastly 
improve representative government, but will render possible and 
practical a great extension of direct legislation, national as well as 
state (H. Sumner to J. King, 24 October 1914, Sumner Papers, Box 3, 
Folder 4). 
Additional efforts included editorial writing for popular publica-
tions such as the New Republic or the New Review (e.g., Sumner Papers 
Correspondence, Box 2, Folders 12-14). Public education was often 
conflated with public persuasion, as the Institutionalists attempted to 
gain support for specific policies. For example, in 1934, Groves relied 
on his bill co-authors, Brandeis Raushenbush and Raushenbush, to 
organize the public hearings and town hall meetings necessary to 
generate public support for the Wisconsin Unemployment Reserves 
Act (Groves, 1969b, 122). The next year, Witte relied on public hear-
ings and “much explaining and much patience” to sell the Social Se-
curity Act (Perkins in Witte, 1962, ix). 
The Wisconsin Institutionalists spoke at churches, student clubs, 
union meetings, lodges, and women’s clubs with the deliberate goal 
of persuading the public to support and effect change. Morehouse 
(1969, 16-17) lauded Ely as “unique in the extent to which he went 
off-campus for public, university extension programs, or Chautauqua 
lecturing.” Commons gave hundreds of public lectures, most de-
signed to educate and persuade the public on labor problems, social 
insurance, and health reforms (J.R. Commons Papers, Box 13, Folders 
5 and 6). Witte evinced the same commitment to public education. He 
“thoroughly enjoyed lecturing and was willing to talk ‘to everyone 
everywhere;’” he accepted nearly every opportunity to meet with 
people simply “because they asked me” (in Lampman, 1962, xvii). 
3.3. Working Classes 
Labor education predated Institutionalism at Wisconsin, arriving 
with Ely and his Social Gospelism. Progressive economists like Ely 
had embraced a responsibility to organize labor. For them, the educa-
tion of the working class provided both moral conditioning and a 
mechanism for social control. “Unions can be organized by right-
thinking individuals who, by using persuasion, will inspire individu-
al workers to improve their ethical behavior” (Ely in Kapuria-
Foreman and McCann, 2012, 505). The stated goal was “Christian 
civilization” and the “full and harmonious development in each indi-
vidual of all human faculties” (Ely, 1886, 3). The unstated goal was 
social stability and gradual change as a remedy to the revolutionary 
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and anarchical approaches of the more militant labor unions. It was 
incumbent on laborers and their leaders to improve “character, to 
practice temperance, to eschew politics, to reject violence, to work 
within the law, and to refrain from demands for equality” (Kapuria-
Foreman and McCann, 2012, 508). The last was not trivial, but rather 
was an essential feature of Ely’s elitism. 
Commons and Selig Perlman divorced the religious motivation 
from Ely’s labor theory, replacing the moral reformer with expert in-
tellectuals who would “direct the manual workers away from the 
strict and narrow interest of wage-earners as a class, and to lead them 
towards affiliation with other classes” (Commons, 1918, 19). In this, 
the Wisconsin Institutionalists saw themselves as the intellectual 
leaders of the working classes—not in the mold of labor intellectuals, 
but rather as academic intellectuals, informed by research and data 
(Commons, 1963, 87-88). 
Under Commons’ leadership, the University of Wisconsin offered 
a variety of adult education programs. The most notable was the 
University of Wisconsin Extension and within that, the School for 
Workers. The worker schools were designed to both educate workers 
in fundamentals and foster a working knowledge of labor laws and 
worker rights. The first program was a school for ‘working girls,’ a 
six-week summer program for factory workers beginning in 1926 
with the collaboration of the YWCA. The original curriculum includ-
ed courses in economics, history, physical education, and health. Men 
were admitted in 1928, at which time the objectives and functions of 
the school underwent rapid change. More utilitarian courses were 
developed, including those specific to collective bargaining and labor-
management relations, designed to equip workers with the tools nec-
essary to incite and support reform. Field study synopses, union and 
shop histories, and statistical summaries informed much of the cur-
riculum (D. Lescohier Papers, Box 1; see also Bauder, 1929). Students 
studied their unions and factories and produced reports. As the pro-
gram evolved, special sessions were added to train union managers 
and empower unions as institutions for social change (Schwarz-
trauber, 1950). 
3.4. The Defective, the Criminal, and the Pauper Classes 
Wisconsin Institutional economics as a public science embraced “the 
use of belief … for purposes of social control, to either retain or 
change institutional arrangements and practices” (Samuels, 1991, 51). 
As Leonard writes of the Progressives-later Institutionalists general-
ly—and which was certainly true of the Wisconsin Institutionalists—
they “saw the poor as victims in need of uplift but also as threats re-
quiring social control” (2009, 109). Ross (1991) viewed immigrant ed-
ucation as a means to instill control over the new, diverse popula-
tions; education could substitute for the control that had been previ-
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ously provided by homogeneity of religion in the United States. 
Commons advocated for the Americanization and assimilation of 
immigrants through educational programs. A worker should not be 
“taught only their mere trade but also some essentials which will 
prepare him for life and a place in the civic body” (McCarthy, 1912, 
143). Numerous units on Americanization were offered as part of the 
University of Wisconsin’s summer school for workers throughout its 
history (Schwarztrauber, 1950). In all, the Wisconsin Institutionalists 
believed that “government has an over-riding responsibility to pro-
mote the general welfare … democratic government must control an-
ti-social conduct and affirmatively promote social action” (A. Alt-
meyer Papers, 7 May 1954, Box 10). 
Yet, significant illiberal and discriminatory views were institution-
alized in course work at the University of Wisconsin well through the 
1920s. Commons’ Races and Immigrants in America (1907) and Ross 
(1901) illuminate the extent of prejudices. These works strikes the 
modern reader as at odds with the institutional emphasis on educa-
tion, outreach, and social reform. However, it is important to note 
that bigotry does not preclude the possibility of interacting, even ami-
cably, with individuals of despised groups. And though Commons’ 
work was full of negative stereotypes, he regards nearly all as being 
ultimately capable of adopting ‘American’ ideals and of being assimi-
lated into American life. The Wisconsin Institutionalists also evi-
denced varying degrees of intersectionality, as race, ethnicity and 
gender created overlapping subgroups of different statuses among 
the researchers and the publics. Perlman, for example, wrote of Yel-
low Hordes despite being discriminated against as a Jewish immi-
grant. Sumner Woodbury accused women of undercutting the wages 
of men and of strike breaking. Schmid McMahon argued for lower 
minimum wages for women on the basis of the “family wage.” Near-
ly half of the proposed dissertations by women during the Commons’ 
era were at the intersection of eugenics and social policy.21 Many were 
based on field work and direct interaction with the relevant popula-
tions. This fit well with action research that demanded measurement 
and empirics and lent the label of scientific to the subsequent eugenic, 
social, and labor reform proposals. Field work and interaction were 
therefore a necessity. Through 1929, Economics remained combined 
                                                            
21 From lists of doctoral dissertations in progress from the American Economic 
Review: Caroline MacGill on Unpaid Services (1910), Roberta Pritchard on 
Heredity in Relation to the Control of Defectives (1910), Rhonda White on 
Morality of the City Population (1910), Emma Lundberg on Personal Inefficiency 
as Related to Family and Social Conditions (1911), Roberta Hodgson on Types 
and Traits of Negros of Athens, Georgia (1911), and Katharine Lumpkin on Social 
Situations and Girl Delinquency (1928). While a handful of topics chosen by men 
during this period reflect eugenic views, these are nowhere near as prominent. 
See Johnson (2018) for more details. 
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with Sociology and had significant overlap with social work, thus 
promulgating research related to social biology, degeneracy and crim-
inality. However, eugenic ideas dropped out of the Wisconsin pro-
gram fairly quickly after the retirement of Commons in 1932. 
Leonard (2016) makes apparent the extent to which eugenic beliefs 
and racism permeated the academy in the United States before the 
Second World War. The appeal of eugenics to the Wisconsin Institu-
tionalists shared much with the appeal of empirical research general-
ly: it conformed to their view of modern science, it assumed a promi-
nent role for government activism, it relied on experts, and it neces-
sarily called for new social legislation. The Wisconsin Institutionalists 
segmentation of the public into intelligent citizens, the working and 
immigrant classes, and delinquent classes for the purposes of educa-
tion and social control illustrates the extent to which Institutionalism 
operated as a program of public persuasion as well as a public sci-
ence. 
4. Conclusions 
The story of Wisconsin Institutionalism as public science reflected the 
sweeping changes in social science theory and practice from the 1890s 
through the Second World War. This paper makes use of the wealth 
of materials left by Wisconsin Institutionalists to consider how they 
thought about economics as public science and public persuasion. I 
argue that the volume of research materials generated by the Wiscon-
sin Institutionalists reflected a desire for confident, scientific 
knowledge to underpin their program reform. Influenced by Pragma-
tism, their work was necessarily empirical because it was meant to be 
constructive—it was research designed to identify specific problems 
and suggest specific regulatory or legislative solutions. It was public 
because the research was conducted within the community they 
hoped to serve; research included case studies of individual firms, 
unions, schools, and city offices as well as survey data, field research-
es, and interviews. The “mass of descriptive material” that irked 
Coase (1984) was thus an inescapable by-product of what the Wiscon-
sin Institutionalists wanted to accomplish. 
The Wisconsin Idea demanded that science should be used to im-
prove the lives of the people of the state, and Wisconsin’s economists 
embraced the mandate. Indeed, the “studious economist and statisti-
cian,” informed by research and study, was obligated to address in-
justices, improve the conditions of the laboring poor (Commons, 1963, 
87-88). With such high stakes, the Wisconsin economists did not stint 
at employing economics as persuasion to convince intellectuals, gov-
ernment officials and politicians, the working classes, and inferior 
populations of the necessity of reforms. They therefore produced and 
disseminated vast quantities of data, case studies, and histories to in-
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form legal and regulatory changes. They provided policy advice and 
copious public commentary. They developed extension and outreach 
programs, bringing scholarly and practical knowledge directly to the 
people. Of course, this could mean delivering to citizens what they 
wanted and lacked. But, it could also mean giving citizens what the 
experts think they should want. Thus despite the publicness of their 
science was in tension with their view that the extremely complex 
problems of government could not be left solely to the people. A gov-
ernment of experts was need to provide guidance, to educate and to 
persuade the public to the best course of action (Van Hise, 1913, 473). 
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This article explores Robert E. Lucas’s policy agenda and his engagement 
with the public debate between the 1970s and early 1980s. It investigates 
how he interacted with the public debate by envisioning key principles of 
his macroeconomic theory and methodology, and how he promoted his 
policy agenda. An exploration of Lucas’s personal and professional ar-
chives sheds light on his participation in policy debates after the publica-
tion of his works, illustrating how Lucas built a discreet and cautious way 
of engaging with the public. Lucas did not propose a detailed program to 
implement his policy agenda, nor was he actively promoting his policy 
agenda. The article suggests that Lucas’s originality compared to his con-
temporaries was his belief on the ability of macroeconomics to scientifical-
ly devise binding policy rules that could be integrated in an economic 
constitution. 
Keywords: Lucas (Robert E.), Lucas critique, monetary policy, fiscal poli-
cy, tax policy, policy rule 
Un programme sans plan.  
La trajectoire de Robert E. Lucas à travers le débat public 
Cet article analyse le programme de politique économique de Robert E. 
Lucas et l'engagement de ce dernier dans le débat public entre la fin des 
années 1960 et la fin dans les années 1970 et au début des années 1980. 
L'article s’interroge d'abord sur l'interaction entre le contexte du débat 
public et les principes méthodologiques et théoriques de la 
macroéconomie de Lucas; puis, nous explorons la manière dont Lucas 
promeut son programme de politique économique. Grâce à l'exploitation 
des archives professionnelles et personnelles de Lucas, nous pouvons 
éclairer sa participation aux débats de politique économique qui suivent la 
publication de ces travaux; émerge un portrait d'un Lucas prudent et 
discret dans ses interactions avec le public. Lucas ne défend aucun agenda 
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concret pour la mise en place de ses préconisations de politique 
économique, et ne fait aucune promotion active de celles-ci. Enfin, nous 
suggérons que l'originalité de Lucas par rapport à ses contemporains 
réside dans la conviction que la macroéconomie puisse développer de 
façon scientifique des règles de politique économique qui pourront être 
ensuite intégrées dans une constitution économique.  
Mots-clés : Lucas (Robert E.), critique de Lucas, politique monétaire, 
politique fiscale, règle de politique 
JEL: B22, B31, B41, Z18 
 
In 1988, Alan Blinder accused the New Classical economics of repre-
senting the “triumph of conservative ideology over liberalism” 
(Blinder, 1988, 278). Like many at the time, Blinder associated Robert 
E. Lucas’s work with “right-wing ideology” and “laissez-faire” (Ibid., 
286), relating the success of New Classical economics to the conserva-
tive turn in the United States at the end of the 1970s. Our article ex-
plores Robert E. Lucas’s political vision and his interventions in the 
public sphere, shedding light on his links with the economic policy 
debates of the 1970s and early 1980s.1 Even though Lucas built his 
reputation from his theoretical and methodological contributions to 
macroeconomics, this article reveals less-known aspects of his writ-
ings. Relying on a specific view of the functioning of market econo-
mies, he offered some considerations on economic expertise and core 
policy recommendations that followed his methodological and theo-
retical framework. 
Our work bridges a gap between two separate types of literature. 
On the one hand, the history of economic thought focuses on Lucas 
theory and methodology, depicting him as the intellectual leader of a 
fundamental change in macroeconomics (Hoover, 1988; Vercelli, 1991; 
Backhouse and Boianovsky, 2013; De Vroey, 2016). On the other 
hand, the literature discussing the role of free-market advocates such 
as Milton Friedman (Cherrier, 2011; Burgin, 2012), Friedrich Hayek 
(Caldwell, 2008; Burgin, 2012) or James Buchanan (MacLean, 2017) in 
the public debate grants a minor role to Lucas. Despite his links with 
these authors and with the Economics Department of the University 
of Chicago, Lucas’s thought and participation in the public debate has 
been ignored by both kinds of literature. Thus, this article draws a 
broader portrait of Lucas as an economist in the public debate. 
Instead of focusing on Lucas’s theories, the article pursues an in-
vestigation of his trajectory through the “lens of practice” (Stapleford, 
2017), i.e. exploring how he was “doing economics” (Ibid.), through 
an analysis of his discourse, his policy recommendations and the use 
                                                            
1 Our goal is not to argue that Lucas’s macroeconomic work was influenced by 
ideology and political considerations, but rather to show that it was not limited to 
theoretical and methodological considerations. 
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of economic concepts in various contexts. Therefore, our original 
sources include both academic and non-academic published writings, 
as well as unpublished materials from Lucas’s archives—constituting 
an essential source to unveil on Lucas’s engagement with the public 
debate.2 
First, we show that during the 1970s and early 1980s, Lucas devel-
oped a well-defined vision of macroeconomic policy issues, address-
ing policy recommendations for the U.S. economy. We will refer to 
these recommendations as his “policy agenda”. We illustrate how 
Lucas’s agenda consistently relied on his own peculiar set of political 
beliefs, as well as on his theoretical and methodological stances. This 
led him to criticize both the “Keynesian” regime of expertise, as well 
as Arthur Laffer and the “supply-siders”. We then connect and con-
trast Lucas’s views with the ones addressed by Friedman, Hayek, and 
Buchanan, highlighting the originalities of Lucas’s thought. 
Secondly, we show that Lucas was not actively promoting his poli-
cy agenda: he did not act to implement successfully his policy rec-
ommendations.3 In comparison to other major macroeconomists of 
the 1970s, such as Karl Brunner, Milton Friedman, Lawrence R. Klein, 
Franco Modigliani or Robert Solow, his interventions on policy issues 
remained scarce. He was not a predominant figure in the press nor in 
the political public debate; similarly, he was not actively contributing 
to policy-making institutions, government bodies, lobbies or think 
tanks. Nevertheless, thanks to archival evidence, we shed light on his 
discreet and cautious way of engaging with the public debate: Lucas 
followed closely the policy and political debates of the time (especial-
ly antagonizing Ronald Reagan’s policies), corresponded with politi-
cians, delivered few interventions in the press, and animated the de-
bate with his peers who were working in policy-making institutions.  
                                                            
2 Archives are essential because, given the discretion of Lucas’s engagement with 
the public debate, it would otherwise be impossible to detect it from other 
sources. However, an important caveat to be raised about the use of archive 
research of a living scholar is the possibility of a sample bias. Put differently, the 
sample of documents can be subject to an intended selection process in order to 
create a specific character, or aspirational self. This problem is inherent to the use 
of any archive and, more broadly, to a historical reconstruction relying on the 
sole writings of the author. Conscious of this, our work also uses other sources 
(academic papers, press, and congressional records) to build a consistent 
investigation of Lucas’s thought and action.  
3 Our work discusses Lucas’s interactions within the public sphere, not his 
influence. In other words, we focus on Lucas’s writings and practices, and not on 
the influence on (or reception by) others of his contributions. For instance, 
Lucas’s (1976 [1973]) famous Critique lived “a life of its own and means different 
things to different people”, as emphasized by Lucas (2012) himself: the reception 
of this idea is then beyond the scope of our paper (for an account of the reception 
of the Lucas Critique, see for instance Goutsmedt et al., 2019). We also do not 
refer to the interaction of the public with the broader stream of ideas coming 
from Lucas’s closest co-authors (Thomas Sargent, Neil Wallace, Edward Prescott). 
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1. Lucas’s Policy Agenda 
Lucas developed and expressed a well-defined vision of macroeco-
nomic policy issues, as well as policy recommendations for the U.S. 
economy, in several articles (1977, 1978, 1979, 1980a) and in particular 
in “Rules, Discretion and the Role of Economic Advisor” (1980b). Lu-
cas rejected what he called “meticulous day-to-day management” of 
economic policy (i.e. devising immediate and temporary action for 
current problems) advocated by Keynesianism as well as by “supply-
side” economics that inspired the Reagan administration.4 Instead, 
Lucas urged for a long-term vision relying on “institutional design” 
of binding rules for economic policy. This agenda relied on his belief 
in market stability, as well as on rational expectations. 
1.1. Fighting the Keynesians and Supply-siders’ Policy Agendas 
Lucas suggested that macroeconomists had been historically address-
ing two types of policy agendas, which he called “day-to-day man-
agement” and “institutional design”. For him, early business cycle 
theorists of the beginning of the 20th century (such as Hayek and Wes-
ley Mitchell) conceived macroeconomics as devoted to “institutional 
design”: that is, “[identifying] institutional sources of instability” in 
order to mitigate economic fluctuations by “appropriate institutional 
changes” (Lucas, 1977, 8). For Lucas, this view was overshadowed by 
the General Theory and its subsequent developments, which brought a 
“sharp change in the nature of the contribution to policy which econ-
omists hoped to offer and which the public has come largely to ac-
cept.” (Ibid.) This change stemmed from the “belief that policy could 
affect immediate, or very short-term, movements of the economy 
from an undesirable current state, however arrived at, to a better state” 
(Ibid., Lucas’s emphasis). Instead of aiming at mitigating fluctuations, 
this new policy agenda focused on the concept of “involuntary” un-
employment. This implied that economic policy “can and should be 
directed at the attainment of a particular, specifiable level of the 
measured rate of unemployment” (Lucas, 1978, 353). 
The debate between these two policy agendas had, for Lucas, 
deeper roots in a divergent set of political beliefs: they resulted from 
                                                            
4 Note that, in the 1980s, the label “supply-side economics” could refer to 
different groups. It could refer to the study of the effects of tax policies on 
supply—to contrast with the Keynesian focus on demand—as in Feldstein (1978) 
and Boskin (1978). Lucas (1990) refers to this latter when using this label—and 
claiming his role as a forerunner of this approach (Lucas and Rapping, 1969). 
Outside academia, the label came to designate the idea (popularized by Laffer 
and his curve) that decreasing taxes will increase government revenue. Today, 
though Feldstein and Boskin both advised Reagan’s administration (Campagna, 
1994), the label is mostly associated with Laffer. In our article the label refers to 
this second, contemporary meaning. 
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another long-standing and “never changing” conflict between “mer-
cantilism and government intervention vs. laissez faire and free mar-
ket” (Lucas in Levy, 1993, 3). In a draft to his review of Tobin’s Asset 
Accumulation and Economic Activity (1980), Lucas argued that “two 
schools of macroeconomic (and perhaps all) social policies” existed, 
and proposed different policy agendas. Those aiming at “[keeping] 
the power of government to injure” (sic) would be inclined to endorse 
institutional design; those aiming at “exercise [power] more effective-
ly” would adopt a day-to-day management (RLP, Box 23, Folder “To-
bin”). As Lucas further asserted, the inner division between the two 
policy agendas followed the belief (or the lack of faith) in the self-
regulating ability of market economies. Therefore, choosing between 
institutional design and day-to-day management equated to decide 
whether “the role of government in stabilization policy should be to 
reduce its own disruptive part or actively to offset private sector in-
stability” (Lucas, 1981a, 235). 
According to Lucas, the rise of Keynesian macroeconomics and its 
day-to-day management policy agenda intertwined with an overall 
shift in U.S. political beliefs towards more government intervention. 
Keynesian macroeconomics rather “rationalize[d] this activism” (Lu-
cas, 1979b, 165, Lucas’s emphasis), which was established by the Em-
ployment Act of 1946: 
[Keynesian macroeconomics] defined itself to be that body of expertise the 
existence of which was presupposed in the Employment Act, and its prac-
titioners devoted themselves to the development and refinement of fore-
casting and policy evaluation methods which promised to be of use in the 
annual diagnosis-prescription exercise called for by the act. (Lucas, 1980b, 
201)5 
For Lucas, the Employment Act also fostered a change in the role of 
the macroeconomist in the public sphere and her/his relationship 
with policymakers. Academic knowledge would then be devised to 
support economic expertise, “equipping” experts with tools for “op-
erational guidance” on a daily basis: 
                                                            
5 Lucas’s claim that Keynesian macroeconomics is defined by The Employment 
Act is controversial. The Act—an “American version” of Britain’s 1944 White 
Paper (Employment Policy White Paper. London: Ministry of Reconstruction, 
1944, Cmd: 6527)—resulted from the efforts of Alvin Hansen (a Federal Reserve 
Board consultant at the time), other Harvard economists (Richard Gilbert, Walter 
Salant, Gerhard Colm) and U.S. decision-makers from the Federal Reserve Board 
and Budget Bureau to call for a formal governmental commitment to full 
employment. It emphasized economic stabilization, which included attacking 
both deflation (one of Hansen’s concerns) and inflation, as well as stimulating 
aggregate demand not only via government spending, but also through changes 
in tax structure to spur private investments. Given Hansen’s specific 
understanding of Keynesianism, there is some controversy on the role of the 
Employment Act as a benchmark to Keynesian macroeconomic policy in the 
postwar (Guizzo, 2016).  
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Within the existing institutional framework, the role of the economic ex-
pert as day-to-day manager expanded rapidly, and the role of the academ-
ic macroeconomist became that of equipping these experts with ideas, 
principles, formulas which gave, or appeared to give, operational guid-
ance on the tasks with which these economic managers happened to be 
faced. (Ibid., 202) 
The postwar expansion seemed to justify the day-to-day management 
policy agenda supported by Keynesian macroeconomics and fostered 
by the Employment Act—though “it is impossible to distinguish good 
luck from good policy” (Lucas, 1977, 10). But it faced a crisis with the 
1970s stagflation, which for Lucas resulted from policy mistakes in 
the 1960s (Goutsmedt, 2017). Therefore, during the early 1980s, Lucas 
relentlessly blamed the persistence of this specific policy agenda de-
spite its apparent failure. U.S. institutions, academics, policymakers, 
and the general audience still demanded immediate action on current 
economic problems. For Lucas, the mass media played a major role in 
devising “new” problems and in urging “new” theories for policy-
making: 
To the journalist, each year brings unprecedented new phenomena, calling 
for unprecedented new theories (where “theory” amounts to a description 
of the new phenomena together with the assertion that they are new). (Lu-
cas, 1980a, 697) 
According to Lucas, the 1973 oil shock aftermath fueled the develop-
ment of new ad hoc models for day-to-day management: 
This is the legacy of stagflation: a general loss of confidence, whether sci-
entifically warranted or not, in the formerly accepted framework guiding 
discretionary economic management. Since the demand for discretionary 
policies remains strong, we are seeing the proliferation of new “solu-
tions”6 to “short-run” policy problems, defended by the promise of par-
ticular results but without basis in either theory or historical experience.” 
(Lucas, 1980b, 204) 
In Lucas’s view, the same attitude remained widespread among mac-
roeconomists, both in policy-making institutions and in academia. As 
an illustration, he targeted Paul McCracken et al.’s (1977) OECD re-
port “Towards Full Employment and Price Stability”.7 Lucas (1979, 
162) attacked such kind of “vacuous” patchwork of “ambiguous and 
unsupported opinions” that exemplified the crisis of day-to-day 
management. The report proposed a “list of issues which have been 
defined in popular debate as ‘policy problems’” and associated to 
these problems a “treatment by government action” without any 
“consistent set of economic principles underlying either the choice of 
questions to be addressed or the policy stances which are recom-
                                                            
6 Here, Lucas targeted specifically Laffer and Arthur Okun (see Lucas, 1980b, 
204).  
7 McCracken has also been chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (1969-
1971) under Nixon. 
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mended” (Ibid.). Lucas thought most academics shared the same un-
fortunate attitude. At the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) Bald Peak conference (October 1978), Stanley Fischer asked 
Lucas, William Poole, and Solow to prepare a discussion of “what 
policy should have been in 1973-75” (Fischer, 1980, 2-3). In his speech, 
Lucas objected: 
Economists who pose this “What is to be done, today?” question as 
though it were somehow the acid test of economic competence are cul-
ture-bound (or institution-bound) to an extent they are probably not 
aware of. They are accepting as given the entirely unproved hypothesis 
that the fine-tuning exercise called for by the Employment Act is a desira-
ble and feasible one. (Lucas, 1980b, 208) 
When commenting on Tobin (1980), Lucas explicitly raised the ques-
tion of alternative policy agendas: 
Does [Tobin] think that our economic authorities should continue to for-
mulate monetary and fiscal policy on a year-to-year basis, as uncon-
strained as they now are by legislative or constitutional limits on what 
policies may be selected, or does he see our task as that of designing new 
rules of the game, and conceiving institutional frameworks capable of en-
forcing them? (Lucas, 1981d, 564) 
Lucas considers that having followed this day-to-day policy agenda 
for years had proven to be eventually catastrophic during the 1970s, 
and the time had come to promote a change:  
The capitalist democracies have paid dearly for their neglect of this ques-
tion over the past decade. If we continue to evade it, as I read Tobin advo-
cating we do, we are in for a good deal worse. (Ibid., 566) 
The “culture-bound” or “institutional-bound” made the day-to-day 
management agenda so persistent and widespread that both Keynes-
ian and non-Keynesian macroeconomists were perpetuating this way 
of thinking. In an opinion column in The New York Times Magazine, 
Lucas also argued that supply-side economics and Keynesian eco-
nomics represented two sides of the same coin: 
Today, deficit spending is rationalized by the novel doctrines of supply-
side economics. Yesterday, the same policies were defended by the logic 
of Keynesian economics. (Lucas, 1981c)8 
Lucas believed that changing this state of affairs required a transfor-
mation of macroeconomics that would result in a change in the con-
                                                            
8 Lucas was scathing not only against Laffer’s “ad hoc” theory (see above), but 
also against other supply-siders. One of the targets of Lucas’s criticism was Jude 
Wanniski, a Wall Street Journal columnist, influential advocate of supply-side 
economics, and author of The Way the World Works (1978). Contacted by the Olin 
Foundation, George Stigler asked Lucas for his opinion about the book. Lucas 
considered that Wanniski’s book did not worth “occupying the time of any 
contemporary critics” (RLP1, Folder 1980 3/3). 
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duct of economic expertise.9 The rise of Keynesian ideas promoted 
and rationalized a specific policy agenda for macroeconomics, based 
on day-to-day management; similarly, the transformation in macroe-
conomic theory and methodology Lucas was devising would have 
led to another policy agenda.  
1.2 Lucas’s Policy Agenda: Macroeconomics as Institutional Design 
Lucas’s policy agenda changed the scope of macroeconomic policies 
from involuntary unemployment to the business cycle. Without any 
“coherent idea as to what full employment means or how it can be 
measured” (Lucas, 1978, 353), it made no sense to devise monetary 
and fiscal policies to tackle this imaginary involuntary unemploy-
ment—this is even “real and dangerous hypocrisy”, and it “does no 
service to unemployed people to talk about it as though it were” (Lu-
cas, 1987, 105).10 Lucas’s arguments mirrored one of Friedman’s (1968, 
10) arguments that targeting unemployment was purposeless since 
there is no way of measuring full-employment or the natural rate of 
unemployment. 
The level of unemployment (that is, the “equilibrium” or “natural” 
level of unemployment) was still a relevant policy issue to Lucas; 
however, he considered it to be an issue for public finance and wel-
fare economics, whereas macroeconomics should be concerned solely 
with business cycles. Then, Lucas saw two separate approaches in 
policy-making—each one dealing with one specific policy issue: 
The policy problem of reducing business cycle risk is a very real and im-
portant one, and one which I believe monetary and fiscal policies directed 
at price stability would go a long way toward achieving. The problem of 
finding arrangements for allocating unemployment risks over individuals 
… is also important, and can be analyzed by the methods of modern wel-
fare economics. (Lucas, 1981a, 246)  
Welfare economics can deal with unemployment “in total ignorance 
of the nature of business-cycle dynamics”, while “the discovery of 
                                                            
9 He recognized that promoting such a change was difficult, at least as long as 
“the economic manager responsible for advising … the size of the coming fiscal 
year deficit [will be] uninterested” in listening to it (Lucas, 1980b, 201). However, 
he saw an “encouraging” signal in the adoption of Resolution 133—integrated in 
the Federal Reserve Act in 1977 (Ibid., 208). The resolution committed the Fed to 
maintain the long run growth of monetary supply consistent with the economy’s 
long run potential growth (Weintraub, 1978).  
10 This idea echoed Lucas’s theoretical and methodological project for 
macroeconomics (see De Vroey, 2016, chapters 9-11). One of the distinctive 
assumptions introduced by Lucas (Lucas and Rapping, 1969) is that 
unemployment always results from workers’ choices. Workers decide to supply 
hours of labor according to the optimal (utility-maximizing) intertemporal 
allocation of their time between leisure and consumption; as wages and prices are 
always instantaneously converging to their equilibrium levels, no involuntary 
unemployment is possible.  
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better business cycle theories will contribute little or nothing” to the 
understanding of welfare issues such as social insurance or income 
distribution (Lucas, 1987, 105).11 Further, macroeconomics cannot 
provide any relevant policy insight about reducing the unemploy-
ment level. For instance, since market economies are assumed to con-
verge towards the equilibrium level of unemployment, aggregate 
demand policies cannot affect durably the level of unemployment.  
Lucas emphasized that macroeconomic policy should focus exclu-
sively on mitigating business cycles; or, put differently, to reduce the 
variance of macroeconomic aggregates, primarily of the price level. 
This agenda, similarly to the day-to-day management approach, had 
deeper roots in the “never-changing” dilemma between the “two 
schools of macroeconomic policy” that differed on interventionism. 
As previously mentioned, whether “the role of government in stabili-
zation policy should be to reduce its own disruptive part, or actively 
to offset private sector instability” (Lucas, 1981a, 235). Lucas never 
hid his preference for the first school and his faith in the self-
regulating abilities of market economies. 
Then, the role of macroeconomists is to “design institutions” en-
suring a stable environment for economic activity. By “institutions” 
Lucas meant binding policy rules for the government to follow (“in-
stitutional arrangements which bind us to follow them”, Lucas, 
1981b, 564). In “Principles of Fiscal and Monetary Policy” (1986), Lu-
cas clarified: “[t]he most useful way to think about government policy 
is as a choice of rules of the game to which government is committed 
for some length of time” (Ibid., 104). 
This form of commitment is already valid for other, non-economic 
domains of public action: ensuring commitment to rules is simply the 
reason “why democratic governments have constitutions that are dif-
ficult to change and legal systems that respect precedents and ‘due 
process’” (Ibid.). The same should be true for macroeconomic poli-
cies, and such rules need to encompass all governmental institutions 
involved.12  
                                                            
11 For instance, welfare theory will discuss the level of unemployment 
compensation, which determines the natural rate of unemployment. “Severe 
penalties” for unemployed could for instance “reduce unemployment rates to 
any desired level”, and also output (Lucas, 1981a, 246); whereas a generous 
compensation scheme would “involve a subsidy to being unemployed” (Ibid.), 
but, by ensuring a sure current income, it could encourage risk-averse workers to 
seek a new job. 
12 As emphasized by Lucas’s criticism of Reagan’s tax policy (see infra, 2.3), the 
monetary and fiscal authorities should both commit to mutually consistent rules: 
“it is not within the abilities of any central bank to make things work out right in 
a society that insists that the real resources spent by its government can exceed, 
on a sustained basis, the resources that government extracts from the private 
sector via taxes.” (Lucas, 1981a, 30) 
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Then, Lucas endorsed Buchanan and Wagner’s (1977) idea of en-
forcing an “economic constitution”: 
We need, in Buchanan and Wagner’s useful terminology, an “economic 
constitution” and we are at last beginning to develop the economic theory 
that will be helpful in designing it. (Lucas, 1987, 104) 
In Lucas’s view, two reasons justified the superiority of a policy 
agenda based on institutional design over that based on day-to-day 
management: optimality and scientificity. 
Lucas (1986) used optimality (or also, in his words, “efficiency”, or: 
“for each citizen, attaining the highest welfare level”, 129) as the crite-
rion to decide among alternative economic policies.13 There, he pre-
sented a simple general equilibrium model to deduce “the neoclassi-
cal welfare-economic principles that bear on the efficient conduct of 
national, or aggregative, monetary and fiscal policy” (Ibid., 117). The 
model emphasized how only policy rules can be optimal in terms of 
welfare. A crucial principle in supporting this argument was the no-
tion of time-consistency (forcefully argued by Kydland and Prescott, 
1977). As for designing institutions of macroeconomic policy, a gen-
eral equilibrium model is essential to the extent it allows to “quantify 
the welfare cost of simple (and non-optimal) rules for fiscal and mon-
etary management” (Lucas, 1986, 132). 
In a nutshell, Lucas anchored his policy agenda about rules and 
institutional design in his theoretical and methodological view of 
macroeconomics: it presupposed that the macroeconomist should 
formulate a model with a theoretical framework consistent with what 
he identified as “general equilibrium” (meaning the Arrow-Debreu 
neo-Walrasian approach). This encompassed a set of distinctive as-
sumptions: individual optimizing behavior, market clearing, and ra-
tional expectations. A macroeconomic model microfounded on this 
basis would, therefore, enable to deduce welfare functions to assess 
which rule would be optimal.  
However, for Lucas theoretical general equilibrium models that 
deal with optimality were not enough to justify a policy agenda scien-
tifically. As emphasized by De Vroey (2011), Lucas was concerned 
with the inevitable intertwining of theory and political beliefs.14 
                                                            
13 Although the discussion of optimality of policy rules could be found already in 
Lucas (1972b, section 7), where he discussed Paretian optimality of a Friedman-
type monetary policy rule over other monetary policy rules. 
14 According to De Vroey, Lucas claimed that, in practice, “ideology” (a set of 
political beliefs about how society works or should work) could hardly be 
separated from science. Macroeconomists (like any citizen) hold ideological 
views, and then most theoretical propositions in macroeconomics are intertwined 
with ideology. Thus, policy conclusions derived from theory are not ideology-
free; on the contrary, they are also embedded with the implicit ideology in the 
premises of a theory. For instance, Lucas (1977, 25) argued that assuming market 
clearing logically implies that countercyclical policies will be of limited use; 
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Therefore, he considered that policy prescriptions drawn from theo-
ries can be translated into policy agendas if and only if they relied on 
an empirical basis.15 Macroeconometric models devoted to this task: 
providing scientific (empirical) assessment for alternative policies. 
Lucas’s emphasis on models did not display originality, given the 
well-established macroeconometric tradition since the 1960s. He in-
deed recognized that advances in model-building were the most posi-
tive contributions to economics made by the Keynesian day-to-day 
management era (Lucas, 1980a, 701). Nevertheless, in his famous Cri-
tique (Lucas, 1976 [1973]), he rejected the possibility that such models 
would be able to provide any reliable quantitative evaluation of dis-
cretionary policy. He aimed precisely at demonstrating that: 
the ability to forecast the consequences of “arbitrary”, unannounced se-
quences of policy decisions … appears to be beyond the capability not on-
ly of the current-generation models, but of conceivable future models as 
well. (Lucas, 1976 [1973], 280). 
The Lucas Critique argued that only rules can be assessed with “scien-
tific quantitative policy evaluations” (Ibid., 279, Lucas’s emphasis), 
i.e., by using macroeconometric models. For Lucas, policy evaluation 
with macroeconometric models should rely on a description of the 
way economic agents would react to alternative policies. The analyti-
cal tools available made only possible to model such reactions for 
rules, but not for discretionary policies. The theoretical argument 
about optimality then became secondary: 
The preference for “rules vs. authority” in economic policy making sug-
gested by [my] point of view is not … based on any demonstrable opti-
mality properties of rules-in-general … The point is rather that the possi-
bility [that discretion can lead to superior economic performance] cannot 
in principle be substantiated empirically. (Ibid., 279, Lucas’s emphasis)  
Lucas also recognized that, in practice, the development of such 
model-based quantitative assessment of policy rules remained unsat-
isfying (Lucas and Sargent, 1978, 62-63). Despite not being able then 
to determine scientifically what the optimal policy rule should be, 
Lucas still considered that there was enough support for, on the one 
hand, an immediate abandoning of day-to-day management, and, on 
the other hand, implementation of some “good approximation” of the 
optimal rule. Lucas considered Friedman’s four percent rule of mon-
ey growth as a “good approximation” of an optimal rule for mone-
tary policy. Even if it “would have welfare consequences differing 
                                                                                                                                     
therefore, one can conclude that the market clearing assumption is ideologically 
biased. 
15 Put differently, ideology cannot be separated from macroeconomic theory, but 
it can be “neutralized” with empiricism—it is only by neutralizing the ideological 
bias that theories can provide scientific policy prescriptions. 
300 Aurélien Goutsmedt, Danielle Guizzo, and Francesco Sergi | 
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 9(2) : 289-314 
trivially from the optimum policy”, “[it] would be easy to spell out 
and monitor” (Lucas, 1986, 132-133). 
When addressing the specifics of the policy rules that an “econom-
ic constitution” should enforce, Lucas did not really differ from 
Friedman. In The New York Times Magazine (Mermelstein, 1979, 32) 
and in his academic article for the NBER Bald Peak conference 
(1980b), Lucas supported Friedman’s “A Monetary and Fiscal 
Framework for Economic Stability” (1948) and A Program for Monetary 
Stability (1959). Lucas’s policy prescriptions corresponded to the fol-
lowing rules: 1) a 4% annual rate of growth of M1; 2) a cyclical federal 
government spending and tax rates 3) a balanced federal budget; 4) 
no government intervention to fix wages and prices.16 These four 
measures would “fully protect the economy against sustained infla-
tion” and “entirely eliminate erratic monetary and fiscal shocks as 
independent sources of instability” (Lucas, 1980b, 207), in order to 
provide “a stable, predictable environment for the private sector of 
the economy” (Ibid., 210).17 
Lucas’s defense of rules and their constitutionalization establishes 
common ground between him and the main advocates of free mar-
kets and government limitation in the 1970s in the U.S. First, with 
Hayek’s Law, Legislation and Liberty (1978), which proposed to inte-
grate into the constitution the prohibition of progressive income taxa-
tion. Second, with Buchanan: as we saw, Lucas praised several times 
Buchanan and Wagner’s idea in Democracy in Deficit of an economic 
constitution aiming at, among other things, limiting fiscal deficits (see 
Lucas, 1980b, 209; 1986, 132; 1987, 104).18 Third, and more important-
ly, Lucas agreed with Friedman’s views on economic policy, especial-
ly those he formulated with Rose Friedman in Free to Choose. There, 
constitutionalization of economic policy was described as “the equiv-
alent of the First Amendment to limit government power in the eco-
nomic and social area—an economic Bill of Rights to complement and 
reinforce the original Bill of Rights” (Friedman and Friedman, 1980, 
                                                            
16 This last point is rather inspired by Lucas’s own opposition to Nixon wage-
price control (cf. infra). 
17 Another kind of binding rules seemed appealing to Lucas. He appeared 
enthusiastic about the tax revolts of 1978 in California that led to an amendment 
to the Constitution of the State, the Proposition 13, which established a limitation 
to property taxation (Lucas, 1980b, 204). 
18 Esteem was mutual. In a letter dated from August 7th 1980, Buchanan 
confessed that he liked Lucas’s “Death of Keynesianism” (1980c), a strong piece 
against Keynesian economics presented in 1979 in Chicago’s Graduate School, 
and that he agreed “with almost all of what [Lucas] sa[id]”. Buchanan claimed 
that he was optimistic for the years to come as it “must be the time for more 
widespread discussion of constitutional reforms, not only in monetary matters, 
but generally” (RLP1, Folder 1980 1/2). 
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299).19 An important part of this new “Bill of Rights” should be a rule 
that “require[s] the monetary authorities to keep the percentage rate 
of growth of the monetary base within a fixed range.”20 (Ibid., 308) 
However, despite this proximity on the issue of economic rules 
and constitutionalization, Lucas’s thought on economic policy and its 
elaboration carried some originality. Notably, his firm belief in the 
ability of mathematical models to estimate empirically the optimality 
of policy rules anchored him in a form of scientific positivism, which 
certainly distinguished him from Hayek and Austrian economics 
(Hoover, 1988, Chapter 10). His commitment to the neo-Walrasian 
general equilibrium model contrasted with Friedman’s preference for 
Marshallian partial equilibrium model (Hoover, 1984; De Vroey, 
2011). 
These differences are neither minor nor anecdotal. Lucas’s meth-
odology for macroeconomics went hand in hand with his considera-
tions on economic policy and the role of economists in it. To a large 
extent, his policy agenda relied on macroeconometric modelling—
macroeconomists must find optimal rules—while being in the same 
time independent of it—models were not yet ready to perform this 
task, but it did not prevent Lucas for defending rules.  
The connection between Lucas’s political beliefs and his methodo-
logical and theoretical considerations appears in a conference he gave 
in New York in March 1977.21 Lucas explained in the introduction 
that he regarded as peculiar to be asked to talk about “New Ideas on 
economic policy” since what he defended—“stable monetary growth 
and balanced government budget”—was not new and was close to 
the thought of “Coolidge or McKinley” (RLP39, Folder Mitchell, 
Hutchins Conference).22 He added that his reasons “for favoring such 
‘passive’ policies” were not “more sophisticated than ideas current in 
Coolidge’s day”, that is to say “a belief that if government and the 
Fed can keep their own affairs in order, proceeding smoothly and 
                                                            
19 In a letter from January, 22 1980, Lucas thanked Friedman for having sent him a 
copy of Free to Choose and explained that he jumped to the Chapter 10 as he was 
particularly interested by the issue of the constitutional approach to monetary 
growth (RLP1, Folder 1980 1/2). 
20 These strong similarities on the issue of rules and constitutionalization shall not 
make forget the potential differences that exist between New Classical Economics 
and Friedman, stemming from the use of rational expectations. It has some 
importance for instance on the path to choose for disinflation policies, as what is 
primordial with rational expectations is the credibility of the policy rather than 
the money stock variations. But these differences with Friedman and monetarism 
are much visible in Sargent’s work than in Lucas’s (see Goutsmedt, 2018). 
21 Lucas was invited to present on “New Ideas on economic policy” by Mitchell, 
Hutchins Inc., a Wall-Street-based financial firm selling securities research 
services. 
22 William McKinley was the 25th President of the U.S. from 1897 to 1901, and 
Calvin Coolidge the 30th from 1923 to 1929. 
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predictably, the private sector will take reasonably good care of itself” 
(Ibid.). However, he then proceeded to convince people that do not 
have yet this belief—like him “ten years ago”—based on his theoreti-
cal analysis of Keynesian policy agenda and the impact of rational 
expectations for economic policy.  
However, despite a clear policy agenda, neither Lucas committed 
himself fervently to defend economic rules and their constitutionali-
zation, nor did he engage in any modelling work for public or private 
policy institutions. Whenever he carries some involvement in the 
public sphere, it seems to have been always unintended and in the 
margin. 
2. Lucas’s Trajectory through Public Debate  
Lucas’s intervention in the public domain appeared more discreet 
than those of other prominent macroeconomists of the time, such as 
Brunner, Friedman, Klein or Solow. It nevertheless reveals his view of 
current events; more importantly, Lucas’s interventions consistently 
echoed his policy agenda. Lucas’s activity took place in the U.S. con-
text of the 1970s and early 1980s, which saw radical changes in eco-
nomic policy (Nixon’s wage-price controls, the Humphrey-Hawkins 
Act, the tax revolts, Volcker’s disinflation, and Reagan’s tax cut plan). 
We claim that Lucas got involved in these debates, but without ac-
tively engaging to promote his policy agenda and impose his views. 
On the contrary, most of Lucas’s interactions with the general audi-
ence seemed unintended or passive: Lucas was solicited by others to 
express or clarify his views about policy issues. This resulted in an 
engagement with the public that was cautious and discreet—and out-
side policy-making institutions.  
2.1. Searching for New Theoretical Perspectives:  
Lucas at Carnegie, 1966-1969 
During his first years as an associate professor at the Graduate School 
of Industrial Administration at Carnegie Institute of Technology 
(Carnegie hereafter), Lucas worked, with his colleagues, on an empir-
ical research agenda (Lucas, 1967a; 1967b; McGuire et al, 1968). 
However, by the end of the 1960s, Lucas progressively shifted his 
research focus. The blooming of new ideas at Carnegie fostered the 
development of his distinctive approach to macroeconomics, based 
on rational expectations and general equilibrium. The influence of 
senior faculty members (e.g., John Muth and Herbert Simon) is wide-
ly acknowledged, both by Lucas himself (Lucas, 1996) and by recent 
historical works (Darity et al., 2004). Co-writing with young scholars 
at Carnegie, as Edward Prescott, also influenced Lucas’s new ap-
proach to macroeconomics (da Silva, 2017).  
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During these years, Lucas’s participation in the public debate or in 
policy-making expertise remained quite limited, except from 1966 to 
1967, when he worked as an external consultant for the Bureau of 
Budget to assess the impact of changes in taxation on firms’ invest-
ment (RLP39, Folder Bureau of Budget). In 1969, the U.S. Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare offered him a position in their re-
search department. Lucas, however, turned down the offer: “I’m 
afraid I am not willing to spend time away from my research during 
the next year or so” (RLP1, Folder 1969). 
Nevertheless, Lucas considered that discussing political issues was 
part of economists’ job. In 1968, Lucas wrote an open letter to Carne-
gie’s President Guyford Stever to express his support for political dis-
cussions within the faculty.23 Lucas argued that it would be “difficult 
and dangerous” to draw a clear line between “scholarly and political 
activity”, and pledged in favor of policy-oriented academic research: 
most research [in economics] is quite explicitly directed toward improving 
public economic policy. … it would seem to me to be altogether appropri-
ate to advocate these policies [produced by my research] via letters to 
newspapers, to congressmen, and so forth, in addition to describing my 
results in academic journal articles. I regard both types of activity as part 
of my professional life, equally entitled to the support of school services. 
(Ibid., Folder 1968 1/1, Lucas to Stever, 01/02/1968) 
However, Lucas did not seem to write any “letters to newspapers, to 
congressmen” during this period, although he supported his col-
league Leonard Rapping in doing so. Rapping wrote to Congressman 
William S. Moorhead, a democratic representative for Pittsburgh dis-
trict: “[Myself] and three of my colleagues [at Carnegie] (Professor 
Martin Geisel, Professor Robert Lucas and Professor Richard Roll) 
would be willing to serve as unpaid consultants” (RLP1, Rapping to 
Moorhead, 21/05/1969). Rapping supported Moorhead’s motion to 
cut military spending (CR, Vol. 115, 25/04/1969) and his “attempt … 
to take on the Military and its numerous supporters”. Rapping sug-
gested that his role would be to help the Congressman overcome his 
“substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the Defense Department”, given 
that the latter disposes of “incredible resources, both in terms of mon-
ey and manpower” (Ibid.).  
Overall, the first period of Lucas’s career seems to have been dom-
inated by his academic work and the early development of his new 
approach to macroeconomics. However, Lucas did not overlook polit-
ical and policy issues.  
                                                            
23 Following the circulation at Carnegie of different materials against the Vietnam 
War, President Stever had blamed, in a letter to the faculty (11/01/1968), the use 
of the university’s resources (“mails, mimeograph service”) to express “personal 
thinking on controversial public issues”. 
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2.2. The Years of “High Theory”: Lucas at Carnegie, 1969-1973 
Between 1969 and 1973, Lucas wrote the path-breaking articles that 
became his most famous contributions to macroeconomics. His work 
during this period was driven by requests or funding originating 
from policy-making institutions or policy-oriented solicitations. 
The period between June 1969 and the end of 1971 was crucial. Lu-
cas spent the summer at the NBER (1970) and received a fellowship 
from the Brookings Institution (1970-1971; RLP1, Folder 1969, Folder 
1970 1/2). In June 1969, the Federal Reserve Board invited Lucas to 
write a paper about the “econometric testing of the natural rate hy-
pothesis”, to be presented by November 1970 at a Fed conference 
about “The Econometrics of Price Determination” (Ibid.). This com-
missioned paper became “Econometric Testing of the Natural Rate 
Hypothesis” (Lucas, 1972a), further published in the proceedings of 
the conference (Eckstein, 1972). In the same period, Lucas completed 
his “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money” (1972b). 
Lucas also contributed to the new series of macroeconomics con-
ferences, the “Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy”, organized 
by Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer. For the first meeting, Lucas had 
agreed in December 1972 to write a “literature review on the studies 
on the Phillips curve” (RLP1, Folder 1972): this paper became “Econ-
ometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique” (1976 [1973]). 
Earlier in 1972, Brunner wrote to Lucas a letter on a related matter 
(RLP1, Folder 1972, Brunner to Lucas, 14/01/1972). Brunner asked 
him to join a group with other 30 U.S. economists to cooperate in or-
der to gain influence on the public debate about economic policies.24 
Brunner argued how media coverage was biased (“one-sided re-
ports”) toward the “dominant vision” supporting “much and better 
regulation” (Ibid.). According to Brunner: 
It is time that economists with professional record and some reservation 
about the general propensity to find “solutions” in more controls, or larg-
er budgets, assert themselves more effectively in public policy discus-
sion.25 (Ibid.) 
With Brunner’s office serving as a “clearing house”, the group could 
easily “distribute the cost of attending repetitively and somewhat sys-
tematically to important issues” and provide “an established organi-
zation to prepare and launch statements” (Ibid.).26 Lucas answered 
                                                            
24 Brunner presented the idea as “originating from discussion with several friends 
last summer in Europe”, an almost certain reference to a meeting of the Mont 
Pèlerin Society.  
25 A reference to Nixon’s wage-price controls policy (August 1971). 
26 Brunner did not limit the group functions to “launching statements” but also 
envisaged assuring that “at least one of our group is invited to important 
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enthusiastically: “Yes, I would like very much to be a part of the 
group you describe … I would like to help in any way I can” (Ibid., 
Lucas to Brunner, 19/01/1972). However, such a network group was 
never implemented: instead, in 1973, Brunner initiated with Allan 
Meltzer (Carnegie) a smaller group focused on monetary issues, the 
“shadow open market committee” (SOMC), to which Lucas did not 
take part (Meltzer, 2000). 
2.3. The “New Guru” from Chicago, 1973-1986 
The publishing of “Econometric Policy Evaluation” (as a working pa-
per, in the Fall 1973) symbolizes a turn in Lucas’s career and a new 
phase of his engagement with the public. In 1974, Lucas decided to 
move back to the University of Chicago after the Economics Depart-
ment had sent him a full professorship offer. He spent the rest of his 
professional career, also serving as vice-chairman (1975-1983) and 
then chairman (1986-1988). 
From the beginning of 1974, Lucas received many letters asking for 
a copy of the Critique. William Poole reported to Lucas: “my copy of 
[your paper] is wearing out from people reading it, unstapling it, 
Xeroxing it, and restapling it” (RLP1, Poole to Lucas, 01/11/1975). 
Lucas’s paper disseminated to a larger and larger audience after its 
publication in the Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy (1976). Me-
dia coverage on Lucas (and, more broadly, on “rational expectations” 
macroeconomists) gained momentum: between 1975 and 1981, arti-
cles about Lucas appeared in Newsweek, The Wall Street Journal, For-
tune, Business Week, The New York Times Magazine, and, in Europe, The 
Economist and Der Spiegel.27 Probably in response to this coverage, the 
University of Chicago (through its Office of Public Information) re-
leased a press résumé about Lucas, emphasizing the policy implica-
tion of his work: 
[the theory of rational expectations adds] some potent fuel to the argu-
ment long associated with Milton Friedman that government attempts to 
regulate economic activity are not beneficial. … government economic 
policies are a waste of time and effort.28 (RLP1, Folder 1977 2/2) 
                                                                                                                                     
Congressional Hearings” or bringing “our case to a wider attention by means of 
Press Conferences or television interviews” (Ibid.). 
27 For instance, Business Week’s (8/11/1976, 74-75) headline was: “How 
Expectations Defeated Economic Policy”. The article presented Lucas and Sargent 
as “ivory-towered economists” providing “solid theoretical base” to Friedman’s 
policy assertions and going “even beyond”: “no systematic policy can be devised 
that is affecting anything other than the inflation rate”. Der Spiegel (29/11/1976) 
gave a similar interpretation: “for Lucas, the best stabilization policy … is to do 
nothing” (our translation). 
28 However, the text clarifies below that Lucas “disagree[s] with Friedman” on 
altering the money supply to stabilize the economy (Ibid.). 
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The same year, Republican representative John Rousselot used the 
Lucas Critique as a backbone argument for criticizing the federal 
budget before the Congress: 
Mr. Speaker, the following [statement] provides a concise and effective 
critique on the reliability and worth of econometric models. In that, the 
figures we are debating today and tomorrow are based on the calculations 
and results of these Keynesian models. I think it is helpful to understand 
the faulty assumptions on which they are based. (CR, vol. 130, 
22/02/1977) 
The statement introduced by Rousselot was actually written by Paul 
Craig Roberts, a Republican economic advisor.29 The statement be-
longed to a broader strategy for defending the Kemp-Roth bill (which 
aimed at a massive cut on households’ income tax): jointly with the 
use of the Lucas critique to criticize the CBO model, Roberts also pre-
sented alternative results using another econometric model. After-
wards, Roberts corresponded with Lucas, soliciting his advice on the 
matter: 
I have seen your critique of econometric policy evaluation. The subject has 
now been officially raised in the U.S. Congress [by Rousselot], and I be-
lieve your comments on the enclosed exchange [CR mimeo] might be a 
positive contribution to public economic policy. (RLP1, Roberts to Lucas, 
21/03/1977) 
The discussion initiated by Rousselot went on during the session of 
the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress (CR, vol. 130, 
24/06/1977). The Wall Street Journal (18/04/1977, 29/06/1977) cov-
ered both debates, further amplifying the echo of Lucas’s idea in the 
public debate. 
The media success of the Lucas Critique made it particularly ap-
pealing to people outside academia, including researchers in private 
corporations (Monsanto, Merrill Lynch) and policy-making institu-
tions. Dozens of letters to Lucas asked for a copy or send him enthu-
siastic appreciation (RLP1, Folder 1978 1/4 to Folder 1978 4/4).30 By 
the end of the 1970s, Lucas enjoyed then a well-established reputation 
and fame going beyond the academic circles, a reputation that will 
stand during the 1980s. For instance, when invited to give a confer-
                                                            
29 Professor at George Mason (alongside with his former PhD supervisor 
Buchanan; MacLean, 2017, 181-82) Roberts also contributed from the beginning to 
the redaction of the Kemp-Roth bill. Roberts was hired by Representative Jack 
Kemp in 1974, and he built (with Norman B. Ture) an econometric model to 
support the bill and to undermine CBO’s results (Blyth, 2002, 163). Roberts later 
played a key role in Reagan’s campaign and administration (Crouse, 2018, 217). 
30 The public also consulted Lucas about other topics. For instance, Stephen Neal 
(a Democratic representative) consulted Lucas about the idea of publishing 
minutes from the Federal Open Market Committee. Lucas praised this 
suggestion, which will enhance transparency and predictability (RLP1, Folder 
1976 2/2). 
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ence at Ohio State University in 1983, the organizer wrote to Lucas: 
“[attending your lecture], in addition to faculty and graduate stu-
dents, there will be numerous undergraduates and curious people 
from the business community who wants the views of the “new 
guru” from Chicago” (RLP13, Folder “Lectures Notes 1979-1980”, 
William Dewald to Lucas).31 
During this period, Lucas also wrote two academic articles (1977; 
1980a) that clarified and systematized his views. Additionally, he ed-
ited two books of collected writings, one on his own (1981a) and an-
other co-edited with Sargent (1981). Perhaps the most representative 
piece of this period is another article with Sargent, “After Keynesian 
Economics”. Presented at a conference organized by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Boston in 1978, the paper was a “frankly rhetorical 
piece” as the authors themselves described it (RLP, Box 19, Folder 
“After Keynesian Macroeconomics 1978-1979”, Lucas to Sargent, 
09/02/1978).32  
Besides this academic-oriented effort to disseminate his work, Lu-
cas engaged with the public to clarify his views, which shows that 
Lucas’s academic production aligned with his increasing engagement 
with the public. He continued to correspond with politicians, such as, 
for instance, Congressman Phillip Crane.33 In these letters, Lucas clari-
fied to Crane some of his views on economic policy that the Con-
gressman held from a recent article published by Newsweek: 
My work has not focused on particular policy issues … Much of it has 
been devoted to explaining why our econometric models cannot be used 
to “fine tune” the economy. (RLP1, Folder 1978 4/4) 
During this new phase of his interaction with the public, Lucas 
seemed more inclined to speak in the media about policy issues.34 He 
also publicly criticized Reagan’s administration. In two columns pub-
                                                            
31 Also, this reputation travelled outside the U.S. Lucas received also a significant 
number of letters from German and Japanese economists, and Models of Business 
Cycles (1987) was immediately published in a Japanese edition (RLP13, Folder 
“Models of Business Cycles”). 
32 On this episode, see Goutsmedt (2017). Lucas also drew from this piece to give 
a talk at the Graduate School of Chicago’s Annual Management Conference in 
1979, called “The Death of Keynesian Economics” (see DeVroey, 2016, 210). 
33 Crane was a prominent GOP representative and chairman (1977-1979) of a 
powerful conservative lobby, the American Conservative Union. He later ran for 
the nomination for president in 1980, against Reagan. 
34 Lucas was for instance interviewed on BBC2 program “The British Economy” 
(RLP, Box 5, Folder 1982 2/2). However, Lucas felt sometimes that media 
coverage was not faithful to his ideas. In a letter to a journalist of The New York 
Times Magazine (RLP13, Folder “Directions of macroeconomics”, Lucas to 
Mermelstein, undated 1979), Lucas complained harshly about his views being 
“paraphrased by journalists with different background and objectives than 
mine”. We can also add to the list of Lucas’s interviews his conversation with 
Klamer (1984), even though it was intended for an academic audience. 
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lished in The New York Times (26/08/1981, 28/08/1981), Lucas dis-
cusses the lack of long-term consistency of the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act, arguing that it was “discouraging”, as it would lead to high-
er deficits.35 To make his case, Lucas drew a rhetorically strong paral-
lel between his stance and Alexander Hamilton’s “Reports on the 
Public Credit” (1790-1795), presented before Congress as Secretary of 
the Treasury. By paying a tribute to Hamilton and his foresighted 
management of the public debt, Lucas attacked Reagan’s administra-
tion for following the opposite path. For Lucas, Hamilton’s central 
argument “was the recognition that a policy-decision taken today is, 
like it or not, an announcement of general principle by which analo-
gous situations are to be treated in the future.” (1981b) Conversely, 
Reagan’s administration implemented inconsistent decisions to attain 
an equilibrated budget: on the one hand, tax-cuts; on the other, a 
monetary policy promising price stability. Combined, these decisions 
lacked credibility, as their objectives were “obviously inconsistent” 
(Ibid.). Rational expectations constituted the theoretical underpinning 
of Lucas’s opposition to Reagan’s policy: if public deficit soared, 
households and firms would fear debt financing by money creation, 
what would counter the monetary policy implemented by Paul 
Volcker since October 1979. More generally, through his participation 
to the public debate, Lucas seemed to hold the laymen in higher es-
teem than policymakers. Most of his policy agenda relied on the “vir-
tues” of the common people, namely their capacities to pursue their 
own interest in a consistent and forward-looking way—in other 
words, their economic rationality. This underpinned Lucas’s faith in 
the self-regulating abilities of market economies and the negative 
view of government discretionary intervention. 
Lucas’s columns did not go unnoticed and led GOP Senator Ernest 
Hollings to ask his advice about a plan for reducing deficits he had 
just proposed before Congress. Lucas agreed with Hollings’ “empha-
sis on fiscal discipline” and that “the Reagan-Kemp-Roth tax cut was 
a mistake” (RLP1, Folder 1981 1/2). Lucas’s policy agenda pushed 
him to fight against the supply-siders-inspired policies. That is why 
Lucas appeared reluctant to be assimilated to a certainvision of U.S. 
conservatism associated with Reagan’s administration, which he pub-
licly criticized: 
                                                            
35 The act was the fulfillment of the Kemp-Roth project. Lucas had been opposed 
since the beginning to this project: he received the evaluation of the results of the 
tax cuts, which relied on econometric simulation of the Chase Econometric 
Forecasting Model---the model was managed by Michael K. Evans, who was 
convinced of the relevance of Laffer and supply-siders’ ideas (Blyth, 2002, 163). 
Lucas rejected the simulations, regarding them as “just pulled out of the air” 
(RLP1, Folder 1979 2/4). He considered that they should contact Martin Feldstein 
or Robert Barro, if they wanted “competent quantitative evidence on fiscal 
policy”.  
| Robert E. Lucas’s Trajectory through the Public Debate 309 
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 9(2) : 289-314 
It’s hard to be a conservative with the Reagan administration turning to 
fine-tuning, which seems insane to me. So, if being conservative means 
liking their economics, I guess I’m not. (Lucas in Klamer, 1984, 51) 
3. Concluding Remarks 
This article has drawn a broader portrait of Lucas, emphasizing the 
connections between his worldview, his methodology for macroeco-
nomics and his policy recommendations. These aspects of Lucas’s 
work relied on his belief in rational agents, self-stabilizing markets 
and the likely harmfulness of government interventions. Lucas’s poli-
cy agenda, as it appears in his writings, exhibited many similarities 
with some recommendations made by free-market advocates of that 
time. Nevertheless, Lucas’s originality lied in the importance given to 
macroeconomics: he believed in the scientific elaboration of binding 
rules, which would be part of an economic constitution, as well as in 
the necessary methodological transformations for the discipline, aim-
ing at building new models able to assess “scientifically” optimal 
rules.  
The weight he granted to macroeconomics when dealing with pol-
icy issues could have explained his discretion in the public sphere, 
and why his acknowledgments were mostly academic. Indeed, it is 
possible that Lucas’s form of engagement with the public debate 
could have resulted from personal reasons. Following his own justifi-
cation, this could relate to individual characteristics: “I don’t think I 
personally have any particular talent or liking for [advice-giving]” 
(Lucas in Snowdon and Vane, 291). For Lucas, the most important 
issue was to push for the development of new practices in macroeco-
nomics that would encourage and facilitate the kind of policies he 
envisioned. Adopting a discreet and cautious way to deal with public 
debate would have the advantage of strengthening his scientific legit-
imacy and protecting him (to a certain extent) from being accused of 
ideological commitments.  
Such a strategy complied with what Lucas called a “division of la-
bour” (Ibid.) among his colleagues.36 For instance, Sargent completed 
Lucas’s work by developing a more concrete “Rational Expectations 
Theory” of inflation, thus proposing a New Classical explanation of 
U.S. stagflation (Goutsmedt, 2018). However, the subsequent spread 
of New Classical ideas outside academia and their influence in policy-
making institutions remains largely to be recounted. In this story yet 
to build, the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis could constitute an 
important step in a larger channel between academic and policy: not 
only Sargent and Prescott were employed by the Bank as researchers, 
but also its president (Mark Willes) publicly defended the relevance 
                                                            
36 And then he adds: “I am glad that other people do [take] the role of advice-
giving” (Ibid.). 
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of rational expectations to understand inflation and monetary policy. 
In this sense, the use of the Lucas Critique in the Congress and the 
adoption of rational expectations by the supply-siders behind Reagan 
(Blyth, 2002; Greider, 1982) could have played a significant role. 
Therefore, Lucas’s interaction with the public sphere differed from 
the other economists discussed in this special issue: Lucas was not an 
official (or informal) advisor to politicians or policymakers, counsel-
ling and eventually changing their mind about concrete policies (such 
as Walter Heller, or Albert Hirschman); he was not intervening in the 
public debate through the medias, popularization books or confer-
ences to persuade or educate the laymen (as did Arthur Pigou); he 
was not a member of any consultative body to policy-making institu-
tions, producing technical advice and guidance to the conduct of eco-
nomic policy (such as Modigliani or Klein). Nevertheless, his own 
way to intervene in the public debate raised questions about the dif-
ferent channels by which economics and economists could influence 
public reason. 
Archives 
CR. Congressional Records, U.S. Government Publishing Office,  
Washington (DC). Available online at https://archive.org/. 
RLP. Robert E. Lucas Papers, 1960-2011 and undated. David M.            
Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University, 
Durham (NC). 
RLP1. RLP, Boxes 1 to 4. Correspondence, 1968-1981.  
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How to Write a Memo to Convince a  
President: Walter Heller, Policy-Advising, 
and the Kennedy Tax Cut 
Beatrice Cherrier* 
 
Walter Heller’s success in convincing JF Kennedy to pass a “tax cut” when 
he was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors in the 1960s is often 
heralded as the poster child for economists’ policy influence, yet also 
sometimes seen as a lost golden age. The purpose of this paper is to rein-
vestigate how Heller channeled his expertise into policy, and what lessons 
he drew on how economists should engage with public reason. The paper 
first zooms onto the historical “footsteps” of Heller’s CEA tenure: his 
memos. I show that Heller considered himself as “an educator of presi-
dents,” but that in educating, he was also led to commission some aca-
demic work that altered the science he was trying to disseminate. The un-
derlying emphasis, thus, is not just on how economic knowledge affects 
public reason, but also how public reason shapes economics science. I then 
analyze how Heller “theorized” his and his colleagues’ practices in the 
late 1960s, in particular what stance he took on three contentious issues: 
the place of science and persuasion in advisers’ interaction with their pub-
lics, how much normative values are involved in advising, and whether 
advising should rely on a disciplinary consensus. I conclude that the insti-
tutional and personal context of the 1960s entailed a highly personalized 
vision of advising, at odd with the tool-based vision underlying the sub-
sequent “economicization” of economic policy in the following decades. 
Keywords: Heller (Walter W.), fiscal policy, tax cut, Keynesianism, Tobin 
(James), Kennedy (John F.) 
De l’art de murmurer à l’oreille du prince: des « memos » du conseiller 
économique Walter Heller aux reductions d’impôts de JF Kennedy 
L’un des exemples les plus donnés pour illustrer l’influence des écono-
mistes sur la politique publique est celui de Walter Heller, président du 
Council of Economic Advisors, qui réussit à convaincre J.F. Kennedy, de 
mettre en place une réduction d’impôts massive dans les années 1960. Cet 
article documente la manière dont Heller a transformé son expertise éco-
nomique en politique publique, et les leçons qu’il en a tirées sur les inte-
ractions entre experts et décideurs. Pour ce faire, j’analyse la vision de 
l’économiste comme éducateur qui se dégage de ses « mémos », et 
                                                            
*CNRS and THEMA, University of Cergy-Pontoise, beatrice.cherrier@gmail.com 
I am very grateful to participants in the Lausanne ‘Economics and Public Reason’ 
workshop and in the LSE economic sociology workshop, as well as to Cléo Chas-
sonnery-Zaïgouche, Alexandre Chirat, Harro Maas, Marco Guidi, Marianne 
Johnson, Steven Medema, Roberto Romani as well as two anonymous referees for 
their helpful comments and suggestions. 
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j’explique que ce n’est pas seulement la recherche économique qui nour-
rissait les débats de politique publique, mais que sa volonté de convaincre 
le président conduisit Heller à superviser de nouvelles recherches macroé-
conomiques. J’étudie enfin la place qu’attribuait Heller à la science et à la 
rhétorique dans les interactions entre les conseillers économiques et leurs 
publics, l’inévitable dimension normative et l’importance de rechercher et 
de rendre visible un consensus disciplinaire en économie. Je conclue que 
cette vision très ‘personnalisée’ du conseil aux décideurs contraste avec les 
modes technocratiques et anonymes par lesquels les économistes ont plus 
récemment influencé les politiques publiques.  
Mots-clés : Heller (Walter W.), politique fiscale, réduction d’impôts, 
Keynesianisme, Tobin (James), Kennedy (John F.) 
JEL: A10, A13, A14, B20, B29, B31 
 
 
Today’s talk of an ‘intellectual revolution’ and a ‘new 
economics’ arises not out of startling discoveries of new 
economic truths but out of the swift and progressive 
weaving of modern economics into the fabric of national 
thinking and policy (Heller, 1966) 
 
As macroeconomist Jim Tobin reflected on the legacy of Walter Hel-
ler, the famed chair of John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s Council of Econom-
ic Advisors (hereafter CEA), he wrote: “the most important memos 
were for JFK. Walter knew how to get them read. He made friends 
with Ken O’Donnell, gate-keeper to the Oval Office, who would slip 
Walter’s memo into the weekend Hyannisport briefcase. Walter had 
made it easy to read—short, pointed, colorful, and studded with the 
figures of speech that were the Heller trademark. The Treasury’s thir-
ty pages of bureaucratic prose were no competition” (Tobin, 1991, 
105). The quote illustrates how crucial documenting seemingly anec-
dotal aspects of economists’ work is to understand the scope and na-
ture of their influence on public reason, a topic currently drawing his-
torians and sociologists’ attention and economists’ anxiety.1  
                                                            
1 Berman and Hirschman (2014) survey hundreds of work documenting 
economists’ influence on policies. Economists in the US and Europe alike have 
recently published dozens of worried columns on their loss of influence. 
Examples include: “Economics Gets a Presidential Demotion,” 02/14/17 
(https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-14/economics-gets-a-
presidential-demotion), “Why the Public Has Stopped Paying Attention to 
Economists” (06/28/16, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2016/06/28 
/Why-Public-Has-Stopped-Paying-Attention-Economists), “The Public Trusts 
Academic Economists But the Media are Losing Interest” (http://www.res. 
org.uk/view/art3Jul16Features.html), “Why Voters Don’t Buy it When 
Economists Say Global Trade is Good” (https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
07/31/upshot/why-voters-dont-buy-it-when-economists-say-global-trade-is-
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That Heller was successful in influencing economic policies is 
quite uncontroversial. He was instrumental in putting a War on Pov-
erty on the presidential agenda (Haveman et al., 2015) and in turning 
human capital theory into an argument in favor of federal funding for 
education (Holden and Biddle, 2018). Most famously, he managed to 
convince Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson to implement a massive 
income and business tax cut. The facts are well known: Eisenhower’s 
legacy was a sluggish decade, with growth stuck at 2,5% per year and 
unemployment at 8%.2 A recurring budget deficit, which topped 12 
billion in 1959, impeded much-needed defense, education and wel-
fare expenditures. Kennedy’s campaign was consequently focused on 
the promise of restoring growth, of “get[ting] this country moving 
again.” The candidate had nevertheless straightforwardly rejected the 
fiscal stimuli proposed by those economists, including Paul Samuel-
son, who had participated in his Democratic Advisory Committee. 
Kennedy came to the oval office with the notion, inherited from his 
father, that the budget should be balanced and the money supply 
tightly controlled. Kennedy gradually became more favorable to sus-
taining a budget deficit, and by early 1963, he had submitted to Con-
gress the largest peacetime voluntary budget deficit: $12 billion. He 
proposed to reduce income tax rate from 20-91% to 14-65% and cor-
porate income tax rate from 52 to 47% and to abolish loopholes and 
preferential deductions to enlarge the tax base. He promised that, 
should the Congress pass his tax cuts, the 1965 budget would be 
equilibrated. The proposal was finally enacted in 1964, under John-
son. 1965 saw the smallest Federal deficit of the decade (1 billion), 
strong growth and unemployment down to 4%.3 The trend persisted 
throughout the decade, with inflation pressures gradually building in 
response to Johnson’s War on Poverty and the Vietnam War.  
Though protagonist histories developed by Herbert Stein (1969) 
and backed by Collins (1981) have suggested that the fiscal revolution 
of the 1960s was shaped by the business community, the pivotal role 
of Heller in swaying Kennedy has since been documented by Michael 
Bernstein (2001), Irving Berstein (1991) or James Hyllier (2018) among 
                                                                                                                                     
good.html), “Brexit Voters are Ignoring Experts” (07/01/16, https://www. 
project-syndicate.org/commentary/brexit-voters-ignoring-experts-by-jean-
pisani-ferry-2016-07?barrier=accessreg ). See also Benassy-Queré, Blanchard and 
Tirole (2017). 
2 This quick chronology is based on Bernstein (2001, chapter 3). See also 
references in footnote 3.  
3 The extent to which the tax cut fueled this period of prosperity, and subsequent 
imbalances, is still fiercely debated. For a positive evaluation of their legacy, see 
Collins (2000) and Bernstein (2001). For a more critical assessment, see De Long 
(1997), Romer (2007), Kudlow and Domitrovic (2016). On how the new economics 
CEA raised the prestige of economists, see Bernstein (2001), Okun (1969, 14), and 
Business Week (1966, February 5, 125). 
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others.4 A professor of public finance at the University of Minnesota, 
Heller has contributed to shift economists’ image from ivory tower 
technicians to useful experts and to strengthen public trust. A testi-
mony to his public visibility, he made Time’s cover twice in two years. 
No other CEA chair made the cover of the magazine before late 1976, 
and none ever made it twice as CEA chair. While his peculiar status 
as the “economic experts’ expert” and the scope of his influence have 
been documented, its nature, channels, and consequences on the body 
of knowledge produced by economists are less so.  
The purpose of this paper is thus to use Heller’s successful at-
tempts to persuade Kennedy as a case study to reinvestigate the in-
teractions between economic knowledge and public reason. My goal 
is not to perform comparative analysis, and to figure out when Heller 
succeeded and when he failed, of whether and why he was more in-
fluential than his predecessors. While previous accounts of the Ken-
nedy CEA have emphasized the 1962 Economic Report, I focus on the 
more personalized, and high-frequency material Tobin acknowledged 
has been Heller’s preferred weapon, his memos. I show that they re-
flect Heller’s vision of himself as “an educator of president,” but that 
in educating, he was also led to commission some academic work that 
altered the science he was trying to disseminate. The underlying em-
phasis, thus, is not just on how economic knowledge affects public 
reason, but also how public reason shapes economics science.  I then 
analyze how Heller “theorized” his and his colleagues’ practices in 
the late 1960s, in particular what stance he took on three contentious 
issues: the place of science and persuasion in advisers’ interaction 
with their publics, how much normative values are involved in advis-
ing, and whether advising should rely on a disciplinary consensus. I 
conclude that the institutional and personal context of the 1960s en-
tailed a highly personalized vision of advising, one that is less em-
phasized in the many recent histories of the tool-based “economiciza-
tion” of policies in the last decades.  
1. “The President’s Economic Education”  
and the Art of Memos 
The most idiosyncratic aspect of the tax cut episode was probably 
Kennedy’s knack for economics, his willingness to discuss policy as 
well as theoretical aspects, his eagerness to read and digest memos 
and newspaper articles. Yale macroeconomist James Tobin remem-
bers telling the president that he may not be the best pick as CEA 
                                                            
4 Stein (1969) argued that the Committee fro Economic Development he 
represented developed a ‘commercial Keynesianism’ supporting active 
discretionary budget deficit going beyond the then popular use of automatic 
stabilizers, but Hillyer (2018) documents that Heller’s CEA has, in fact, 
architected and pushed for this policy view earlier.  
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member because he was a “sort of ivory-tower economist,” to which 
the latter responded: “that’s the best kind. I’m a sort of ivory-tower 
president” (quoted Bernstein, 2001, 267, fn. 54). Yet, that Kennedy 
was drawn to economics did not make Heller’s job easier. Not only 
was the president surrounded by advisors with conflicting economic 
policy views, not least among interventionist economists, but it was 
not clear, back then, that the role of the CEA as defined in the 1946 
Employment Act was to promote specific policies. First CEA chair-
man Edwin Nourse and Eisenhower’s chairman Arthur Burns con-
ceived their role as being mere advisors to the president, providing 
technical reports and private forecasts and refraining from making 
public statements or testifying before Congress. The only exception 
was Truman’s second chairman, Leon Keyserling, whose more activ-
ist stance created a stir (see Bernstein, 2001, chapter 4). It was never-
theless one more congenial to Walter Heller’s vision of the role of the 
economists within society. 
The son of a civil engineer committed to public service, Heller was, 
by his own admission, one of those children of the Great-Depression 
who turned to economics because “explaining why [the economy flat 
on its back] and try to do something about it, seemed a high calling.”5 
Economists from the University of Wisconsin, where Heller got his 
PhD, boasted a strong record in successfully influencing Wisconsin’s 
policy-making, not least his PhD advisor, fiscalist Harold Groves 
(Johnson, 2015). Heller’s wartime contribution as a Treasury tax ex-
pert, his participation into the Marshall Plan and his lobbying for fed-
erally funded education in the late 1950 strengthened his identity as a 
“policy-oriented economist,” a “do-something-about-it economist.” 
As he was nominated CEA chair, he was ready, not only to provide 
forecasts and technical advice, but also to promote the policies he be-
lieved were supported by good science, to convince the president, to 
testify before Congress, to engage the media and the public.  He also 
encouraged his two fellow CEA members to do the same.  Tobin and 
budget specialist Kermit Gordon fully shared Heller’s conception of 
the role of an economic expert, as did those economists who either 
work as CEA staff economists, Robert Solow and Arthur Okun, or 
who were close shadow advisors, like Paul Samuelson.6 In a 1961 
Time article, the 3 CEA frontiersmen thus described themselves as 
“pragmatists.” Promoting the tax cut was a team effort. All 3 council 
members had extensive discussions with Kennedy on policy as well 
as on the common theoretical foundations they had borrowed from 
the New Economics articulated by Paul Samuelson at MIT. 
                                                            
5 Quoted in the article “The Pragmatic Professor” published in Time, Friday 
March 03, 1961. See also Pechman (1987) and Tobin (1991). 
6 Samuelson and Tobin’s vision of the role of science and advocacy in public-
advising is detailed in Romani (2018). 
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That Heller primarily conceived his mission as educating the pres-
ident was pervasive in his favorite tool: his memos. While communi-
cating with presidents through memos was a standard practice al-
ready, Kennedy received more than 300 from the CEA (Heller, 1967, 
29). Some were written by Heller’s colleagues, in particular Tobin, 
some were collective and aimed at discussing the economic outlook, 
specific events, or outlined rebuttals of newspaper opinion columns.7 
Heller’s ones, always signed, were short, devoid of technical jargon 
but not of figures, with a clear and apparent structure, and main ar-
guments systematically underlined. They usually began with a quan-
tified depiction of the economic situation, a brief policy proposal, and 
extensive response to possible counterarguments. Though Heller’s 
ability to discuss technical issues in simple term was certainly not 
unusual among economists and policy advisors, Tobin (1991, 103-104) 
nevertheless explains that Heller had “an unmatched talent for find-
ing the revealing examples, instructive jokes, and colorful metaphors 
that made his points succinctly, convincingly, and accurately. Heller’s 
memos were so convincing that, he remembers, president Johnson 
once held up one of his memos at a Cabinet meeting and said “Here’s 
one of Walter Heller’s memos. See how it’s set up? That’s the way I 
want you all to write your memos” (quoted in Crichton, 1987).  
Below is one of the memos that convinced Kennedy to endorse the 
1963 Economic Report and the Special Message to the Congress on 
Tax Reform Heller had contributed to draft, as attested by the almost 
verbatim use of some arguments in Kennedy’s speeches. By mid-
1962, Kennedy had already agreed to run discretionary budget defi-
cits, but, as detailed in the next section, his advisors fiercely disagreed 
on what these deficits should fund.  
 
Excerpt of a “Memorandum for the President” by Walter Heller, Decem-
ber 16, 1962.8 
 
Subject: Recap of Issues on Tax Cuts (and the Galbraithian alternative) 
 
A. The Economic Case for Fiscal Action 
 
1. The cost of a slack economy 
a. The $30-40 billion loss of potential output in 1962 alone is 
—8 times our total foreign aid, 
                                                            
7 See for instance “US-European Budget Comparisons as Seen by the Post,” June 
4, 1962, Heller to President, https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer 
/Archives/JFKPOF-074-008.aspx. Unless otherwise mentioned, all archival 
material has been retrieved from the Digital Collection of the John F. Kennedy 
Presidential Library and Museum. Rather than providing boxes and folder 
references, then, I will provide web link throughout the paper. 
8 Retrieved at https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-
063a-009.aspx. 
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—equals total public and private expenditures on health and medical 
care 
—well exceeds total expenditures on education 
—is almost equal to the total GNP of Italy 
b. Similar losses have occurred in each of the past five years. Next year, 
without a tax cut, we would face a loss of the same order: 
—Normal growth of the labor force plus growth in productivity add 
more than $20 billion to our productive potential next year 
—Optimistic forecasts of actual GNP growth for 1963 without a tax cut is 
of roughly this magnitude 
c. We do not predict a recession in the first half of 1963, but there is still 
one chance in four or five that it will occur. And as expansion continues 
at a slow pace, the chance of a recession steadily increases.  
d. These are avoidable losses. Economics is no exact science; but econo-
mists are almost unanimous in holding that an active fiscal policy can 
prevent this waste. And experience in other countries, where popular 
and parliamentary devotion to outworn fiscal doctrine is less rigid, pro-
vides impressive evidence to support them. 
 
2. The danger of too little and too late 
a. This is a big country. For example: A budget deficit of $15 billion: 
—would be about 3% of potential GNP in 1963. 
—Is equivalent to a deficit of $1-1 ½ billion in 1933 (when GNP was 1/10 
of its present level). 
—Is less as a percentage of GNP than Ike’s record deficit of $12.5 billion, 
which translates into $16.5 billion in today’s GNP 
Our economy is basically healthy, but one doesn’t treat an elephant ear-
ache with an eyedropper. ‘This metaphor has not been certified by Gal-
braith.) 
b. Fiscal medicine is reasonably sure in its effects, but it takes time to 
work … 
 
B. The Political Case for Fiscal Action 
 
1. Congress may be lukewarm, but powerful groups throughout the 
country are ready for action. When the Chicago Board of Commerce, the 
AFL-CIO, the CED, and the US Chamber are on the same side—when 
repeated editorials in Business Week are indistinguishable from those 
appearing in the Washington Post—the prospect for action cannot be 
wholly dim. Can 3000 members of the NY Economic Club be wrong?  
 
2. … 
 
3. Our world leadership—brilliantly asserted only a few weeks ago in the 
political field—would be strengthened by vigorous expansion of our 
economy. Continued economic slack saps our prestige and weakens the 
dollar. One looks for economic miracles today not to the homeland of 
revolutionary economic expansion, but to Western Europe and Japan. A 
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booming US economy can do more to cure economic sickness in Latin 
America—and other producing areas—than all our foreign aid …  
 
C. Why Cut Taxes Rather THAN Go the Galbraith Way?  
… 
 
1. But how could we spend an extra $9 billion in a year or two? This 
would be a 40 percent increase over FY 1963 Federal non-defense ex-
penditures (excluding interest, agriculture, and social security) … At-
tempts to enlarge spending at the rate required to do the economic job 
would lead to waste, bottlenecks, profiteering and scandal.  
 
2. Politically, the case for tax rather than expenditure action is strong: 
—An expansion of spending would bring all of the charges of “fiscal irre-
sponsibility” that attach to tax cuts—after all, deficits would be practical-
ly the same either way. 
—But on top of this would be all of the opposition to expansion of gov-
ernment, to over-centralization, to a “power grab” and a “take-over” of 
the cities, the educational system, the housing market. 
 
3. Tax-cut-induced deficits are also far more acceptable to the world fi-
nancial community than expenditure-induced deficits, ie, far less likely to 
touch off new gold outflows … 
 
In these memos, Heller rolled a peculiar argumentative style out. 
He usually began by explaining how the tax cut was consistent with 
Kennedy’s overarching policy ends, that is, national defense and 
growth (it was an argumentative strategy he had already successfully 
wielded on education funding, Holden and Biddle (2017) argue). This 
is why the above December 1962 memo began with “top of economic 
agenda—must match our progress in foreign policy and defense with 
a restoration of full vigor of our domestic economy.” This strategy 
was taken up by Kennedy in the first sentences of his Special message 
to the Congress a month later:  
the most urgent task facing our Nation at home today is to end the tragic 
waste of unemployment and unused resources—to step up the growth 
and vigor of our national economy—to increase job and investment op-
portunities—to improve our productivity—and thereby to strengthen our 
nation’s ability to meet its worldwide commitments for the defense and 
growth of freedom.9 
Having argued that his proposed economic policy was in line with 
the President’s broader aims, Heller proceeded to frame complex pol-
icy choices in simple economic terms: it was all about bridging “the 
gap.” Already in memos issued early 1961, Heller hammered that the 
                                                            
9 “Special Message to the Congress on Tax Reduction and Reform,” January 24, 
1963, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9387. 
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key question was “how do we close the gap between existing and po-
tential levels of employment, production and income.” He used the 
term so much that after a 1961 hearing Joe Pechman told him “gee, 
you ought to stop talking so much about the gap because it just isn’t 
doing any good.”10  
Though Heller refrained from using technical terms in his memos, 
he did not shy away from quantification. At the end of 1961, he 
sensed that he needed a better picture of how increasing the capacity 
of production utilization could help “bridge the gap.” He therefore 
asked CEA staff economist Arthur Okun to quantify this “output 
gap.” The resulting paper (Okun, 1962), which introduced the famous 
“Okun law,” illustrates the influence of policy concerns on economic 
research. In the introduction, he explained that “if programs to lower 
unemployment from 5 ½ to 4 percent of the labor are viewed as at-
tempts to raise the economy’s “grade” from 94 ½ to 96 [use of produc-
tion capacity], the case for them may not seem compelling. Focus on 
the ‘gap’ helps to remind policy-makers of the large reward associat-
ed with such an improvement.” Using 3 different techniques to esti-
mate the relationship between unemployment and real GNP, he une-
quivocally concluded that each extra percentage point in the unem-
ployment rate above four percent has been associated with about a 
three percent decrement in real GNP.  
Setting the “full employment without inflationary pressure” target 
at 4% was a key assumption of the paper, though Okun explained 
that another target would only change the figures, not the method. It 
reflected, in his own word, a “subjective judgment” by Heller and his 
council economists (Okun, 1969, 18). “I remember the general judg-
ment that that’s about where the public’s tolerance of inflation would 
give out. Nobody at that time would have thought that 3 or 4 percent 
inflation would be an acceptable situation in the American economy. 
That’s really a judgment about what kind of public reaction you get to 
the tradeoff between consumer prices and unemployment rather than 
the question of what the real terms are on which the tradeoff oper-
ates,” Okun (1969, 19) later explained.  It was not the only case where 
Heller’s quest for sound theoretical and empirical basis for the poli-
cies he was advocated stimulated new research. At about the same 
time, he asked Burton Weisbrod, senior staff economist at the CEA, to 
expand his quantitative analysis of the external benefits of education 
(Holden and Biddle, 2017).   
The last paragraphs of Heller’s memos were usually aimed at de-
dramatizing the consequences of a tax cut, namely budget deficits. He 
did so by showing that countries exhibiting a more rapid growth than 
the US, such as France, Italy or Germany, were not shy of running 
                                                            
10 Transcript of CEA Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 08/1/1964 (https://www. 
jfklibrary.org/sites/default/files/archives/JFKOH/Council%20of%20Economic
%20Advisers/JFKOH-CEA-01/JFKOH-CEA-01-TR.pdf), 293.  
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deficits to support aggregate demand. He also followed a gradual ap-
proach, first convincing Kennedy not to raise taxes to fund the addi-
tional $1 billion military expenses needed to face the building of a 
Berlin Wall in the summer of 1961 (see Okun, 1969, 12-13). He also set 
to counter the “fiscal irresponsibility” argument, occasionally going 
downright political: “under present programs and outlook, a deficit 
in fiscal ‘62 is already in the cards,” he wrote in March 1961. “Once 
fiscal virginity is lost, the size of the deficit matters very little to the 
critics of ‘fiscal irresponsibility.’ The Eisenhower $12 billion deficit 
should restrain the stone-throwing of Republican critics. Our deficit 
would be less, and it would come at the right time.”11 
2. Educating (or Neutralizing) the Whole Decision Chain  
2.1. Persuading the Executive Branch 
Educating the president was only part of Heller’s job. The whole deci-
sion chain had to be persuaded, in particular skeptical presidential 
advisors and dissenting voices had to be silenced. In those years, 
macroeconomic expertise within the executive branch was scattered 
across the CEA, Douglas Dillon and Robert Roosa’s Treasury, David 
Bell’s Bureau of Budget and the Federal Reserve Board, whose chair, 
William McChesney Martin, served from 1951 to 1970. Their task was 
to provide forecasts, advice and coordination, and prepare the budg-
et. Beyond routine disagreement on forecasts, these economists held 
divergent visions of the major economic threat Kennedy had to deal 
with. Dillon, Roosa and Martin were worried about the growing im-
balance in foreign payments and the associated risk of gold drain, 
and Martin also closely monitored the deterioration of the value of 
the dollar. They also believed that the high level of unemployment 
was the consequence of the “changing structure of the labor force” 
rather than of slacking demand. 
To dismiss “the official Republican diagnosis (or excuse) is that 
growing unemployment is due to changing structure of the labor 
force”, Heller claimed that science was on his side. An early 1961 
memo accordingly contrasted “the ‘correct’ analysis … would be that 
most of our unemployment would respond to over-all measures de-
signed to stimulate demand and investment … would call for sub-
stantial additional spending, tax cuts and deficits” with “the ‘incor-
rect’ policy position that most of the unemployment and under-
                                                            
11 Council of Economic Advisors, “A Second Look at Economic Policy in 1961,” 
March 17, 1961, https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/ 
063a/JFKPOF-063a-007. 
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capacity operation are the result of structural factors.”12 Heller also 
emphasized the non-partisan character of his policies by providing 
long lists of individuals and organizations across the political spec-
trum that he had managed to convince that a tax cut was the best pol-
icy. A December 1962 briefing book listed the Committee for Econom-
ic Development, the AFL-CIO, New York Governor Nelson Rockefel-
ler, the National Association of Business Economists, and, ironically, 
most of Eisenhower’s CEA members.13 
Heller copied those memos to Kennedy’s closest policy aids. Ted 
Sorensen, Myer Feldman ad Richard Godwin, who had fiercely op-
posed budget deficits during the campaign, came to agree with the 
CEA, as did Treasury and Bureau of Budget officials. Heller invited 
them to meet with Fed chairman Martin on a monthly basis. He close-
ly monitored the agenda and exchanges of these “quadriad” meetings 
(Ackley, 1974, 21). Through his memos, Heller even managed to de-
feat an alternative proposal to replace the $10 billions tax cuts with a 
$9 billions expenditure increase. The idea was carried by Kenneth 
Galbraith, who since their Harvard students’ day was much closer to 
Kennedy than Heller, Tobin or Gordon were. Galbraith, like 
Sorensen, was more concerned than Heller with the structural nature 
of unemployment, as well as with the political feasibility of the stimu-
li and its long-term economic effects. He thus favored public spend-
ing and education investment over a tax cut. Though he was then 
Ambassador in India, he was around Washington in the summer and 
actively fought Heller’s proposal (Parker, 2005, chapter 16). In a June 
1962 memo to Kennedy, he explained: “I do not think the country is 
ready for it … We cut taxes but do not pass an education bill. Not 
good … The psychological effect of an expansion drive of this sort [a 
program to make jobs] will be just as great as a tax cut.”14 In response, 
Heller added a “Why cut taxes rather than go the Galbraith way?” 
section to the December 1962 memo reproduced above: “how could 
we spend an extra $9 billion in a year or two?,” he wrote. “Attempts 
to enlarge spending at the rate required to do the economic job would 
lead to waste, bottlenecks, profiteering and scandal.” Moreover, extra 
spending would make the government vulnerable to suspicions of 
“over-centralization, power grad of the cities, the educational sys-
tem.” Tax-cut-induced deficit was more acceptable to the world fi-
nancial community, he added, “ie, far less likely to touch off new gold 
outflows.” 
                                                            
12 Memo from Heller to president, 02/24/61, “‘Blue Ribbon’ Advisory Committee 
on Full Recovery” (https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/ 
JFKPOF-063a-007.aspx). 
13 Heller, “Brief Book on Economic Matters,” 20 December 1962 
(https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-063a-009.aspx). 
14 Memorandum from Galbraith to President on “Tax Reduction,” June 6, 1962 
(https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-056-010.aspx). 
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2.2. Neutralizing the Fed 
Neither was Heller shy to testify before the Joint Economic Commit-
tee of the Congress, in an attempt to win support for the forthcoming 
bill. In the end, the only enduring resistance came for Fed chairman 
Martin. The longstanding fight for influence between Martin and Hel-
ler was not restricted to the tax cut issue. Martin was not trained as an 
economist, and was therefore impervious to Heller’s arguments.  He 
took office in March 1951 just after negotiating, as assistant secretary 
of the Treasury, a landmark agreement between the Treasury and the 
Fed (Hertzel and Leach, 2012). The 1951 accord exempted the Fed 
from the interest rates pegging meant to support the government war 
debt financing, and he was therefore eager to reassess the Fed’s new-
found ability to pursue independent monetary policy. When Kennedy 
was elected, he did not offer his resignation, as was the practice in 
those years. To counter the deteriorating balance-of-payment, stabi-
lize the value of the dollar and contain the inflationary pressures 
which he believed would derive from a tax cut, Martin intended to 
raise interest rates. In the early months of the presidency, he made it 
clear that he did not see fit to offset the upward pressures on the in-
terest rates associated with the fledging recovery. 
Heller’s counter-attack was multifaceted. He asked Tobin, whose 
command of monetary policy was unrivalled, to write detailed and 
technical notes for the president. In his own memos, the chair took a 
broader view, emphasizing that the success of the tax cut required the 
implementation of an appropriate “mix.” He was walking a tight 
rope: “monetary policy should be used, as needed, for balance-of-
payments or price stability reasons,” he conceded, “but don’t offset 
the expansionary effect of tax cuts,” he immediately underlined.15 He 
argued that monetary policy should be discussed within quadriad 
meetings for the sake of “economic policy coordination,” and sug-
gested to fill the board of directors of the 12 district Banks with New 
Frontiersmen like Tobin or Solow. He repeatedly tried to convince 
Martin that, while short-term interests rates should be raised as need-
ed to avoid a gold drain, the Fed should buy long-term bonds so as to 
keep long-term interests rates low (“buying long”). This would stimu-
late investment and risk-taking, he argued. Heller also brought their 
disagreement to the media, an unusual practice in these years: in the 
1961 Time article, he declared: “high interest rates and budget sur-
pluses are incompatible: an Administration has to choose one or the 
other. Since both tend to hold down demand, tight money and budg-
et surplus acting together have a gravely depressing impact on the 
economy.” 
                                                            
15 Heller, “Memorandum for the President,” January 27, 1963, Heller papers, box 
19, JFK Library, online copy: https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/archival/1197/item/ 
3565. 
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Sensing that he would not convince Martin, Heller labored toward 
proposing alternatives to control inflationary pressures. In the 1962 
CEA report, he therefore advocated wage and price guideposts 
whereby wage increases should be guided by expected gains in 
productivity. And in the Spring of 1962, he and other advisors con-
vinced Kennedy to oppose price increases in the Steel industry. He 
also sought to alleviate the balance-of-payments constraint. The gold 
drain had been accelerating since the beginning of 1962, with the con-
sequence that Martin was taking measures to raise the short-term in-
terest rate. Heller convinced Kennedy to make a public statement to 
restore faith in the dollar. “The United States will not devalue its dol-
lar … I have confidence in it, and I think that if others examine the 
wealth of this country and its determination to bring its balance of 
payments into order, which it will do, I think that they will feel that 
the dollar is a good investment and as good as gold,” Kennedy de-
clared during a transatlantic TV broadcast on July 23 1962.16  Heller 
never succeeded in bringing Martin into line, and the Fed rates dou-
bled during Kennedy’s presidency. He nevertheless felt he had 
avoided more dramatic hikes on short and, more important for the 
policy mix, long term rates.17 
2.3. Engaging the Public 
Heller’s final target was the lay public. In the early months of his ten-
ure, he wrote in a memo to Kennedy that “a committee could con-
tribute to public education on … “modern” solution such as deficit 
financing and expanded government programs, thus overcoming in 
part the results of eight years of miseducation and retrogression in 
economic thinking under the Eisenhower Administration (see foot-
note 13).” Heller devoted considerable energy to give talk to citizens, 
labor and professional organization, and also seized the opportunity 
to preach the Gospel through the media. He, Tobin or Samuelson, 
who had refused to chair the CEA but kept an eye on its progresses, 
regularly published popularization articles in Business Week, Time, 
Life, Business Insider, and so forth. In a December 1962 memo, he ex-
plicitly outlined why educating the public was both crucial and diffi-
cult, in terms that resonate today: 
Problem of public attitude greater here, perhaps because of greater public 
participation in government decisions; Also, Americans are more prone to 
a tendency of ‘each man his own economist.’ In other countries, they’re 
                                                            
16 See https://www.armstrongeconomics.com/research/the-president-kennedys 
-telstar-news-conference-of-july-23-1962/. 
17 The 1962 Economic Report praised the Fed for its long-maturity Treasury 
securities purchase program, one aimed at bringing down long-term interest 
rates.  
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more likely to ‘leave it to the experts.’ And who’s to say that our situation 
is worse, for a democracy?18 
In his memos, Heller therefore looked for ways to overcome “Ameri-
can people and the Congress’s strong aversion to budget deficit.”19 
His solution was to “repeat ‘deficit of inertia vs creative deficit for 
expansion” argument,” and this was precisely how Kennedy January 
1963’s message to Congress was framed: “our choice today is not be-
tween a tax cut and a balanced budget. Our choice is between chronic 
deficits resulting from chronic slack, on the one hand, and transitional 
deficit temporarily enlarged by tax revision designed to promote full 
employment and thus make possible an ultimately balanced budget,” 
the president asserted.  
Heller resigned in November 1964, in spite of Johnson’s request 
that he stayed for another term. He was succeeded by Gardner Ack-
ley, and remained a close advisor to the president. Ironically, he soon 
found himself on Martin’s side. As Johnson proceeded into his War on 
Poverty program, Heller sensed that the overheated economy had to 
be cooled by a tax increase. Absent such measure in the 1965 budget, 
Martin was right in warning that he would raise interest rates. This 
time, Heller failed to convince the president. 
3. Does the Advisor Trump the Scholar?  
Heller’s View of the “Political Economist” 
After his stint at the CEA, Heller returned to holding a professorship 
at the University of Minnesota for the rest of his life. Amidst his nu-
merous talks to all sorts of lay and professional audiences, his testi-
monies, and his introductory economics and public finance courses, 
he found time to reflect on “Advising and Consensus in Economic 
Policy Making,” the title of the first Godkin lecture he gave at Har-
vard in March 1966, published the next year. In those lectures, he took 
strong views on three characteristics of the economist’s public role 
which had been hotly debated before and ever since: the respective 
role of positive and normative analysis, of science, education and per-
suasion, and of disciplinary consensus.  
First, Heller insisted that “value judgments are an inescapable, ob-
ligatory and desirable part of the life of an economic adviser.”  “Mere-
ly selecting objectives for economic policy, as one must, involves us in 
normative choices,” he continued. “‘Full employment,’ ‘high growth,’ 
and ‘price stability’ may have a hard economic ring, but they are only 
proxies, if you will, for such social goals as personal fulfillment, a ris-
                                                            
18 Heller, “Brief Book on Economic Matters, 20 December 1962, Deficits & Debt 
#1.” https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/063a/JFKPOF-
063a-009. 
19 Heller, “Brief Book on Economic Matters, 20 December 1962.” 
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ing quality of life, and equity between fixed and variable income re-
cipients.” He even considered that “value judgment are obligatory un-
der the Employment Act, which requires the setting of target levels of 
employment, production, and purchasing power” and that pretend-
ing otherwise would make the adviser “unfit to serve.” It is therefore 
the task of the political economist to “press the case” for some 
measures and against others. Yet, Heller did not believe that in doing 
so, the economist was engendering his objectivity, scientific credibil-
ity and integrity. Those were ensured by “selective silence,” by keep-
ing close ties with his professional base, and by returning to academia 
after a period of service in the government.  
Another reason why Heller did not believe his “open advocacy” in 
favor of a tax cut, a war on poverty or price guideposts endangered 
his scientific integrity is that he perceived them as directly deriving 
from ends set by the Full Employment act and the President and 
those means “correct analysis” were pointing to. More important than 
analyzing and advocating, therefore, was his education mission: “edu-
cation—of the president, by the President, and for the president—is 
an inescapable part of an economic advisor function,” he wrote. Hel-
ler took office with the view that “the major barrier to getting the 
country’s economy moving again lay in the economic ignorance and 
stereotypes that prevailed in the land” (Heller, 1967, 26). He thus la-
bored so that “the analytical models of the economist” are implanted 
“in the minds of Presidents, congressmen and public leader.” He was 
confident that economists’ conceptual advances and quantitative re-
search would “replac[e] emotion with reason” (Ibid., 9). What he and 
his colleagues considered dangerous “myths and false fears” includ-
ed the notion that sound public management required a balanced 
budget.20 Even economists had to be re-educated, since, they were 
unduly focused on mitigating “cycles” rather than “closing the out-
put gap.”  
The first mind to educate what that of the president, but as Ken-
nedy himself conceived the “White House as a pulpit of public educa-
tion in economics” (Heller, 1967, 26), education “of” the president 
turned into education “by” the president.  An example Heller, Tobin 
(1991, 103-104) and Okun (1969, 13-14) often referred to was the 
commencement address Kennedy gave at Yale in June 1962. The pres-
ident’s speech did not merely closely mirror the arguments found in 
Heller’s memos. Kennedy “wanted a myth-exploding speech,” Okun 
(1969, 14) remembers, “and he ordered that it be focused on economic 
policy.” The resulting discourse was thus explicitly designed to fight 
myths: 
Today I want to particularly consider the myth and reality in our national 
economy. In recent months many have come to feel, as I do, that the dia-
                                                            
20 Samuelson, quoted in Romani (2018, 10-12) talked about “folklore.” 
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log between the parties—between business and government, between the 
government and the public—is clogged by illusion and platitude and fails 
to reflect the true realities of contemporary American society … The myth 
persists that Federal deficits create inflation and budget surpluses prevent 
it. Yet sizeable budget surpluses after the war did not prevent inflation, 
and persistent deficits for the last several years have not upset our basic 
price stability. Obviously deficits are sometimes dangerous—and so are 
surpluses.21 
Promoting the role of the economist as an educator was however 
nothing original. In spite of substantive disagreement on both style 
and substance (see below), Reagan CEA chair Martin Feldstein (1992, 
1229) concurred that he had always regarded testimonies to congres-
sional committees, speeches to a wide array of audience, TV and 
press interviews as “opportunities to teach economics.” Nahid 
Aslabegui and Guy Oakes (2019) document A. C. Pigou’s belief that 
the British public was woefully ignorant of economic affairs. The wel-
fare economist came to understand economists’ role as being respon-
sible for “enlightening” the public on how to understand and assess 
the merits of economic policies so as to generate “assent.” He chose to 
do so through, for instance, writing The Times and writing “low and 
middle-brow” pieces. He also believed in non-partisanship and ad-
vised his colleagues to cultivate a “detached mind.” The Wisconsin 
institutionalists who trained Heller “elevat[ed] practical problem 
solving as the central focus of economics study” Marianne Johnson 
(2019) explains. They accumulated “practical evidence” with the goal 
of producing “confident scientific knowledge” meant to persuade 
policy-makers, and “educate,” even “control” laborers and immi-
grants. One key difference with these economists, however, was that 
Heller considered those he needed to educate as intellectual equals, 
not inferiors or ignorants. He considered Kennedy and Johnson “as 
the first modern economists in the American presidency” (1967, 37).  
A final reason why Heller did not feel his role as an advisor 
threatened his scientific values was his perception of a disciplinary 
consensus: “The rising star of the political economist is also correlated 
with growing professional consensus … comparing economists of 
today with those of twenty-five years ago, I am sure it is fair to say 
that there is more of both the Keynesian and the conservative in us all 
… We do agree that the economy cannot regulate itself. We now take 
for granted that the government must step in to provide the essential 
stability at high levels of employment and growth that the market 
mechanism, left alone, cannot deliver.” As someone jousting with fel-
low economists on a daily basis he did not deny that “there is plenty 
of room for controversy on the degree and form of government ac-
tion,” but consensus on “governing principles” is growing, he never-
                                                            
21 “Commencement Address at Yale University,” June 11, 1962, consulted on 
September 9 2018 at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29661. 
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theless believed. The political economist was thus tasked with build-
ing on that disciplinary consensus to become a “consensus-seeker … 
carrying the economic gospel not only to the uninformed by to the 
skeptic and the heathen.” Pivotal in Heller’s perception of a discipli-
nary consensus was the institutional unification offered by the 1946 
Employment Act, which he systematically referred to when discuss-
ing policy-advising. By the early 1980s, Feldstein (1992, 1926) argues, 
“the professional consensus rejected the premise on which the CEA 
was originally established: that fiscal policy should be managed to 
maintain full employment. The emphasis shifted from fiscal policy to 
monetary policy and from the maintenance of full employment to the 
goal of price stability.” 
Heller’s depiction of policy-advising as education was thus under-
pinned by his confidence that he was disseminating “correct” eco-
nomic analysis. To what extent his practice in fact can be described by 
historians as rhetoric or persuasion is thus a matter of debate. Those 
terms are often negatively connoted. Romani (2018, 14), for instance, 
argues that the new economist’ attitude was one of “apostolic zeal, 
overconfidence and insufficient tolerance of rival approaches which 
suited more an ethical creed than a scientific theory… “belief in the 
neutrality of their policy theory, coupled with their passion for the 
public good.” Yet, as Deidre McCloskey (1994, 17) argues, “there is 
nothing shameful in this logic and fact of scientific rhetoric.”22 Her 
goal was to craft a theory of scientific communication for economics 
richer than the “sender-to-receiver” one, by taking into account the 
fact that figures of speech and choices of metaphor matter.  Heller 
himself (1967, 20-28) indeed believed that, beyond education, the po-
litical economist should also be involved in “adaptation and transla-
tion,” which he described as “tak[ing] the highly refined and purified 
concepts of economics and to convert them into workable and digest-
ible form for service.” He was explicit that his team had to devote 
time not only to develop what was “economically workable,” but also 
what was “politically marketable” (Heller, 1967, 27). Okun (1969, 20) 
was equally sensitive to the importance of blending analysis and 
“salesmanship,” and sensed Heller excelled at it:  
It was that that put all the emphasis on educating the President, the Con-
gress, the public, making the case publicly--you know, really improving 
the packaging, the labeling, the palatability of the medicine rather than 
improving the prescription at that time . Obviously, we did a lot of eco-
nomic analysis … But I think still you’d find that the largest emphasis of 
the Council’s activity was on the salesmanship of a product rather than on 
                                                            
22 As Heller’s endorsement of the normative aspect of policy-advising shows, the 
new economists did not believe their theory was “neutral.” Rather, they thought 
it was the right means to promote the ends put forth by the Employment Act, one 
consistent with their emphasis on unemployment rather than price stability or 
balanced budget.  
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the development of a superior product, because that was what the real 
need was. And I think it’s fortunate historically that Walter’s personality 
and talents fitted in immensely well for that. He’s a great publicist; he’s a 
great salesman. 
It may not, in the end, make sense to try to disentangle the scientific, 
the education and the persuasion aspects of economic policy-
advising. There are not separate layers, but flavours of the same prac-
tice. 
4. Conclusion: Questions on Economists and Public Reason  
This account of how Heller persuaded Kennedy to implement a tax 
cut raises highlights several characteristics of the interactions of econ-
omists with public reason. First, it challenges the notion of a pipeline 
that runs from science to expertise and policy-making. The tax cut 
case shows that knowledge produced in the academia—whether cy-
cles are demand or supply driven and how to offset them—are put to 
work in the policy arena, but also, that questions emerging from the 
latter shape economists’ work and interest. The “output gap” was 
Heller’s subjective interpretation of the economic situation before it 
was measured by Okun and became a cornerstone of the Keynesian 
synthesis. Okun’s estimation of the employment-growth relationship 
therefore crucially relied on a collective subjective judgment, that the 
optimal rate of unemployment was 4%.  
Second, it challenges economists’ widespread belief that a profes-
sional “consensus” is a precondition for their expertise to be success-
ful.23 The notion that sound science is reflected in consensus has even 
been built into the legal system. The 1993 US Daubert Decision, for in-
stance, stipulates that an evidence used in the courtroom has to go 
through a peer review process, must display a conventional level of 
statistical significance, and must be “consensual” within the scientific 
community it originates from (see Chassonery-Zaïgouche, 2016). 
While Heller believed the rising prestige of the political economist 
was tied to some disciplinary convergence, his practice largely con-
sisted in defusing opposition and actively building a consensus rather 
than publicizing one. Also, the existing consensus was engineered as 
much by the changes in the legal framework, in particular the 1946 
Employment Act which set the goals for economic intervention, as by 
theoretical unification.  
                                                            
23 Such belief is seen in the advice offered by Benassy Quéré, Blanchard and 
Tirole (2017, 11) to fix the tensed relationships between French economists and 
policy-makers: they should “showcase consensus,” as American economists do. 
They thus suggest to “establish a panel of economic experts who are questioned 
each month on a practical question involving economics or economic policy.” 
What they seek to emulate here is the IGM Economic Experts Panel.  
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Finally, it shows how “personalized” Heller’s practice, as well as 
his vision of policy-advising was. Though in the Presidential Address 
he gave to the American Economic Association in 1974, he emphasized 
the strengths of the tools developed by postwar economists, he never 
lost sight that these tools were wielded by persons with specific 
views. For all its bureaucratic apparatus, economic policies were se-
lected by presidents, and it was the president of the United-States 
economists needed to educate and persuade, for instance through 
personalized memos.24 The completion of the Keynesian Revolution 
had “put the political economist at the President’s elbow,” he wrote, 
adding that “given the uses of political economy as a source of effec-
tive Presidential power; given the compatibility, in this context, of 
power with freedom; and given the statutory responsibility for main-
taining prosperity in an economy that, by its nature, cannot be self 
regulating, one finds hard to imagine a future President spurning 
professional economic advice and playing a passive voice” (1996, 14-
15). Even as the policy consensus he had advertised in the 1960s had 
evidently crumbled in the 1980s, his lectures retained a focus on 
Reaganomics or “Reaganology,” one architected by his “supply-
siders” advisers: “the Super-supply siders who sold Reagan a bill of 
goods on the basis of flimsy theory and evidence had two main 
points.”25 
As a result, Heller’s influence on American policy was not just one 
of concepts and tools (like the “output gap”), it was one of substance 
(which policy to implement). This conclusion contrasts with the con-
sensus that has developed among historians and sociologists in recent 
years, one that emphasizes that economists’ influence was indirect 
and channeled through the tools they developed. Elisabeth Berman 
and Dan Hirschman 2014 survey’s conclusion is that economists con-
tributed to the “economicization” of public policy mainly through 
shaping the data that influenced policy decisions—GDP, CPI indexes, 
unemployment rate—, the range of questions which could be asked—
increasingly focused on efficiency—, and the socioeconomic tools to 
                                                            
24 In his interview with Crichton (1987), Heller emphasized that he developed a 
distinctive “staccato style” for Johnson, one tailored to his observation that 
Johnson “had a great I.Q., but he didn’t want to go into things in the same depth 
that Kennedy did.” 
25 Econ 1001 lecture notes for November 29, 1983 folder “Fall 1983,” and for 
3/8/83 folder “Winter 1983” folder box 1, Walter Heller Papers, University of 
Minnesota. Heller’s Econ101 notes, as well as his public lectures, were ripe with 
sentences like « which, in turns, traces considerably to Carter’s decontrol of oil 
prices, with Reagan just speeding up the last installment of that decontrol»  
(lecture notes for November 15, 1983) or « covered the Nixon pump up of the 
economy behind the facade of wage-price controls and the failure of Carter to 
recognize the excess demand that was building up and take action» (notes for 
February 28, 1983, folder « Winter 1984 »). 
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implement and evaluate policies—from cost-benefit analysis to auc-
tions and scoring techniques.  
Since the Heller case alone does not allow any generalization, one 
can only speculate about the gap between the rich and colorful cast of 
scholar and experts featured in histories of the 1960s US presidencies 
and the anonymous set of economic tools laying at the core of the his-
tories of the next decades. One possible explanation is that, as eco-
nomic statistics, quantifications and tools have become more and 
more influential under new policy-making and public management 
regimes, economists have become less so. Heller was successful in 
altering tax policy because he had a clear vision of what the policy 
decision-chain looked liked, and he was willing to take action at eve-
ry stage: convincing the president, the quadriad, the Congress, the 
public. One is therefore left to wonder whether economists have lost 
the ability to influence these different stakeholders, or whether the 
decision chain has grown too complex for them to do so, and what 
exactly is economists’ agency and control over the use of the tools 
they created, be it cost-benefit analysis, scores, auctions, or else. Yet 
this case study might also point to the benefits of combining tool-
based and actors’ history, even in those highly technical areas such as 
monetary or financial regulations: after all, the psychology, rhetoric, 
style and beliefs of central bank presidents have never been more 
scrutinized.  
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A Night Train in Broad Daylight:  
Changing Economic Expertise at the  
Dutch Central Planning Bureau 1945–1977 
Tom Kayzel* 
 
The Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) is the most prominent scientific 
advisory body of the Dutch government on economic issues. By providing 
a macroeconomic framework the CPB plays an important role in the prep-
aration and coordination of social and economic policy. With the figures 
and forecasts it offers to national media and politicians, the CPB is also an 
influential actor in public debates. In both instances, the expertise that the 
bureau offers is strongly based on the macroeconomic models it employs. 
By discussing two periods in the history of the CPB, this article will inves-
tigate how the CPB gained this important role in Dutch politics and what 
the relation is between its modelling practices and economic expertise. 
The first period deals with the CPB’s initial attempts of gaining a foothold 
in policymaking circles from 1945 to 1955. The second period concerns the 
CPB’s interventions in public debates on unemployment and the growth 
of the public sector in the 1970s. Making use of two theoretical notions 
from sociology, policy device and public interventions, I will argue that the 
introduction of new macroeconomic models was crucial to the impact of 
the CPB’s interventions in both periods. Furthermore, I will argue that by 
targeting a broader audience in the 1970s, the CPB started to shift the 
mode of their expertise, from a facilitating role towards a watchdog role. 
Keywords: Tinbergen (Jan), expertise, economic policy, economic plan-
ning, public economics, public debate 
Un train de nuit en plein jour : l’évolution de l’expertise économique au 
Bureau central néerlandais de planification 1945-1977 
Le Bureau central néerlandais de planification (CPB) est l’organe consulta-
tif scientifique le plus important du gouvernement néerlandais sur les 
questions économiques. En fournissant un cadre macroéconomique, le 
CPB joue un rôle important dans la préparation et la coordination de la 
politique sociale et économique. Par les chiffres et les prévisions qu’il offre 
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aux médias nationaux et aux hommes politiques, le CPB est également un 
acteur influent dans les débats publics. Dans les deux cas, l’expertise 
qu’offre le Bureau est fortement fondée sur les modèles macroécono-
miques qu’il utilise. En examinant deux périodes de l’histoire du CPB, cet 
article examine comment le CPB a acquis ce rôle important dans la poli-
tique néerlandaise et quelle est la relation entre ses pratiques de modélisa-
tion et son expertise économique. La première période porte sur les pre-
mières tentatives du CPB de prendre pied dans les cercles politiques de 
1945 à 1955. La deuxième période concerne les interventions du CPB dans 
les débats publics sur le chômage et la croissance du secteur public dans 
les années 1970. En utilisant deux notions théoriques issues de la sociolo-
gie, à savoir le dispositif politique et les interventions publiques, je sou-
tiendrai que l’introduction de nouveaux modèles macroéconomiques a été 
cruciale pour l’impact des interventions du CPB dans les deux périodes. 
De plus, je soutiendrai qu’en ciblant un public plus large dans les années 
1970, le CPB a commencé à changer le mode de son expertise, passant 
d’un rôle de facilitateur à un rôle de chien de garde. 
Mots-clés : Tinbergen (Jan), expertise, politique économique, planification 
économique, économie publique, débat public 
JEL : B20, B22, A11, A14, H10, P11 
 
 
 
No other scientific advisory body in the Netherlands holds such sway 
over politics like the economic experts of the Central Planning Bureau 
(Centraal Planbureau, CPB).1 Deeply embedded in the state apparatus, 
the forecasts and assessments of the CPB play an instrumental role in 
the development of new social and economic policies. Researching 
the influence of economists on government policy in 1984, sociologist 
Marie-Louise Bemelmans-Videc concluded on the role of the CPB 
that: “it is where the most important research takes place, and where, 
and above all, the framework is developed which provides the foun-
dation of policies with a systematic character” (Bemelmans-Videc, 
1984, 406).2  
Outside of policymaking circles, the bureau is an important player 
in the public debate: providing figures for politicians and journalists; 
putting issues on the agenda or intervening in discussions through 
publicly available reports on a variety of subjects, from state pensions 
                                                            
1 In de 1990s the CPB changed its official English name into Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis since the notion of ‘planning’ in the name of the bureau caused 
some confusion confusion with regard to the task of CPB  outside of the 
Netherlands. In Dutch the name ‘Centraal Planbureau’ is still used. Because I 
want to make the connection of the bureau’s origins with ideas on economic 
planning explicit, I stick to the more literal translation of the name. For a critical 
account of the large influence of the CPB on Dutch politics see Becker and 
Hendriks (2008), Hendriks (2010, chap. 5), Klamer and Teule (2014). 
2 All translations of sources in the Dutch language are mine. 
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to educational policy. Justifying its role in the public debate the bu-
reau has described itself as the gatekeeper of realism, economic feasi-
bility, and sound facts within the public debate; making sure that 
false promises, misleading rhetoric and falsehoods regarding the 
economy do not enter the public domain. Or, as former director of the 
CPB, Gerrit Zalm, formulated this idea in more contemporary 
buzzwords: “The election of a Donald Trump-type for public office, 
or a Brexit, could never have happened in the Netherlands. We have 
institutions like the CPB that can single out and counter the fake news 
in our political debate.”3 
In the performance of both roles the application of large scale mac-
roeconomic models is central to the bureau’s modus operandi. It is a 
model that produces the policy scenarios on which basis policymak-
ers design their measures. And it is the models that allow for strategic 
oversight of policies, ensuring their systematic character. Likewise in 
the presentation of their reports the CPB is keen to stress their figures 
are model-based, sometimes even going so far as presenting the mod-
el as a neutral arbiter on economic issues (Boumans, 1990, 51). Ana-
lysing the historical development of the relation between macroeco-
nomic modelling and the mode of expertise of the bureau, this article 
investigates how the CPB came to plays such a prominent role in 
Dutch politics, and what this role precisely entails. 
The CPB’s role in policymaking and its role in the public debates 
did not emerge during the same period. In the 1950s the bureau start-
ed to assist public officials in the structuring of policymaking proce-
dures, becoming integrated into the larger network of governmental 
bodies and advisory councils in the process. It was only in the 1970s 
that the CPB would fully take on a role in the public debate, adopting 
more coordinated strategies to get its messages across in national me-
dia. In both cases, the introduction of macroeconomic models proved 
to be crucial to the success of the CPB’s interventions in the political 
sphere. In the first case it was crucial in convincing policymakers to 
collaborate with the CPB, while in the second, for getting across its 
message in the public discussion. In the first section of this article, I 
will discuss the CPB interaction with policymakers in the 1950s; in the 
second, I will delve deeper into the role the bureau played in discus-
sions on economic politics in the 1970s. As I hope to show, the adop-
tion of a new role did not only entail a shift towards a new audience, 
but also a shift in the form of economic expertise it provided: going 
from a facilitating role to policymakers in the 1950s, towards a role of 
a gatekeeper or watchdog over the public debate.  
By discussing the role of models in relation to the influence of the 
CPB on Dutch politics, I do not only want to focus on the political 
                                                            
3 In a public interview at the book presentation of Wimar Bolhuis’ De 
rekenmeesters van de Politiek (Bolhuis, 2017) on January, 24 2017.  
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context in which the bureau developed its mode of expertise, but also 
on the modelling processes itself. In that manner I will explore how 
these models are in part responses to political needs and how it is 
partly the design of the models themselves that determines their suc-
cess in the political sphere. Doing so, I will draw theoretically from 
two bodies of literature. First from recent scholarship from the Histo-
ry of Economic Thought that make use of practice-oriented accounts 
and assigns a central role to the application of economics (e.g. Back-
house and Cherrier, 2017; Stapleford, 2017; Halsmayer, 2018). More 
specifically, I am conceptualising the model as an artefact and focus 
on how it travels from a milieu of academic economics into the sphere 
of politics. This process entails, as Verena Halsmayer puts it, follow-
ing “all the shifts and changes in [the model’s] meanings, forms, and 
interpretations. … Even if a model keeps its shape, it still changes 
when we engage with the narrative practices that accompany it.” 
(Halsmayer, 2018, 632) This also requires attention to the “spaces of 
speech” and the “inscription devices” that allow the model to travel 
and which cause shifts in meaning, form and interpretation. In order 
to better understand the modelling processes of the CPB, I will draw 
on archive material from the archives of the bureau itself. To see what 
narratives are constructed around the model, I will furthermore ana-
lyse the reports and news outlets containing the figures of the models 
under discussion. 
The second theoretical source is literature from sociology and Sci-
ence and Technology Studies. More specific, I will adopt two socio-
logical notions to structure the history of the CPB in this article. In the 
first section, I will analyse the role of the macroeconomic model in 
terms of what Daniel Hirschman and Elizabeth Popp Berman call a 
policy device (Hirschman and Berman, 2014).4 Using this notion, the 
economic model can be seen as a heterogeneous assemblage that ena-
bles policymakers to act on a domain called ‘the economy’. Such as-
semblages, Hirschman and Berman write, “bring together people, 
knowledge, and material things in ways that turn the messy, endless-
ly complex world into a formal, calculative order that can be used 
productively” (Hirschman and Berman, 2014, 796). To formulate it 
differently, policy devices are objects that provide frames in which 
economic issues can be identified, as well as scripts that allow for ad-
equate solutions to those issues (Callon, 1998).5 The use of these 
frames and scripts create what Alain Desrosières has called a cognitive 
space, a domain in which economic entities gain coherence and stabil-
ity, enabling thinking and reasoning about them, and wherein specif-
ic types of thinking and reasoning gain legitimacy (Desrosières, 1992).  
                                                            
4 The notion is a riff on the idea of market devices introduced by Fabian Muniesa, 
Yuval Milo, and Michel Callon (2007). 
5 The idea of frames and scripts is derived from the works of Erving Goffman 
(1974). 
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Subsequently, for my analysis of the CPB’s role as an economic au-
thority in public debates in the second section, I will utilise the notion 
of public interventions as introduced by Gil Eyal and Larissa Buchholz 
(Eyal and Buchholz, 2010). The notion of public interventions allows 
for the description of diverse ways in which experts have an impact 
on politics, without focussing solely on public debates and the media 
in which these debates take place. Instead, the focus is placed on the 
role of epistemic communities, devices, figures and infrastructures 
that make public interventions by experts possible. Moreover, this 
framework allows for an analysis of what makes an intervention a 
success or not. Next to the already identified archival sources and 
publications, I will base the analysis of the CPB’s public interventions 
on articles in newspapers, magazines and economics journals on rele-
vant economic issues in the 1970s. It should, furthermore, be noted 
that the two central notions, policy device and public intervention, 
are not mutually exclusive, but partly overlap and can be, as I hope to 
show, used as an extension of each other.  
Lastly, there already exists extensive body of literature on the ex-
pertise of the CPB and its models, especially in Dutch. Moreover, 
there are some historical accounts that also take similar practice-based 
accounts of models as a starting point as this article does, although 
most of them do not go beyond the history of the CPB in the 1950s. 
For example: Adrienne van den Bogaard takes an Actor Network 
Theory inspired approach in order to explain how the model-based 
expertise emerged in the Netherlands; Arnold Wilts discusses the 
emergence of economic expertise in the Netherlands in relation to the 
formation of economics as a discipline, making use of Maarten 
Hajer’s notion of discourse coalition; and Harro Maas discusses the 
turn to mathematical modelling techniques in the CPB and the estab-
lishment of a new form of economic expertise (Van den Bogaard, 
1997; Wilts, 1997, Maas, 2010). The success of the macroeconomic 
model as a tool for policy is also discussed in a non-historical way by 
Mary Morgan and Frank den Butter; Annick de Vries, Willem Halff-
man and Rob Hoppe, who all place emphasis on the boundary work 
that establish a fruitful interaction between economist and policy-
maker (Den Butter and Morgan, 1998; De Vries, Halffman, and 
Hoppe, 2010). Building on above mentioned studies, this article at-
tempt to extend a practice-oriented account of the history of the CPB 
into the 1970s. Furthermore, by making use of the notions of policy 
device and public interventions, I will explore, to a greater degree 
than these precedents, how the models of the CPB shaped the cogni-
tive space in which reasoning about the economy took place, both by 
policymakers and in public discussions. 
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1. The Emergence of Model-Based Expertise, 1945-1955 
Only three months after the liberation of the Netherlands in 1945, the 
newly appointed minister of Economic Affairs, Hein Vos, instructed 
his fellow Labour-Party member Jan Tinbergen to start the organisa-
tion of a new institute for scientific expertise on economic issues that 
would carry the name of the Central Planning Bureau. The founding 
of the CPB was part of the larger effort by Vos and prime minister 
Wim Schermerhorn to “order the economy”. The task of the newly 
founded bureau in ordering the economy was formulated in the bill 
Preparations for the establishments of a National Welfare Plan from 1946 as 
follows: “The CPB’s task is to design a National Welfare Plan, which 
will be regularly determined for the benefit of the coordination of 
governmental economic, social and financial policies.”6 These Welfare 
Plans became known as Central Economic Plans, published annually 
by the CPB. Estimating economic development, including the econo-
my’s needs and preferences, these plans were intended as the basis 
upon which economic issues could be discussed and policies could be 
designed and implemented. For Tinbergen public discussion of eco-
nomic issues was of great importance for the democratic legitimacy of 
economic policies, and the availability of reliable numbers crucial for 
the “rationality” of those discussions (CPB, 1951, 6). In addition to its 
tasks of monitoring and informing, the Plans also contained policy 
recommendations. Looking back at the end of his life, Tinbergen for-
mulated this last task as follows: “to scientifically determine [the to-
tality of] preference within society. And on the basis of those prefer-
ences, recommending measures that would result in the highest wel-
fare” (quoted in Passenier, 1994, 40). 
In order to perform those three tasks, the CPB used a national ac-
counting-like framework to draft their Central Economic Plans, the 
so-called national budgets. The mutation of each budget item was 
determined on the basis of time-series data. And these mutations 
were, in turn, used to produce forecasts of the Dutch economy. In the 
booklet that would form the actual Central Economic Plan, these na-
tional budgets were presented in tables combining the preliminary 
data of the present year, with forecasts of the following year (see fig-
ure 1 for an example). The forecast for the next year given in the ta-
bles was actually the forecast of the state of the economy based on the 
adaptation of all the CPB’s recommendations by the government. In 
this manner the bureau incorporated its recommended measures into 
                                                            
6 ‘Voorbereiding ter vaststelling van een Nationaal Welvaartsplan’, in 
Handelingen der Voorloopige Staten-Generaal (1945-1946) bijlage 180 1-2 artikel 
3. 
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its forecasts, making forecast and recommendation less distinguisha-
ble.  
Figure 1. ‘Table IV.i. Abbreviated Confrontation between Means and  
Requirements’ 
 
An example of an earlier method of presenting the forecasts of the Dutch economy in 
the Central Economic Plans. The ‘Plan-figures’ (plancijfers) contain a forecast of the 
economy in a scenario where the government was to adopt all the measures that the 
CPB recommended. These figures are presented in the columns with the heading ‘1949’ 
(4 and 8). No other forecasts were provided in the table. From Centraal Economisch Plan 
1949 (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1949, 20) 
 
The plans were, however, not a success. Ministers were inclined to 
use the data they received from their ministry, and policymakers 
were not keen on giving up their data producing activities. Moreover, 
ministers tended to regard the CPB’s recommendations as unwanted 
interferences in their own policies (Passenier, 1994, 81-99; Camphuis, 
2009, 63-65; Don, 2019, 63-65). To make matters worse, the cabinet did 
not want to publish the Central Economic Plans, as they considered 
the data in those plans to be politically charged, thus making public 
discussion on the basis of the figures impossible (Maas, 1986). It was 
clear that the figures of the CPB were still very much contested, frus-
trating Tinbergen’s ideal of informed public discourse on economic 
issues. Telling in this case was the decision made by minister of eco-
nomic affairs Jan van den Brink not to involve the CPB in the prepara-
tion and implementation of his industry investment agenda, the so-
called Industrialisation memorandum (Industrialisatienota), one of the 
most prominent economic policies of the 1950s (De Hen, 1980, 267-
290; De Liagre Böhl, Nekkers, and Slot, 1981, 218-236). 
Generally speaking, the political climate was shifting at the end of 
the 40s. With the immediate economic dangers of the aftermath of 
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World War Two averted, and the Dutch economy slowly showing 
some recovery, a strong call for ending state control on the economy 
became imminent (De Liagre Böhl, Nekkers, and Slot, 1981; Mellink, 
2017). After the 1946 elections, Vos lost his position as minister of 
economic affairs. The new minister, Gerardus Huysmans and his suc-
cessor Jan van den Brink, both members of the Roman-Catholic Peo-
ple’s Party, opted for a different manner of organising the economy. 
They installed a law on organised businesses and labour organisa-
tions in which the coordination of the economy should commence 
through the deliberation of representatives of both businesses and 
unions. The central platform for this deliberation was called the Social 
and Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad).7  
With the founding of the Social and Economic Council in 1950 the 
Dutch government adopted a series of economic measures that would 
determine the social economic politics for the coming decade. With 
the negative impact of the Korean War on the Dutch economy in 
1950, the government deemed it necessary to introduce wage-
moderation, a measure soon approved by the Social Economic Coun-
cil, as well as a less rigid system for price-control. Additionally, the 
Council stressed the importance of full employment. On top of these 
measures, the government added another three spearheads of eco-
nomic policy: keeping equilibrium in the balance of payments, keep-
ing consumption relatively low, and introducing an industrial in-
vestment agenda. Except perhaps for the measure of wage-
moderation,8 none of the policies were CPB recommendations (Van 
Zanden, 1998, 120-130). 
1.1. Seeing the Macroeconomy, Towards a Model-Based Expertise 
With the economic politics of the government set in stone, a strong 
advisory role of the CPB in terms of policy recommendations seemed 
no longer viable. Yet, in this new institutional set-up, the bureau was 
quick in adopting new services to provide, while it succeeded in es-
tablishing its figures as authoritative and neutral. Both feats were ac-
complished by developing macroeconomic models and placing them 
at the centre of the expertise the CPB was offering. As it turned out, 
the Social and Economic Council and a newly founded committee for 
high-level public officials, the Central Economic Committee (Centraal 
Economische Commissie), formed the perfect audience for these models. 
Given Tinbergen’s reputation as a pioneer in macroeconomic 
modelling, modelling beyond the simple relations in the national 
                                                            
7 For more on the founding of the Social Economic Council, see: Camphuis (2009, 
chap. 1); Wilts (1997, 117-119). 
8 According to historian Peter van Griensven Tinbergen played a vital role in 
convincing the government in adapting wage moderation policies, see Van 
Griensven (1993). 
| A Night Train in Broad Daylight 345 
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 9(2) : 337-370 
budget was remarkably absent in the early years of the CPB. Indeed, 
scientific employees of the bureau were quite vocal about their hesi-
tance of employing modelling for the drafting of the Central Econom-
ic Plan. For example, in a research memorandum from 1948 titled On 
the Use of Macroeconomic Calculation for Forecasting, CPB employee L. 
Lijklema noted that the use of models had serious drawbacks in “the 
supposed linear relations” and “the assumption of an economic struc-
ture”.9 The measured correlation gave too little evidence for the exist-
ence of these relations and structures. And such relations were, ac-
cording to the author, heavily dependent on “psychological factors, 
which cannot be put into a mathematical straitjacket”. In his critique, 
Lijklema explicitly references the Dutch economist Jan Goudriaan 
who had already criticised Tinbergen in 1936 when the latter had pre-
sented his first macroeconomic model of the Dutch economy to the 
Society for Economics and Statistics. Goudriaan unfavourably com-
pared this model to a night train: just as in a night train the traveller 
cannot see the route the train takes, the model produced results of 
which the user had no idea how the model had derived them.10 This 
critique was approvingly echoed by Lijklema. 
It were specific policy concerns of the Social and Economic Coun-
cil that pushed the CPB towards more model-based work. From 1949 
to 1951 there was much talk among political organisations of reorgan-
ising the social security system and introducing a system of social in-
surances (Van Griensven, 1997). The Social Economic Council tasked 
the CPB with providing an estimate of what the economic impact of 
such policies could be. It was for these estimates that the CPB decided 
to employ a macroeconomic model for the first time. The choice was 
very much prompted by the requests themselves, as the aim of the 
forecasts was not, like previous CPB policy advice, a correction of the 
course of the economy, but rather a reaction of the existing system on 
the introduction of new elements. For such a purpose it was more 
convenient to work with a model that provided a more or less com-
prehensive set of relations within the economy, as the influence of the 
policies on each aspect of the economy could not be calculated inde-
pendently. Macroeconomic models thus provided the ultimate tool 
for seeing the economy as an interconnected system, and allowed for 
a more precise calculation of the effect of government policies. As 
                                                            
9 Lijklema, ‘Het gebruik van macro-economische berekeningen voor de 
prognose’, September, 1948, found in National Archive, The Hague, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs: Central Planning Bureau, entrance number 2.06.093, inventory 
number. 319. Henceforth abbreviated as: NL-HaNA, CPB, 2.06.093. 
10 VSS (1936, 67); Harro Maas notices that Goudriaan’s critique echoes that “of his 
old mathematics teacher in Delft, who compared systems of algebraic equations 
with the ‘night train’ as opposed to the ‘day train’ of geometry.” (Maas, 2014, 
151). 
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Tinbergen put it in the introduction of the Central Economic Plan of 
1951: 
the usefulness of these figures is … that an expression is given to the … in-
terdependence in the national economy [volkshuishouding]. After all, it is 
unthinkable that a good understanding of government policy can be ob-
tained if one is not constantly aware of this interdependence (CPB, 1951, 
7). 
Using small macroeconomic models as policy devices, the policymak-
er and politician would thus be able to gain “awareness” of the inter-
dependences within the economy which was crucial to adequately 
judge economic policy. Speaking with Mary Morgan, it can similarly 
be said that using the tools of the CPB, the policymakers and politi-
cians were able to visualise the macroeconomy (Morgan, 2011). Poli-
cymakers, in particular, started to appreciate the figures of the bureau 
more and more, precisely because it allowed to view the economy as 
a cohesive whole and in a systematic way. When discussing the influ-
ence of economists on government policy, Bemelmans-Videc, con-
cluded that one of the main CPB contributions to policymaking was 
precisely this. One of her interview subjects put it in the following 
way: “Relations… is what forms the background, a frame; gradually 
it becomes a piece of experience. … With the help of techniques and 
models you could indicate what the development is going to be, 
where the bottlenecks are” (Bemelmans-Videc, 1984, 376). The models 
of the CPB thus created a cognitive space in which economic issues 
could be made visible, became objects of discussion, and in which 
solutions to these issues could be formulated. 
Given that these models were not only intended for economic ex-
perts, but also for policymakers and politicians, the CPB attempted to 
make the use of them as simple and easy as possible. As Tinbergen 
stated: “the models must be accessible not only to the experts. But 
also … to those for whom the experts work: members of the execu-
tives and parliaments of the countries concerned” (Tinbergen in the 
introduction of Van Duijn, 1952, 5). In this sense, Tinbergen continued 
his vision for a broad political function for the CPB, in which econom-
ic expertise should first and foremost facilitate a rational public dis-
cussion, and the activities of the bureau should be as transparent as 
possible. It was also a way to circumvent the critique levelled at mac-
roeconomic modelling by Goudriaan. Moreover, since the models 
were to be kept simple, models had to be issue specific. Which part of 
economic reality had to be simplified and how depended on the pur-
pose of the model, and on the specific issue it had to address. Such 
considerations were, according to Tinbergen, the art of modelling.  
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1.2. Uncertainty, Decision Models and Policy Scenarios 
Another opportunity for the CPB to take on a new role appeared 
within the newly found Central Economic Committee. This commit-
tee was composed of high-ranking public officials and tasked with 
the preparation of policies and discussion papers for the Council of 
Economic Affairs (Raad voor Economische Aangelegenheden), the latter 
being a sub-meeting of the cabinet meetings, attended by the minis-
ters of finance, social affairs and economic affairs. The Central Eco-
nomic Committee was initially founded in order to facilitate in-
creased coordination between the ministries of finance, economic af-
fairs and social affairs with the purpose of counter the consequences 
of the before-mentioned Korea Crisis (Van Griensven, 1993). It would 
continue this coordination between the ministries afterwards. Apart 
from the Secretary-Generals and other high officials from those minis-
tries, the director of the Dutch Central Bank and the CPB were also 
members of the committee. The role that the adopted within the 
working group was determined more or less by the nature of the cri-
sis the committee was to address initially. The development of the 
Korea Crisis was deemed very uncertain, and this was the reason that 
the bureau decided to carry out multiple forecasts of the Dutch econ-
omy—from a very grim outlook to an optimistic one allowing the 
committee to work out multiple possible policy scenarios. Although 
the single figures the CPB had been using up to that point were dis-
trusted by the public officials, the multiple forecasts were received 
positively and contributed greatly to the success of the measures pro-
posed by the committee. This success, as well as the agreeable coop-
eration between policymakers and the CPB within the committee, in-
spired the bureau to adopt a new framework for their Central Eco-
nomic Plans (Maas, 1986; Don, 2019; Van den Bogaard, 1997, 180-186).  
The new format was also inspired by theoretical developments 
within the bureau itself. In 1951, an internal memorandum by Tinber-
gen was circulated in which working with forecast scenarios was fur-
ther theorised in a formal economic manner.11 He based his approach 
on Ragnar Frisch’s work on managing the economy through calculat-
ing preferences and decision making, adopting his notion of a decision 
model. The main issues that Frisch addressed with his decision models 
related to how the economy could be managed in a more democratic 
fashion. To that end, Frisch’s model incorporated the preferences of 
policymakers, producing multiple forecast outcomes that could, in 
theory, be discussed in a public debate. Similar to Tinbergen, Frisch 
was here concerned with the public nature of economic expertise, 
                                                            
11 Tinbergen, ‘Welvaartmaximalisatie en decisiemodellen’, 3 June 1951, NL-
HaNA, CPB, 2.06.093, inv.nr. 319. 
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considering democratic support vital to the success of economic poli-
cy (see for example Frisch, 1962).12  
The main question that occupied Tinbergen in his research memo-
randum was how a government would decide what policies to use (in 
his terminology instruments) to what ends (goals, as Tinbergen called 
them). Although it was clearly Tinbergen’s aim to give policymakers 
and politicians freedom in choosing the goals and the instruments, he 
did develop a formal model in order to achieve a certain efficiency in 
the instruments. Tinbergen considered it the democratic responsibil-
ity of politicians to ensure the effectiveness of their policies; a respon-
sibility the CPB was eager to assist in. The goals then should be for-
mulated by the government—more specifically the cabinet—in terms 
of quantitative variables that are part of the model provided by the 
economist. The instruments are also variables of the same system. The 
right instruments that should be used as a means of achieving those 
goals can subsequently be calculated on the basis of four factors: (1) 
the preference of the cabinet for certain instruments; (2) available data 
on the variables; (3) boundary conditions (also expressed in equa-
tions, for example the balance of payments); (4) ‘outside’ variables 
(also confusingly called ‘irrelevant variables’), such as world trade 
and inflation. The model then rendered multiple suitable instruments 
or combinations of instruments out of which the cabinet could then 
choose. This model would appear a year later in a more extended 
version in his On the Theory of Economic Policy (1952). 
Perhaps the method of choosing aims and instruments in the deci-
sion model was not the most relevant for Dutch policy making since, 
as described above, most of the economic policies were already fixed. 
More applicable was the method of finding a way to combine the un-
certainty inherent in the use of specific instruments with the prefer-
ences of policymakers, which provided a way to order the policy op-
tions, from more to less desirable. The uncertainty of an instrument 
depended on the availability of data on specific relations and ‘out-
side’ variables. Policy scenarios that relied on more uncertain instru-
ments were deemed less desirable than more certain variants—
Tinbergen even considered such ordering “objective”, in contrast to 
the “subjective” preferences of the policymakers (Van den Bogaard, 
1997, 180-186). The decision model thus formed a policy device which 
created a framework in which the drafting of policies consisted of or-
dering and evaluating alternatives, in which each policy should be 
judged by its efficiency and probability. The decision model as a poli-
                                                            
12 Work on the development of decision models within the CPB was also carried 
out by Henri Theil, a protégée of Tinbergen who was also working at the CPB at 
that time. Theil’s work might be just as important to the influence of the CPB on 
policymakers as Tinbergen’s contributions were. For the sake of brevity, I will 
focus on Tinbergen in what follows, but for more information see Theil (1958) 
and Don (2004). 
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cy device also provided a method of aggregating efficiency with un-
certainty, thus becoming the ultimate measuring stick for policies. 
Using decision models yielded multiple forecasts similar to the 
ones the CPB had previously delivered in the Central Economic 
Committee during the Korea Crisis. Apart from the method of com-
bining preference and uncertainty factors in one forecast, the presen-
tation of the policy scenarios in the Central Economic Plans was also 
crucial to its success within policymaking circles. Instead of present-
ing the present state and one forecast within one table, as the bureau 
had previously done, the plans now contained multiple policy scenar-
ios (three to ten alternatives) and their estimated effects within one 
table (see figure 2 for an example). The overview of the present state 
was removed and replaced with a forecast containing a scenario of 
the Dutch economy in which no new policies would be adopted. With 
all scenarios in one table, it was easy for the policymakers to compare 
the alternatives and to choose their most preferred combination of 
policy instruments. Over time these tables became such a success that 
policymakers started to refer to them as the “railway timetables” 
(“spoorboekjes”) of the CPB. Just like a train passenger, the policy-
makers would choose their destination (the goal variable) and then 
look at the timetable in order to find out which possible trains (the 
instruments) they could take to get there, and choose their preferred 
route (Den Butter, 2011). As one policymaker would remark years 
later when working with the railway tables became an established 
practice: “It makes … the discussion much easier … it’s all neat and 
tidy and we all know what we are talking about and what we should 
think about when we have to take or discuss certain measures … 
makes the discussion much clearer” (Cited in Bemelmans-Videc, 
1984, 482). 
Since the principles of the economic policies were already in place, 
the main task of policymakers was to adjust those policies with re-
gard to new economic developments, e.g. to increase the amount of 
money spent on a policy, or to prioritise specific policies over others. 
For example, one of the principles of social-economic policy was full 
employment, and in order to combat a rising unemployment rate 
when it occurred, policymakers would usually adjust government 
expenditure in order to boost the aggregated demand of the Dutch 
economy, resulting in more production and consequently more em-
ployment. This economic policy is often called Keynesian demand 
management (Schmelzer, 2016, 190). The Central Economic Plan in a 
new style contributed to and reinforced this practice, not only by in-
corporating the preferences and uncertainty in forecasts which were 
needed to adjust the policies accordingly, but the detail figures also 
offered a guideline on how to adjust those policies, i.e. which one 
should be prioritised or how much money should be spent on them. 
The tables of the plans thus framed the actions of the policymakers by 
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reducing the options for making new policies into specific scenarios 
provided by the CPB and turning the process of policymaking into a 
more ordered affair.  
Figure 2. ‘Table III.2. Overview of the Principle Outcomes of the  
Alternatives for 1952’  
 
This table is a good example of how the CPB presented their forecasts of policy alterna-
tives within one chart, allowing for easy comparison. The upper half of the table con-
tains the presumptions on the economy and the lower half the outcomes. The roman 
numerals (I up to VIII) represent the different policy alternatives. From Centraal Econo-
misch Plan 1952 (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1952, 32) 
This emphasis on scenarios and especially the detailed figures they 
contained had another effect. As the tables of the Central Economic 
Plan allowed for comparison of the different scenarios, arguments in 
favour of this or that scenario came down to having the right number. 
Reasoning based on the use of figures from the Central Economic 
Plans started to form a dominant form of reasoning within the Cen-
tral Economic Committee and the Social and Economic Council. 
Sometimes differences between these numbers could be very small, 
which often resulted in bickering over the second decimal. As the 
former minister of economic affairs, Koos Andriessen, would remark 
in an interview with Arjo Klamer concerning discussions within the 
Social Economic Council: “we have the tendency to call upon the au-
thority of the figures if there is a clash of ideas.” (Klamer, 1990, 58). 
Similarly, a respondent in Bemelmans-Videc’s study remarks: “The 
policy requires figures; you can’t say: prices will rise between 6 and 
12%; that becomes 8 or 9%” (Bemelmans-Videc, 1984, 433). To speak 
with historian Theodore Porter, this ‘culture of quantification’ was 
very much propagated by the use of ever-growing macroeconomic 
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models which were better suited to render more precise predictions 
(Porter, 1996).13 As Hirschman and Berman would put it, the econo-
my thus became a “calculative order”. 
1.3. Large-Scale Macroeconomic Models 
With the success of the railway timetables, the CPB started to inte-
grate their model-based advisory task on specific issues, such as un-
employment insurance, with their advisory role of providing model-
based scenario forecasts. This integration resulted in work on one 
large-scale model that would generate more precise forecasts and 
could be applied to multiple issues. The first of model of this kind 
was published in 1955 as part of the appendix of the 1955 Central 
Economic Plan (CPB, 1955, 110-119). Working with large models 
meant a change of practice within the bureau, as well as a change of 
expertise ideal. Within the bureau, the economic advisory practices 
started to revolve around the big model, either developing sub-
models for specific issues that could be integrated into the larger 
framework of the model or running specific policy questions through 
the main model. As former employee Anton Barten would later put it: 
“The staff became model minded. It also homogenized their vision of 
the working of the economy” (Barten, 1988, 59). A bigger model also 
meant a more complex model. The model used for the social policies 
and decision models from 1952 consisted of ten and twelve equations, 
the 1955 model already consisted of 27, and quickly grew bigger. This 
meant that Tinbergen’s ideal for developing models intended for use 
by politicians and policymakers could no longer be adhered to. The 
models were so complex that only CPB-employees could operate 
them.  
This was not the only development that gradually obscured the ac-
tivities of the bureau. Even if the decision models were aimed at more 
democratic engagement with macroeconomic forecasting and helping 
out in the politician’s representative responsibility, the reality was 
that larger model generated too many policy options to include in the 
Central Economic Plan. Although the choice of which scenarios to 
include and which to exclude was dependent on the discussions the 
CPB had with the Central Economic Committee, choosing options 
was not a formalised process and often just as well depended on what 
the bureau’s economists thought economically feasible. Moreover, the 
main discussion partners of the CPB had become the Social and Eco-
                                                            
13 Van den Bogaard discusses Porter’s seminal work in the context of the history 
of the CPB. Contra Porter, Van den Bogaard argues that the emergence of 
economic modelling did not replace an intersubjective trust for an ‘objective’ 
trust in numbers, but rather introduced a new type of expert (Van den Bogaard, 
1997, 204-208). This however does not change the fact that a culture focused on 
numbers did arise in Dutch politics in the 1950s.  
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nomic Council, and the Central Economic Committee. Neither council 
nor committee was a democratically elected body and consequently 
the openness and publicity of the CPB’s activities were diminishing.  
Another effect of the use of large-scale models was a shift in the 
debates on economic policy and the exclusion of certain topics. With 
an increasing reliance on models for the debates within the Social 
Economic Council, the validity of macroeconomic reasoning, as for 
example countering unemployment through government expendi-
ture, or wage moderation, was no longer questioned. These funda-
mental questions on what kind of economic policy was desirable, 
which is what Tinbergen called “qualitative politics”, were excluded 
by the model, focussing instead on the efficiency and uncertainty of 
these policies, which is what Tinbergen called “quantitative politics” 
(Tinbergen, 1952, chap. 1). To use a notion by the philosopher Bruno 
Latour, the model black boxed the more fundamental assumption in 
the debate on economic issues, that is to say, the matters were settled 
and disappeared into the background (Latour, 1988); questions on the 
desirability of the consumption moderation, equilibrium in the bal-
ance of payments, or full-employment, were rarely discussed after 
1951. 
The shift towards a form of expertise based on macroeconomic 
models came about through the interaction the CPB had with various 
audiences: most prominently the Social and Economic Council and 
the Central Economic Committee. Models were meant as tools or, in 
Hirschman and Berman’s term, policy devices. Yet the workings of 
these devices remained for the most part obscure to its users. This 
meant that, despite early reservations and initial caution, the CPB’s 
macroeconomic models had become what Goudriaan had criticised 
Tinbergen for in 1936: a night train. And although the policymakers 
now had timetables to plan trips, the trains they used were still very 
much night trains, i.e. the working of the trains were completely ob-
scure for the ones who made us of them. Moreover, the desired inter-
action of the CPB’s with the public debate became less and less pro-
nounced when the bureau started to rely more and more on macroe-
conomic models.  
2. Macroeconomic Models and the National Media:  
Unemployment Debates in the 1970s 
With the start of the 1960s, the core economic policies of the Nether-
lands began to change. Wage moderation gradually ended, the Neth-
erlands was experiencing an economic boom and the social security 
system was expanded. The constellation of councils, committees and 
bureaus involved in the preparation of economic policies, however, 
remained largely in place. The Social and Economic Council was still 
the main platform for the discussion of economic issues, and the Cen-
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tral Economic Committee the most important organisation for coor-
dination between the ministries involved with social-economic policy. 
The CPB likewise continued to offer its model-based expertise to both 
institutes. Yet under the pressure of a new economic recession and 
the emergence of new ideas on the economy, this constellation was to 
shift in the 1970s. The relevance of the Social and Economic Council 
diminished and the CPB broadened its target-audience to include not 
only policymakers and politicians, but also the general public. The 
latter indicated a change in the form of expertise that the CPB provid-
ed: it was no longer just the provider of policy alternatives and asses-
sor of scenarios, but also the “watchdog” of the public debate, deter-
mining what was feasible and what was not.  
In writings of the CPB, the general public was featured previously 
as an ideal audience for economic expertise, rather than an actual 
public they had a concrete relation with. In order to analyse further 
how this relation with a concrete general public was established, I 
will apply the notion of public intervention as introduced by Gil Eyal 
and Larissa Buchholz, and later expanded in an article by Eyal and 
Moran Levy (Eyal and Buchholz, 2010; Eyal and Levy, 2013).14 Build-
ing on the work of, amongst others, Latour they argue that the public 
sphere should not be seen as “an agora populated by reasonable citi-
zens” but rather as constructed through “techniques, instruments, 
demonstrations, figures, charts and numbers” (Eyal and Levy, 2013, 
227-228). Instead of conceiving the public sphere as one unified space, 
Eyal and Levy argue that this sphere consists of multiple channels, or 
as Latour puts it: “the frail conduits through which truths and proofs 
are allowed to enter the sphere of politics” (Latour, 2005, 9). Tech-
niques, instruments, demonstrations, etc. are then materials which are 
used to constitute a culture or institute in which these truths and 
proofs can circulate. Truths and proofs that successfully enter the 
sphere of politics can then be considered a public intervention. In this 
section, I argue that in the debates on unemployment that ensued in 
the Netherlands in the mid-70s, macroeconomic models can be theo-
rised as a technique that helped to establish multiple channels, allow-
ing for a series of successful public interventions.  
2.1. The Growing Public Sector and Unemployment Problems 
From the end of the 1960s to the mid-1970s, a group of economists of 
neoliberal ilk became increasingly vocal, both in the community of 
academic economics and national media. What brought this group 
together was a shared group of issues, arguments and images, such 
as: a collective worry about the expanding state apparatus; similar 
academic economic arguments about how the growth of the public 
                                                            
14 As the latter article is specifically concerned with economic expertise I take Eyal 
and Levy’s account as starting point here.  
354 Tom Kayzel | 
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 9(2) : 337-370 
sector relative to the private sector would have detrimental effects on 
the economy as a whole; and a shared political doom scenario in 
which the private sector would be swallowed by the state, ending free 
enterprises for good. In short, they formed what Eyal and Levy, fol-
lowing political scientist Peter Haas, call an epistemic community. That 
is to say, a community created and shaped by shared ideas, instru-
ments, techniques, outlets and meeting places within which 
knowledge can develop and be circulated. The fostering of such a 
community is crucial for ideas of that group to compete with other 
ideas, and to bring those ideas within the political sphere (Eyal and 
Levy, 2013, 226). Prominent among this epistemic community were 
professors from Tilburg University, Theo Stevers and Dick Schouten, 
Floor Hartog from the University of Groningen and to a lesser extent 
Arnold Heertje from the University of Amsterdam (Lansbergen, 1980, 
38-43).15 Already in 1977, the economist Hans van den Doel noticed 
that the argument that markets would be more efficient in satisfying 
individual preference than the government was largely absent from 
the writings of this group (the writings of Hartog are an exception 
here). Yet, according to Van den Doel, it was this argument that con-
stituted their underlying world view (Van den Doel, 1979, 60). 
A good example of the writings of this group is Stevers’ book 
Openbare Financiën en Ekonomie (Public Finance and Economics) from 
1971. Stevers argued in an academic style for a technical point in eco-
nomic policy, namely the restriction or diminishing of the costs of so-
cial insurances. According to Stevers, growing social insurances 
would lead to stabilisation, if not a decrease, in spendable income for 
workers even with a growth of wages. More government expendi-
ture, including the social insurances, would lead to higher marginal 
income tax; combined with the ever-increasing demands for higher 
wages by unions, this would eventually lead to an inflation spiral. 
Such a situation would only be sustainable if the private investments 
kept up. But according to Stevers it was precisely this investment rate 
that was under pressure, as businesses experienced a decrease in the 
returns of investments (Stevers, 1971, 282-285). Arguments with simi-
lar structure can also be found in the writing of Schouten and Heertje 
for example (Heertje, 1970; Schouten, 1974).16 
In articles intended for a broader audience, the same common is-
sues and ideas can be found. For instance, in an article for De 
Volkskrant (one of the biggest daily newspapers of the Netherlands) 
from 1976, Stevers repeats his worries for the disastrous consequences 
the expansion of the public sector could have in a more urgent tone. 
The growth of the public sector can only have two outcomes, he ar-
                                                            
15 Schouten and Hartog had been working for the CPB in the past, but had long 
left when they published the after mentioned articles. 
16 The implication of Van der Doel’s remark was that this group formed a 
neoliberal thought collective incognito. 
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gues, social chaos, because of a high level of unemployment, or the 
complete governmental take-over of all economic enterprises. The 
latter option would then automatically lead to “the trampling of per-
sonal freedom”. Under the present circumstances Stevers warns, “the 
instalment of a leftist dictatorship would be the most likely outcome” 
(Stevers, 1976). Similar bleaks visions can, for instance, be found in an 
interview with F. Hartog in the Magazine Haagse Post in 1973, and in 
articles by Heertje from 1974 (Nypels and Tamboer, 1973; Heertje, 
1974).  
At the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, very little people picked 
up on the warnings of Stevers and company. Within economists’ cir-
cles, the group formed an outlier, and among the general public 
probably even fewer people took notice. In terms of public interven-
tions, they had too little material to build a larger community; more-
over, academic publications and newspaper articles proved to be too 
weak a mode of intervention for these worries to actually enter the 
political sphere, i.e. to be put on the agenda in parliament or at cabi-
net meetings. Journals, papers and magazines were, however, not the 
only outlets through which the message of this epistemic community 
could travel. Among its associates, the group had some high-ranked 
public officials, most prominently Frans Rutten of the ministry of 
economic affairs, who later became Secretary-General in 1974.17 Rut-
ten was very willing to bring the concerns regarding the public sector 
into the meetings of the Central Economic Committee, of which he 
was the secretary from 1969 onwards. On the committee, Rutten was 
supported by Coen Oort, the Treasurer-General of the ministry of fi-
nance, and the president of the Dutch Central Bank, Jelle Zijlstra, who 
was also concerned with the public budget, albeit for different rea-
sons. Although the CPB took these voices seriously—especially the 
CPB-director Cees van den Beld was very sympathetic towards Rut-
ten and Zijlstra’s arguments—the bureau struggled to find ways in 
which the worries about the growing public sector could be mod-
elled.18 Problems such as the rising inflation and the reduced returns 
on investment were framed as problems of overheating of the econo-
my.19 Such framing was at odds with the narrative that Stevers and 
Rutten were presenting since they considered the economy’s prob-
lems as structural rather than conjunctural. In the end, the negative 
effects or potential downside of a growing public sector did not end 
                                                            
17 For an account of the neoliberal ideas of Rutten and his influence on Dutch 
social and economic policy, see Oudenampsen (2019, 125-130). 
18 ‘Beoordeling van de Huidige Economische Ontwikkeling’ memorandum 
prepared for the Centraal Economische Commissie, April 10, 1970, NL-HaNA, CPB, 
2.06.093, inv.nr. 211. 
19 ‘Nadere en herziene informatie met betrekking tot de economische 
vooruitzichten van 1973’, memorandum prepared for the Centraal Economische 
Commissie, June 7, 1972, NL-HaNA, CPB, 2.06.093, inv.nr. 211. 
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up in the scenarios of the Central Economic plan; thus the issue failed 
to gain traction among the rest of the community of policymakers. 
Speaking with Eyal and Levy, the large-scale macroeconomic 
models that the CPB used for generating policy alternatives and sce-
nario assessments had become so integral to the policymaking pro-
cess that it formed a channel for public interventions on its own. That 
is to say, a community of economic experts (the CPB in this case) that 
can get their proofs and truths across relatively easy through a system 
of instruments and techniques (such as decision models, national ac-
counting techniques and time-series data), figures and graphs (as 
those provided in the Central Economic Plans). Rutten and support-
ers therefore could not rely on a model-based channel of the CPB to 
pose the expanding public sector as a serious political problem; and 
lacking the models as instruments severely obstructed Rutten, Oort 
and Zijlstra’s efforts. 
However, concerns for the expanding public sector did not disap-
pear, and only increased when the Labour Party and Roman-Catholic 
People’s Party, together with some smaller parties, formed a new cen-
tre-left cabinet led by the Labour leader Joop den Uyl in 1974. The rise 
of New Left at the end of the 1960s had pushed the Labour Party 
gradually to the left, and when Den Uyl took office he led what was 
probably the most left-leaning cabinet in Dutch parliamentary history 
(Hellema, 2012, 150-152). The coalition agreement, which became fa-
mous under the slogan of “the redistribution of power, income and 
knowledge”, chose a completely new economic outlook to counter the 
rising inflation rate of the early seventies than the ones proposed in 
the Central Economic Committee. 
The economic situation became more complex when the Organiza-
tion of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries installed an embargo 
against those countries who supported Israel during the Yom Kippur 
War in October of 1973, which included the Netherlands, resulting in 
what is known as the oil crisis. The crisis hit the Dutch economy par-
ticularly hard. The unemployment rate, that had already been rising 
steadily since the start of the seventies, experienced a sudden spike in 
the aftermath of the crisis (Van Zanden, 1998, 160-167). Den Uyl ini-
tially reacted with a package of public investments, hoping to boost 
the economy. Although receiving praise at first for his quick action by 
the Dutch press, and also internationally by OECD, the economy was 
very slow to recover. Before long, the question whether the cyclical-
oriented measures by Den Uyl were the right ones became a hotly 
debated topic. The uncertainty of the economic situation put extra 
pressure on the CPB to come up with new models to explain the ris-
ing unemployment.  
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2.2. Neoclassical Growth Modelling 
The new approach the CPB took with regard to the rising unemploy-
ment was neoclassical growth modelling based on the work of Robert 
Solow. This was a modelling approach the bureau had been research-
ing since the mid-sixties. Although there was a pronounced wish 
within the board of the bureau to use elements from growth model-
ling in their main large-scale macroeconomic model, integration 
proved difficult. In practice the theory was only used to model specif-
ic issues or sub-sections of the economy (Barten, 1988, 66-67; Zalm 
and Verbruggen, 1993). The impetus to apply growth modelling to 
the unemployment problem came from the board’s same wish for the 
integration of modelling techniques. Van den Beld, the director of the 
CPB, instructed employees Hok-Soei Tjan, who had previously been 
working on growth modelling in the context of assessing the econom-
ic consequences of environmental pollution, to work on a model of 
the development of unemployment. According to Van den Beld, what 
prompted the approach was the discussion on the so-called vintages 
approach. As he would later put it: “We came across an account on 
vintages in a journal. They [the writers of the article] applied those on 
this or that field. Then I said to Tjan and Den Hartog: this is how it 
should go. I could’ve done it myself, but I thought it would be nice if 
someone else could shine in the limelight instead” (cited in Passenier, 
1994, 220). 
The vintages approach had been derived from a certain way in 
which Solow’s notion of technical change could be modelled. One of 
Solow’s main contributions to the theory of growth was the idea of 
technical change, a notion that could explain why the capital-output 
ratio was increasing, i.e. how when applying the same ratio between 
capital and labour the output of goods could rise over the years. Ac-
cording to Solow, this increase was due to the development of tech-
nology, in other words, with more advanced machinery, the same 
amount of labour could make the output grow (Solow, 1957). The vin-
tages approach then had found a way to further model the factor of 
technical change. According to the vintages theory, technical change 
would not come gradually, but only occurred with the replacement of 
old machinery. Assigning vintages to capital goods was thus a way of 
determining the likelihood of employers replacing their machines, 
and therefore a means to forecast the rise of the capital-output ratio 
better (Solow, 1962).  
The result of applying the vintage approach to the relation be-
tween investments, prices, wages and unemployment resulted in 
what became known as the Hartog-Tjan model, first published in a 
CPB occasional paper in 1974. According to Den Hartog and Tjan, the 
rise in unemployment could be explained by high wage costs. Faced 
with increasing wage costs, employers would rather buy new ma-
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chines instead of hiring more labour power. This meant that machines 
received a higher replacement rate than could be expected on the ba-
sis of their age (Den Hartog and Tjan, 1974). The paper thus not only 
explained the rise in unemployment, but also how the increase could 
have snuck up on the Dutch economy. In times of economic prosperi-
ty the fall in jobs relative to the production would not have been no-
ticed. As such, Tjan and Den Hartog claimed that the problem of un-
employment already started in the early 1960s (see figure 3). Beside 
its explanatory power, the strength of the model was that it could fi-
nally theorize a number of relations between the private and public 
sector, thus incorporating a long-standing concern on the part of the 
Central Economic Committee, while also describing unemployment 
as structural problem, providing ammunition for the ongoing debate 
on Den Uyl’s unemployment policy. 
Figure 3. ‘Figure 4. Calculated amount of jobs under normal utilisation of 
the capacity and realised employment in firms, 1959-1973’  
 
The graph shows that the actual amount of jobs (solid line) is much lower than the 
calculated amounts of jobs on the basis of the production function (dotted line). 
From Investeringen, lonen, prijzen en arbeidsplaatsen: een jaargangenmodel met vaste coëf-
ficienten voor Nederland by Den Hartog and Tjan (The Hague: CPB Occasional Paper 
8., 1974, 17) 
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Upon publication, the Hartog-Tjan model caused quite a stir 
among the community of professional economists. Due to its method 
and its application the model was considered controversial. Yet at the 
same time, it set the terms for further debate concerning the unem-
ployment issue. The model and its outcomes was not a perfect fit with 
the narrative on the growing public sector that Stevers, Schouten, 
Hartog and Heertje were propagating. It said nothing about the pub-
lic and private sector ratio, nor was the growth of the public sector a 
problem per se, only with regard to the cost of social insurances and 
wages. Yet Stevers and company seized the model in order to prove 
their arguments right (Stevers, 1975). Other economists also used the 
model in order to argue for their specific solutions to the unemploy-
ment problem. For instance, Tinbergen (who left the CPB in 1955), 
together with fellow Labour Party economists Van den Doel and Cees 
de Galan, drew on the basis of this model the conclusion that the in-
stalment of wage moderation as a means of getting the wage-costs 
down was the best solution to the unemployment crisis (Van den 
Doel, De Galan, and Tinbergen, 1976).  
Critics of the model mostly attacked the methodology, rather than 
the modelling technique or the identified relations. Former CPB em-
ployee and professor at the University of Amsterdam, Wim Driehuis, 
for instance, further disaggregated the relation between production 
output and wage-cost, concluding that productive industries acted as 
wage-leader for less productive industries and public sector, which 
explained the high wage costs in the public as well as in the private 
sector. According to Driehuis, the presumed ineffectiveness of 
Keynesian demand management was caused by a shift in private in-
vestment toward the service sector and a shift in the government ex-
penditure towards social security. If the government would spend 
more directly, the multiplier effect on private investments would oc-
cur. A remarkable facet of Driehuis’ study is that it used the same 
growth modelling techniques as the Hartog-Tjan model, while de-
fending a Keynesian expenditure program to counter unemploy-
ment—completely the opposite of the narrative the CPB was pushing 
or the arguments that Stevers was making (Driehuis, 1979).20 
The impact of the Hartog-Tjan model was not only that the unem-
ployment issue came to be discussed in the terms and relations the 
model suggested. It also shifted the attention in the debate from the 
unemployment figures just after the oil-crisis towards the forecasted 
unemployment rate in the medium-term. The large-scale macroeco-
nomic models used by the CPB were then still short-term models, the 
Hartog-Tjan model in contrast, could be applied for medium- and 
long-term forecasting, something which its successor, the VINTAF-
                                                            
20 Driehuis’ article had already been circulating as research memorandum since 
1976.  
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model, was explicitly designed for. In the short term, the CPB-models 
still predicted that unemployment could be countered through public 
expenditure, medium-term forecasts predicted that this was ineffec-
tive. With the Hartog-Tjan model, figures on the unemployment rate 
in 1980 started to enter the debate and soon took over the conversa-
tion. The focus of the conversation on the development of unem-
ployment similarly shifted. No longer was the problem of disappear-
ing jobs the centre of the discussion, rather structural causes of un-
employment became the object of debate—even among economists 
like Driehuis who argued in favour of Keynesian demand manage-
ment.  
As discussed in the previous section, shifting the emphasis from 
the present state of the economy towards forecasts—going so far as 
removing the present state form their tables—was nothing new for 
the CPB. While such a shift previously reinforced the cognitive space 
of macroeconomics, the VINTAF model started to change the nature of 
the issue at hand. In other words, the CPB models translated the prob-
lem of unemployment into a problem of the development of unem-
ployment and its relation to social insurances and wage costs in the 
long run.  
2.3. The VINTAF Models in the Daily Newspapers 
The structure of the Hartog-Tjan model differed so much from the 
large-scale model used for the Central Economic Plans that the former 
could not be easily integrated into the latter. But the fact that the Har-
tog-Tjan model was a growth model made it potentially very apt for 
medium-term forecasts. Therefore, Den Hartog and Tjan continued, 
together with their colleague Theo van de Klundert, developing the 
model into a medium-term forecaster. The results was the VINTAF 
model, whose name was derived from the vintages approach (VINT) 
and the Dutch word for sales, ‘afzet’ (AF). It was in this form that the 
model would stage its most successful public intervention. In the 
summer of 1975, the CPB prepared a report on the basis of the model 
intended for the cabinet, called De Nederlandse Economie in 1980 (The 
Dutch economy in 1980). The outlook that the report provided was 
very dire: the unemployment rate would keep on rising together with 
the public deficit with no improvement of the situation in sight. These 
numbers convinced the minister of finance Wim Duisenberg that 
drastic measures were necessary (Visser and Wijnhoven, 1989, 42-54). 
With the other cabinet members, Duisenberg agreed on the intro-
duction of the so-called 1%-norm, the principle that the collective fi-
nancial burden (taxes and premiums) could not grow to exceed more 
than one per cent of the national income. Together with a restriction 
on the public debt this basically meant a restriction on the growth of 
the public sector and the implementation of austerity measures. Yet 
for the most part, the 1%-norm remained a paper tiger. Some minis-
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ters were not too willing to implement the budget cuts in their portfo-
lio, nor were all the ministers fully convinced of the necessity of the 
austerity operation. Most prominently, the minister of social affairs, 
Jaap Boersma, constantly proposed alternatives to the 1%-operation. 
According to him, the norm de facto made all his unemployment 
measures impossible. Boersma was also not persuaded by the arguing 
behind the norm. In his view, the unemployment problems were 
primarily caused by the international economic malaise. Den Uyl was 
not convinced either, but decided to follow the 1%-norm anyway. The 
CPB figures that were constantly updated during the operation 
stressed the importance of the austerity measures for the most part 
(Toirkens, 1988, chap. 3). The role of the VINTAF model was so im-
portant in this process that one policymaker would later remark: “The 
1% norm … actually came about through the constant confrontation 
of ministers with a scientifically based model of causes and conse-
quences” (cited in Bemelmans-Videc, 1984, 390). In the terms of Eyal 
and Levy, the VINTAF model became a successful instrument by 
means of which the CPB had created a new channel through which 
they could introduce ‘truths’ and ‘proofs’ into the government’s poli-
cies. 
In writing the memorandum to announce the restriction of the 
government budget, Duisenberg introduced the notion ‘support’ 
(draagvlak) to describe the relationship between the private and public 
sector. Meaning that the public sector could only thrive when it was 
supported by the private sector.21 The same notion was later picked 
up in a report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (Weten-
schappelijke Raad voor Regeringsbeleid), another scientific advisory 
council of the government, which discussed the unemployment prob-
lem with a similar message (WRR, 1977). This description did not fol-
low necessarily from the outcomes of the VINTAF model and echoes 
Stevers’ earlier arguments in which he views the taking over of public 
sector of services from the private sector as the fundamental problem. 
This framing of the CPB forecasts brought the narrative of the public 
sector as a problem in full swing. A similar framing of the VINTAF -
figures were also used in memorandums for the cabinet by the em-
ployers’ federations and the Committee of Economic Expert of the 
Social and Economic Council. Although the content of the memoran-
dums differs—the employers federation wanting a further restriction 
of ten billion on government expenditure; the Social and Economic 
Council wanting support for the weaker industries—part of the mes-
sage overlaps, unemployment is a problem of the growing public sec-
tor (SER, 1977). In this way, a diverse set of social organisations ral-
lied around the VINTAF model and its forecasts. The model allowed 
                                                            
21 ‘Nota over het te voeren beleid ter zake van de collectieve voorzieningen en de 
werkgelegenheid’, Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal (1975-1976), 
13951, ondernummer 4. 
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for multiple discussions and narratives, but amplified one main mes-
sage, adding to the public pressure that was put on the cabinet to car-
ry out the austerity measures.  
Discussions on the usefulness of the 1%-norm were not confined to 
cabinet meetings, but became a heated subject of debate by econo-
mists, union and business representatives and political parties in na-
tional media. The fact that the norm was based on on a new CPB-
model was quickly picked up by journalists, resulting in the name 
VINTAF becoming public. Discussion on the credibility, usefulness and 
desirability of the model soon ensued in newspapers and magazines 
(Van Seumeren, 1977; Van Zweeden, 1977; Pen, 1977).  
Bringing the model into the open was probably a conscious effort 
on the part of the CPB. The VINTAF model was publicly presented for 
the first time in a preliminary report delivered by Tjan, Den Hartog 
and Van de Klundert for the annual meeting of the Society for Eco-
nomics in December of 1975. It is clear from the structure of the paper 
that the authors wanted to focus on the model, putting the name VIN-
TAF at the centre (Den Hartog, Tjan, and Van de Klundert, 1975, 6). 
Although the annual meeting for the Society of Economists was an 
event primarily intended for professional economists, its yearly pre-
liminary reports were usually sure to attract some media attention. 
That year all of the major Dutch daily newspapers published some-
thing on the annual meeting. The CPB was thus ensured that its re-
port would caught everyone’s attention. 
In the similar vein, Van de Klundert published a small booklet two 
years later intended for a broader audience in which he explained the 
workings of the model and placed it in the context of a broader de-
velopment of economics as a science, thus adding to the public recog-
nition of the VINTAF model (Van de Klundert, 1977). Such coordinate 
media strategies also fitted a general development of the relation be-
tween the CPB and the national media. From 1972 onwards, the bu-
reau started to organise yearly press events for the launch of the new 
Central Economic Plans. A little later, press conferences on other CPB 
reports, such as the medium-term forecast, were also organised (Pas-
senier, 1994, 280). Outside the regular publications, the bureau started 
to provide figures to politicians on specific subjects, such as purchas-
ing power trends, which also fostered personal contacts between 
CPB-economists and members of parliament (Passenier, 1994, 230). 
It is clear that the audience of the CPB was no longer limited to 
policymakers and politicians, but also included the general public. In 
an effort to build a channel for a public intervention on the growing 
public sector and unemployment for which large-scale macroeconom-
ic models were unfit, the CPB had to charter new publics and forge 
new alliances with employer federations, neoliberal economists, and 
journalists. With these new audiences the form of the expertise that 
the CPB offered also changed. For policymakers and politicians, the 
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CPB had a seemingly facilitating function, providing tools for picking 
and choosing the right policy mix. With regard to a more general 
public, the CPB adopted a role that I will describe as that of a watch-
dog: an institute that watches over the public debate in order to make 
sure that untruthful or unfeasible statements are debunked or cor-
rected; thus making sure the debate is concerned with facts.22 In the 
news articles that were based on CPB publications at the time, the 
emphasis was usually on the impossibility of alternative policy pro-
posals, rather on the possibility. Alternative plans on countering un-
employment by the labour unions, left-wing politicians, minister Bo-
ersma and economists at the University of Amsterdam were all 
deemed unfeasible in a time where the primary concern of the gov-
ernment should be restriction of the budget. The forecasts for 1980 
were hanging over the debate as a dark clouds warning that all sce-
narios that did not limit to the growth of the public sector would lead 
to massive unemployment. These were according to the CPB the facts, 
and everyone not adhering to them were branded in the debate. 
The real coup d’état of the CPB model came when the successor of 
the VINTAF model (simply called VINTAF-II) had replaced the central 
macroeconomic model of the CPB, customarily used for the prepara-
tion of the Central Economic Plans. As discussed in the previous sec-
tion, this central model which was up to that point, in essence, a re-
vised updated version of the model from 1955, was embedded in the 
economic policymaking process to such an extent that it was crucial 
in how policymakers viewed the economy and understood the issues 
and formulated solutions. In other words, it had (and still has) a very 
solid surrounding infrastructure. The previous model had proved to 
be very influential in justifying the Keynesian demand management 
of the government; replacing it with VINTAF-II, which in comparison 
put much more emphasis on stimulating private investments, had a 
similar influence on the type of reasoning concerning policies and the 
justification of certain policies. Moreover, the instalment of the model 
took place in a politically turbulent time.  
The Den Uyl cabinet had fallen in March of 1977 and in the follow-
ing election the Labour Party won, making them again the largest po-
                                                            
22 The CPB has later adopted the notion ‘watchdog’ to describe its task within the 
Dutch government (Bos and Teulings, 2012). The word was not yet part of the 
task description of the bureau in the 1970s, thus I use the notion 
anachronistically. This watchdog role is different from other economic 
organization that are often also called watchdogs in the media, like the Financial 
Conduct Authority in the UK, as it is not the CPB’s task to regulate markets or 
audit other organization. Rather, in their own description, the watchdog role is 
aimed at the public budget, making sure that the government adheres to 
budgeting rules. I use the notion in yet a different way: emphasizing the role the 
CPB plays in the public debate, guarding the ‘truthfulness’ of the debate. As I 
briefly mention in the conclusion, the fiscal watchdog and the public debate 
watchdog are strongly connected. 
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litical party in parliament. Yet negotiations with the newly formed 
Christian Democratic Appeal (a fusion of multiple Christian parties, 
among which the Roman-Catholic People’s Party) on forming a se-
cond Den Uyl-cabinet were stiff. In this process, the CPB was tasked 
in with the assessment of policy proposals both parties could agree 
on. The instalment of VINTAF-II had a huge effect on the outcomes of 
these assessments, usually with negative effects for the proposed un-
employment policies. According to one of the newspaper commenta-
tors, the Labour Party was so frustrated with the outcomes of the new 
model that they requested the CPB to calculate the intended measures 
with the old model (Hoffman, 1977). A similar frustration can be 
found in the diary that Labour negotiator Ed van Thijn kept during 
the process and that was published a year later. The complete aston-
ishment of Van Thijn with the outcomes of the CPB-models was clear-
ly visible on many occasions. For example: The CPB is overdoing it-
self this time [bakt ze wel erg bruin]. Instead of the previously estimat-
ed 150,000 unemployed in 1980 we now have to suppose that unem-
ployment will rise to 275,000 in 1981. The CPB has adopted a new 
model, introduced new starting points and has also applied new poli-
cy variants. “Out of the blue the economy has collapsed. … When the 
politician is outside campaigning, the forecaster stays indoors and 
reads a book and suddenly the world has changed”. (Van Thijn, 1978, 
28) 
The negotiation failed. And instead the Christian Democratic Ap-
peal decided on forming a cabinet with the right-wing liberal People’s 
Party for Freedom and Democracy, a party much more willing to im-
plement further austerity measures. 
3. Conclusion 
The first macroeconomic model of the CPB in 1951 was to a large ex-
tent an answer to the policies of the time, the institutional architecture 
of Dutch policymaking, and the bureau’s earlier failure to influence 
politics. By adjusting to the situation and reacting to the wishes of 
policymakers, the CPB designed their models in such a way that they 
could be used to enhance and improve existing policies; allowing pol-
icymakers to provide input and giving them a wide variety of choic-
es. As a result, policymaking became a more structured, or systematic 
affair: all social and economic policies could be placed into the 
framework that the macroeconomic models provided and their effects 
on the economy as a whole could be expressed in seemingly precise 
figures. Policymakers could, with the help of models, rank policy sce-
narios and incorporate uncertainty in their measures, thus introduc-
ing a whole new dimension to policymaking. This new model-based 
practice created a cognitive space in which wage-moderation and 
Keynesian demand management became accepted measures. 
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A similar development took place in the 1970s with the VINTAF-
model and the discussion on unemployment. Arguments surround-
ing the model made a strong association between unemployment, the 
growth of the public sector and wage costs; associations used by both 
camps in the debate, both the opponents and proponents of the 
growth of the public sector. These associations became commonly 
accepted relations, thus shaping the unemployment debate for the 
decade to come (Visser and Wijnhoven, 1989, 154-170). Later, at the 
start of the 1980s, the policy principle of full employment was aban-
doned, introducing the idea of a ‘natural’ rate of unemployment ush-
ering a new way of thinking about unemployment. More fundamen-
tal question concerning the relation of unemployment and the collec-
tive financial burden were black boxed in the later iterations of the 
VINTAF model.  
The VINTAF also shaped the cognitive space on thinking about un-
employment even when contributors to the debate were not using the 
model as a policy tool. VINTAF became an artifact around which the 
debate developed; an artifact that allowed for the development of 
new arguments, the articulations of new issues and the creation of 
new epistemic communities. The model also functioned as a builder 
of coalitions, as its figures brought anti-Keynesian economists, em-
ployer federations and the Central Economic Committee together. 
VINTAF allowed for a successful public intervention putting the 
growth of the public sector as major problem on the political agenda. 
The VINTAF intervention highlights the beginning of a develop-
ment in which the CPB became increasingly more visible in the na-
tional media. Using new channels to circulate forecasts figures and 
policy scenarios also meant that the form of expertise the bureau of-
fered changed. The figures associated with VINTAF did not only re-
conceptualise unemployment, they were also used to brand policy 
proposals that went against the 1%-norm as unrealistic, irresponsible, 
or outright dangerous. This set a precedent of how the CPB would 
operate in the public sphere from then onwards, namely, by putting 
emphasis on economic feasibility and political realism. Such a watch-
dog role went hand in hand with an emphasis on the public budget: 
the CPB consciously started to present itself as the institution which 
ensured the government would spend its money responsibly and 
wisely. As such the shift in the CPB’s form of expertise fits into a larg-
er development of the role of economists in society, a development 
Morgan describes as follows:  
In terms of operating the economy, notions of control engineering were 
explicitly discussed during the 1950s experience of the ‘managed’ econo-
my. In the 1980s, still less interventionist modes were in favor, and macro-
economic policy was understood to be taking fiscal care and following 
rules of monetary operation, suggesting the idea of maintaining a smooth-
running machine (Morgan, 2003, 276).  
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The only difference with the role of the CPB is that its practice is 
better described as fiscal watchdog rather than as fiscal caretaker. 
To bring the topics of this article into the present, I would like to 
finish with a contemporary example of the CPB’s watchdog role in 
public debates. As from 1986, the CPB has started to make assess-
ments of political party manifestos during national election times. In 
these assessments, the bureau provides economic forecasts based on 
the policies provided in the manifestos, in order to allow voters to 
make a more informed choice. Although the assessment allows for 
quite some flexibility on how economic issues can be dealt with, all 
the manifestos should adhere to the budgeting principles provided by 
the ministry of finance. These assessments are also executed by the 
main macroeconomic model the bureau still employs. Even with the 
CPB preaching the transparency that these assessments would bring 
to the economic impact of the party manifestos, the analysis also ob-
scures the fact that all parties agree to adhere to budgeting rules. 
Consequently, questions concerning the public deficit tend to disap-
pear from the public debate. Although the models of the CPB are now 
widely discussed, the issues they tend to exclude are not. In Goudri-
aan’s terms: the models are still night trains, but now operating in 
broad daylight.  
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Economics and its sub-disciplines often developed in close relationship 
with its audiences. This paper examines the public life of one particular 
case, the idea of marginal social cost pricing for ports, by highlighting two 
key episodes. The first episode was the emergence of port pricing in the 
1970s, when the academic concept found a willing ear at international or-
ganisations such as the World Bank. The idea of marginal cost pricing for 
ports replaced the then prevailing principle in port policy of national pub-
lic interest, with the principle of economic efficiency. The second episode 
was the eager adoption of the idea of marginal social cost pricing for ports 
by the European Commission in the 1990s. Along the way, from the 1970s 
to the late 1990s, the relation between economics and its audience appears 
to have undergone a dramatic shift. In the earlier episode, academic econ-
omists took the lead finding only a receptive audience with international 
organisations. In the 1990s, by contrast, one such international organiza-
tion, the European Union, took the lead in advancing the idea of marginal 
social cost pricing, pushing economists into the role of either intellectual 
defender or critical observer. The insights from this particular history may 
be useful to obtain a better understanding of the role of applied economics 
in the micropolitics of the various waves of deregulation, liberalization, 
and privatization that swept the world since 1970. 
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L’économie portuaire en quête d’une audience : les péripéties publiques 
de la tarification portuaire au coût marginal social, 1870–2000 
La science économique et ses sous-disciplines se sont souvent développées 
en relation étroite avec leurs audiences. Ce papier examine la vie publique 
d’un cas particulier, l’idée d’une tarification au coût marginal social dans 
les ports, en soulignant deux épisodes clefs. Le premier épisode est 
l’émergence de la tarification portuaire dans les années 1970, lorsque ce 
concept académique a rencontré une écoute bienveillante dans des organi-
sations internationales telles que la Banque mondiale. L’idée de la tarifica-
tion au coût marginal social dans les ports a remplacé le principe qui pré-
valait alors dans la politique portuaire, l’intérêt national public, par le 
principe de l’efficacité économique. Le second épisode est la prompte 
adoption de l’idée de tarification au coût marginal social dans les ports 
par la Commission européenne dans les années 1990. Entre les années 
1970 et la fin des années 1990, la relation entre la science économique et 
son audience semble s’être dramatiquement modifiée. Dans le premier 
épisode, les économistes académiques avaient pris l’initiative en ne trou-
vant un écho favorable que dans les organisations internationales. Dans 
les années 1990, en revanche, c’est une autre organisation internationale, 
l’Union européenne, qui a pris l’initiative en promouvant l’idée de la tari-
fication au coût marginal social, poussant les économistes soit dans un 
rôle d’avocat intellectuel, soit dans un rôle d’observateur critique. Les le-
çons tirées de cette histoire peuvent être utiles pour mieux comprendre le 
rôle de l’économie appliquée dans la micropolitique des différentes 
vagues de dérégulation, de libéralisation et de privatisation qui ont ponc-
tué le monde depuis 1970. 
Mots-clés : économie portuaire, politique portuaire, tarification au coût 
marginal social, Banque mondiale, Union européenne 
JEL: A11, B20, L98, N74, R48 
 
 
There is a growing interest among historians of economics in tracing 
the public impact of economics, and its close relationship with its 
publics. Mata and Medema (2013), for example, used Eyal and Buch-
holz’ (2010) notion of ‘interventions’ to study the concrete ways in 
which economists interact with their audiences. One area where there 
is obviously a strong interplay between economics and public reason, 
is applied economics (cf. Backhouse and Biddle, 2000; Backhouse and 
Cherrier, 2017). This paper focuses on the interaction between eco-
nomics and its audiences when economics is applied to policy issues, 
presenting a case study where economics is applied to ports and port 
policy. It studies how, from 1970 to 2000, the nascent field of port 
economics interacted with its various audiences. It specifically focus-
es on the application of marginal social cost pricing to seaports,1 and 
                                                            
1 When referring to port pricing, the terms ‘marginal cost pricing’ and ‘marginal 
social cost pricing’ are used interchangeably in the literature and without clearly 
discriminating between the two (e.g. Button, 1979; EU, 1995; 1997; 1998). Walters 
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traces how this concept was first applied to ports by transport econ-
omists, slowly made its way into public policy in the 1970s, to even-
tually become the cornerstone of the European Union’s (EU) port pol-
icy by 2000.  
Over the period studied, like so many other public services and 
utilities, ports and port policy underwent important transformations. 
Prior to the 1970s, port policy was primarily framed in ‘public’ terms: 
ports were perceived as public utilities serving the national interest. 
By the end of the 20th century however, after waves of deregulation, 
liberalization, and privatization, port policy became increasingly 
more ‘economized,’ meaning that ports were increasingly viewed in 
economic terms and port policy was increasingly guided by neoclas-
sical economic principles (for a general overview for the case of infra-
structure, see Graham and Marvin, 2001). The present paper exam-
ines how the interventions of economics and economists facilitated 
such a transformation and what role the idea of marginal social cost 
pricing played in this. Port economics as an academic discipline was 
thus not only shaped by evolutions in the port industry. Indeed, de-
velopments in economic thought in general, interactions with key au-
diences, and the policy views of academics made port economics 
what it is today.2 
For the case of port pricing, the audience consisted primarily of 
large international organizations, first in the 1970s, the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the 
World Bank, and later in the 1990s, the EU. To examine how econo-
mists helped shape port policy and especially the issue of pricing ac-
cess to ports, this paper reviews two important episodes in the histo-
ry of port economics. The first was the emergence of port pricing the-
ory in the 1970s in the context of UNCTAD and the World Bank. The 
second episode took place in the 1990s, where the EU emphatically 
                                                                                                                                     
uses the concept of ‘marginal social cost’ in his work on road pricing (Walters, 
1954; 1961), but drops the term ‘social’ in his work on ports (Walters, 1975; 
Bennathan and Walters, 1979). For EU documents it is clear that ‘marginal social 
cost pricing’ is meant, even when ‘marginal cost pricing’ is used (see EU, 1998, 6-
8), but the port economist Haralambides (2002) for instance refers to ‘marginal 
cost’ instead of ‘marginal social cost’. When applied to the pricing of public 
utilities such as ports, marginal cost automatically implies social costs too. Thus, 
when determining the marginal cost of ports and port usage, marginal social cost 
are obviously included. In the current paper therefore, marginal cost is 
sometimes used as a shorthand for marginal social cost.  
2 In this respect our analysis differs from the received view, as expressed by 
Heaver for instance, who stated that “the economic objective of ports and the 
systems of which they are a part have not changed. It is to provide value to 
shippers. (The extent to which governments ascribe other objectives, for example, 
local employment or sovereignty, is beyond economics although the objectives 
may have economic consequences worthy of economic analysis.)” (Heaver, 2006, 
32) 
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adopted marginal social cost pricing as a central tool for European 
port policies within the Common Transport Policy. These episodes 
illustrate that the worlds of academic economics and policy are hard-
ly isolated and that the idea of port pricing emerged from the contin-
uous interaction between port economics and its wider policy publics. 
The interventions of economics and the use of the idea of marginal 
social cost pricing shifted considerably along the way. Where in its 
early days, marginal cost pricing was mostly a critical device pressed 
by economists, it ended up being a normative ideal for EU policy. By 
tracing the public life of the idea of marginal social cost pricing in the 
port sector, this article hopes to contribute to a more detailed under-
standing of the role played by economics in the micropolitics of the 
‘economization’ of public utilities within the larger process of deregu-
lation and liberalization taking place since the 1970s and onwards.  
1. The Birth of Port Economics in the 1970s:  
Marginal Cost Pricing in Search of an Audience 
Up until the 1970s, economic theory did not occupy a prominent posi-
tion in the literature on ports. The economic literature that existed 
was mostly directed at practitioners in the port sector (e.g. Cunning-
ham, 1926; Bown, 1953; Bown and Flere, 1967). In the academic eco-
nomics literature, there was also very little attention given to ports 
(Kershaw, 1947; Heaver, 1993; Brooks and Pallis, 2012; Woo et al., 
2011). Reviewing the early history of maritime economics, Goss re-
marks that the early publications “were certainly useful to the ‘practi-
cal men’ of their day … but none of these contain anything likely to 
be recognised as related to economic principles as known today” 
(Goss, 2002, 396). Note that “economic principles” here refers to those 
of neoclassical microeconomics, given that other economic ideas have 
always played a role in port policy, as ports where generally seen as 
essential economic infrastructures for the national or regional econo-
my. 
1.1. The Push for Marginal Cost Pricing in Ports 
Port economics as an academic field only emerged with the applica-
tion of neoclassical microeconomic principles and economic analysis 
in the 1970s (Goss, 2002; Heaver, 2006). The discussion on port pricing 
in the present paper relates exclusively to the dues charged by port 
authorities for the use of infrastructure to access quays, including 
dredged channels and traffic control for instance, but not port facili-
ties user charges for services like pilotage and towage or occupancy 
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charges for the use of berths, cranes and storage facilities.3 The appli-
cation of the principle of marginal cost pricing to transport derives 
from a more general discussion on marginal costs and public utilities 
that dates back to the 1940s (Hotelling, 1938; Vickrey, 1948; 1955). For 
various reasons, the application of marginal social cost pricing came 
to ports later than to road transport and railways.4 Here we will con-
centrate on how it made its first appearance in the literature on ports.  
A first attempt to apply microeconomic principles and the notion 
of marginal social cost analysis to port pricing was offered in 1974 by 
Ian G. Heggie. At the time, Heggie was Director of the Oxford Uni-
versity Transport Studies Unit, but wrote his contribution as a visit-
ing professor at the Centre of Transportation Studies at the University 
of British Columbia (UBC) in Vancouver, Canada.5 The opening lines 
of Heggie’s intervention set the stage:  
Publicly owned ports rarely price port services on a commercial basis. 
They do not keep comprehensive cost accounts, and they make little at-
tempt to relate specific revenues to costs in any organised way. By and 
                                                            
3 There exists a large variety of institutional arrangements for ports ranging from 
municipally or government owned ports to trust ports, and various models of 
managing ports exist (see for instance Verhoeven, 2010; Verhoeven and 
Vanoutrive, 2012). These are in turn matched by a wide variety of charging 
principles and practices observed and proposed both in theory and practice (e.g. 
Thomas, 1978). 
4 O’Neill (2013) point out that the conceptualisation of infrastructure networks as 
public utilities in sectors such as electricity and transport in the 1950s to 1970s 
paved the way for the application of ‘market’ principles and ‘privatisation’ logics 
to these infrastructures in following decades. Vickrey’s (1952) proposal to revise 
the rapid transit fare structure in New York City was a response to the financial 
problems of the city. Regulation of railway monopolies in the United States and 
Canada had a long tradition and was considered more urgent than interventions 
in the more competitive shipping market. Moreover, the diversity in service 
providers in the ports sector, including railways, has made it a heterogeneous 
industry which is more difficult to analyze and regulate, also for its international 
character (Heaver, 2006). Furthermore, shipowners and port authorities have 
been rather defensive and secrecy has been highly valued (Goss, 2002). 
Furthermore, the fact that ports and railroads have been priced might make 
alternative ways of pricing, on the one hand, more acceptable, but the gradual 
disappearance of toll roads and investments in toll-free motorways can, on the 
other hand, have made road pricing a more urgent topic of discussion in the 
1950s and 1960s (Lindsey, 2006). Other relevant factors include the 1970s oil 
crises, and the rise of the environmentalist movement and the increased support 
for the pricing of externalities.  
5 The Centre of Transportation Studies at the University of British Columbia was 
established in the 1960s with funding from the UPS Foundation (of the global 
express delivery services) and federal grants. At the time it was headed by Trevor 
Heaver who managed to attract several leading European transport economists 
for shorter and longer research stays. The Centre still exists until today and. See: 
http://www.sauder.ubc.ca/Faculty/Research_Centres/Centre_for_Transportati
on_Studies/About_Us (last accessed: 25 April 2018). 
376 Thomas Vanoutrive and P.W. Zuidhof | 
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 9(2) : 371-394 
large, their tariff structures were established before the turn of the century 
and have simply been extended and revised to cover their added respon-
sibilities and their increased costs. (Heggie, 1974, 3) 
According to Heggie, prevailing port tariffs “lack any obvious ration-
al basis” (ibid., 6) and conventional “non-cost-based pricing” is usual-
ly defended with reference to flawed perceptions of the public bene-
fits of ports. He therefore proposed that port “charges should be 
based on the [marginal] social opportunity cost of providing each 
service” (ibid., 10). To determine the marginal social cost of these ser-
vices, Heggie drew on his own earlier work in transport economics 
(1972) and the pricing of transport improvements, where he used so-
cial accounting prices.6 In his view, the advantages of using marginal 
social costs were threefold. In the short run it produces port prices 
that are conducive to an efficient use of facilities. In the long run, it 
offers a rational basis for port investment programs. Lastly, it could 
fuel competition among port users.  
Heggie’s contribution was only a prelude to the real uptake of 
marginal social cost pricing in the ports literature following the inter-
ventions of Alan A. Walters. In 1975, Walters published a seminal pa-
per titled ‘Marginal cost pricing in ports’. It was followed in 1979 by a 
book-length treatise titled Port Pricing and Investment Planning for De-
veloping Countries co-written with Esra Bennathan, which was pre-
pared for and published by the World Bank. Later authors built on 
Walters’ ideas (notably Bobrovitch, 1982; Button, 1979; Noritake, 
1985) and review papers and textbooks invariably refer to Walters’ 
contribution on optimal port pricing (e.g. Jansson and Schneerson, 
1983; Goss and Stevens, 2001; Abbes, 2007; Acciaro, 2013; Heaver, 
2006; Bergantino, 2002). Published only one year after Heggie’s, Wal-
ters’ paper, apart from some differences, makes similar claims but is 
more convincing.7 Incidentally, the paper was written while Walters 
was also a Visiting Professor at UBC. Walters’ paper starts with the 
                                                            
6 Social accounting prices was an instrument borrowed from development 
economics where it was developed as part of Social Cost Benefit Analysis, a 
method used at the OECD and World Bank in the 1960s and 1970s to assess 
development projects (viz. Little and Mirrlees, 1969). 
7 One difference between Heggie (1974) and Walters (1975) is that the former 
borrows his cost concept from social accounting prices that were used in the 
context of Cost Benefit Analysis, while the latter is more firmly rooted in 
conventional welfare analysis. Another difference is that Heggie and Walters 
each propose a different solution for the problem of recouping fixed costs, with 
different political ramifications. If pricing is based on marginal (social) cost, large 
investments are sunk costs that are not earned back. Heggie suggests to cover 
these by introducing a subvention due, basically a subsidy, to be paid by the port 
authorities or government. Walters proposes using two-part tariffs, that consists 
of a fixed annual fee plus a marginal cost fee for services. The fact that Walters 
proposes to put the burden on users as opposed to governments may be part of 
the explanation as to why his intervention got more play than Heggie’s over time.   
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observation that “ports are normally operated by public authorities” 
(1975, 299) and that governments, as a rule, rely on a set of historical 
standards for determining port charges. Walters claimed that “the 
long history of government regulation has not produced a rational 
system of charges either according to the marginal costs of providing 
the service or to any discernible principle of social justice,” and that 
there is “no single guiding principle of port pricing as there is now in 
the area of road pricing” (ibid., 300). The reference to road pricing is 
no coincidence. Walters had been an important pioneer in modern 
transport economics and made important contributions to the re-
search on congestion pricing—marginal social cost pricing applied to 
roads (Lindsey, 2006; Vanoutrive, 2017).  
Walters discussed some examples of port pricing to illustrate how 
the application of short-term marginal cost pricing challenges or even 
runs counter to the then existing perspective on port charges. The 
common practice of charging large vessels more for the use of a 
dredged channel may seem right from the perspective of equity or 
ability to pay, but has little basis in terms of marginal cost. For Wal-
ters, the idea of marginal cost pricing was hence a way to debunk ex-
isting port pricing policies. Walters points out that if port authorities 
do not apply marginal cost pricing, they consistently provide incor-
rect price signals that hamper economic efficiency. The first objective 
of better pricing is to encourage economic efficiency in the short term, 
and the second is to offer a rational guide for port investment deci-
sions (see also Goss and Stevens, 2001). Third, by not pricing accord-
ing to marginal costs, port authorities willingly or unwillingly distort 
competition in the logistic chain that runs from international shipping 
to domestic transport, with potentially disturbing effects on trade. 
Walters’ conclusion was that “the introduction of marginal cost pric-
ing into port operation involves many difficulties of detail and ad-
ministration”—not the least the problem of how ports will be able to 
recoup sunk costs or fixed costs—it does however clearly “supply a 
useful set of principles to deploy in the discussion of port pricing pol-
icy” (ibid., 306). 
The intellectual inspiration for marginal cost pricing in ports came 
straight from the field of transport economics, where both Heggie 
(e.g. 1972) and Walters had earned their stripes. Walters, who would 
later become a macroeconomic advisor to Margaret Thatcher, got his 
first job in 1952 at the University of Birmingham working with the 
transport economist Gilbert Walker and the maritime economist, Esra 
Bennathan. Working on public utility pricing and the pricing of road 
services, he developed the argument that pricing policies should be 
based on short-term, not long-term marginal costs (Walters, 1954). He 
extended this to a theory of congestion pricing published in Economet-
rica (Walters, 1961) and in The Economics of Road User Charges pub-
lished with the World Bank (Walters, 1968). With Bennathan, he 
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made his first foray into maritime economics with The Economics of 
Ocean Freight Rates (1969).  
After his stint as macroeconomic advisor in the Heath government 
in the UK, Walters spent a year in Vancouver (in 1974), a year at the 
World Bank, and four years at Johns Hopkins University. The time 
abroad provided Walters with the opportunity to extend his earlier 
research on marginal social cost pricing and congestion pricing for 
roads to the new context of ports.8 The 1975 essay on port pricing 
was, together with Bennathan, developed into Port pricing and invest-
ment policy for developing countries (Bennathan and Walters, 1979), 
published by the World Bank. It could be considered the first text-
book on port pricing, explaining key principles and discussing practi-
cal applications and complications. 
The conceptual toolbox of marginal cost pricing had been readily 
available within transport economics and both Heggie and Walters 
adapted it from roads to apply it to the case of ports. The theory of 
port pricing thus developed as an intellectual spill-over from road 
pricing. The initial push for marginal cost pricing in ports thus came 
largely from within the economic field, as a critical tool for appraising 
existing port policy. It was driven by a motivation to use sound eco-
nomic principles to put port pricing policy on a new, rational footing. 
Where port pricing had largely been the province of national econom-
ic interest and public interest considerations, the neoclassical econom-
ic approach aimed to replace this with the objective of economic effi-
ciency. 
1.2. An International Audience for Marginal Cost Pricing in Ports 
Designed as a critical tool for appraising existing port policies, mar-
ginal cost pricing could not immediately find a willing ear among 
policymakers. Port authorities, for one, would hardly be open to the 
suggestion of marginal cost pricing, which could imply lower charges 
for port services while leaving the problem of recovering sunk costs 
to the port authorities. Heggie (1974, 12) anticipated that port authori-
ties or governments would have little incentive to embrace these no-
tions:  
Tariff revisions are generally associated with attempts to raise charges. 
They are therefore usually resisted by both shipping companies and cargo 
interest … and they generate little interest from the port authority because 
of the lack of ultimate financial responsibility and the cost accounting and 
other difficulties. (ibid., 20) 
                                                            
8 The biographical details were derived from an auto-biographical paper 
published by Walters (1989) and obituaries published after his death in 2010, e.g. 
Blundell for the Mont Pèlerin Society published on the website of the Adam 
Smith Institute. 
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Walters’ solution to the problem of investment cost recovery was 
the adoption of two-part or multipart tariffs that comprise a fixed 
charge to recoup fixed costs and a variable charge based on marginal 
costs.9 While his solution would make marginal cost pricing more 
palatable to port authorities, it still ran counter to the immediate in-
terests of port authorities. Why replace a system of port charges that 
brought in sufficient dues, with one based on economic principles 
whose outcomes are still uncertain (Walters, 1975, 306)?  
According to early port economists, another benefit of marginal 
cost pricing is that it would put more competitive pressure on large 
shipping interests, in particular the so-called shipping conferences. 
These conferences (which functioned like cartels) were agreements 
between shipping companies to set standard freight rates on shipping 
routes, which was a key issue in maritime economics in the 1970s. A 
problem posed by shipping conferences was that marginal cost price 
savings in one port would not have an immediate effect on shipping 
prices because of the standardized shipping rates for routes (see Heg-
gie, 1974, 9; Bennathan and Walters, 1979, 134). Customers of ship-
ping lines would thus not benefit from the efficiency gains of rational 
port pricing. Only if marginal cost pricing would improve the cost 
basis of outside competitors, could it set in motion a process of “chis-
elling” that could cause a conference to break down (Walters, 1975, 
303; Bennathan and Walters, 1979, 204). The adoption of marginal cost 
pricing thus also ran counter to the interests of members of shipping 
conferences.  
In light of the immediate interests of port authorities and large 
shipping interests then, marginal cost pricing would have been ex-
pected to garner little support. The project, in fact, presented an even 
more fundamental political challenge as it contested the then domi-
nant view that emphasized the public function of ports. The reigning 
view, which never disappeared entirely, was that ports should serve 
the interests of national and regional industry and trade, and should 
act as engines of economic growth and employment.10 Bennathan and 
Walters referred to this as the ‘European doctrine’:  
The European doctrine views the port as part of the social infrastructure of 
a whole region. The value of a port should be assessed not in the accounts 
of the facilities but in terms of the progress of industry and trade in the 
hinterland. (1979, 4) 
                                                            
9 The solution of a two-part tariff emerged as part of the ‘marginal cost 
controversy’ where it was introduced by Coase (1946) in response to Hotelling 
(1938). See also Frischmann and Hogendorn (2015). 
10 Note that this is a broader claim about ports having a public function that goes 
beyond stating that ports are public goods in the technical economic sense (see 
also Baird, 2004).  
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The proposed ‘economization’ of ports through marginal cost pric-
ing clearly challenged such a public and national function of ports:  
The national interests which are supposed to motivate the European doc-
trine are elusive and nebulous. Nevertheless, most people would agree 
that the term somehow expresses the spirit which should guide port poli-
cy. (ibid., 4) 
The rational economics of marginal cost pricing thus promised to dis-
lodge the ‘elusive and nebulous’ national and public interest reason-
ing that marked port policy at the time. The interventions of econo-
mists like Heggie, Walters and Bennathan, based on the mainstream 
neoclassical economic principle of efficiency, thus threatened to chal-
lenge the perceived national and public interest of ports and ‘protec-
tionist’ maritime policy, which would not be received lightly by port 
authorities and other governing bodies.  
Given these political strictures, it is no surprise that the economics 
of marginal cost pricing for ports found a more willing ear elsewhere. 
Circumventing port authorities and other national policy bodies, the 
emerging ideas of rational port pricing found a first receptive audi-
ence at international organizations whose aims reached beyond nar-
rowly defined national economic goals or shipping interests. As Goss 
noted, in the 1960s shipowners and national port authorities had been 
highly sceptical of economic research, since the “dissemination of sci-
entifically-based ideas on shipping economics was a deliberate policy 
intended to moderate the exaggerated claims often made by interest-
ed parties” (Goss, 2002, 399).  
In the 1960s and 1970s, international organizations such as 
UNCTAD, the World Bank, and the OECD however began building 
their economic research capacities in the field of transport and ship-
ping (Stern and Ferreira, 1997). The establishment of UNCTAD in 
1964 presented a first step in this direction, and international ship-
ping was one of UNCTAD’s first policy concerns (UNCTAD, 2014). 
The UNCTAD’s Shipping Committee had begun to attract maritime 
economists, opening its policy advice to more rigorous economic 
analysis (Metaxas, 1983, 148). The committee delivered reports critical 
of the shipping conferences, which signalled its efforts to put mari-
time economics to work for promoting free trade, development, and 
the validity of a scientific approach (Goss, 2002, 394 and 400). In 1975, 
UNCTAD published a first report addressing the question of port 
pricing (UNCTAD, 1975).11 
During the 1970s the economic analysis of transport infrastruc-
tures, however, got more play at the World Bank. Stern and Ferreira 
                                                            
11 Alternative approaches for assessing port costs and port prices, other than 
marginal cost pricing, were explored at the time. Bromwhich (1978) suggested 
alternatives and UNCTAD was exploring alternative options based on the notion 
of fully distributed cost (quoted in Bergantino, 2002, 361, n. 14).  
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(1997, 531) describe how this period was characterized by an in-
creased interest in the application of basic microeconomic principles 
and the role of prices, notably in the economics of transport infra-
structures. One of the earliest World Bank Working Papers on 
transport economics was in fact Alan Walters’ book-length paper on 
‘The Economics of Road User Charges’ (1968). The World Bank’s 
search for a more solid economic footing for its infrastructure projects 
is reflected in the foreword to Walters’ paper by the then President of 
the World Bank, Robert S. McNamara:  
I would like to explain why the World Bank Group does research work, 
and why it publishes it. We feel an obligation to look beyond the projects 
we help to finance towards the whole resource allocation of an economy, 
and the effectiveness of the use of those resources. Our major concern, in 
dealings with member countries, is that all scarce resources, including 
capital, skilled labor, enterprise and know-how, should be used to their 
best advantage … Finally, we are required by our Articles, as well as by 
inclination, to use objective economic criteria in all our judgments. (In 
Walters, 1968, v) 
Walters’ paper on marginal cost pricing for roads had a big impact on 
future research on transport at the World Bank (Stern and Ferreira, 
1997, 554), and continued to inform its policy recommendations 
(Grosdidier de Matons, 1986, 274). 
It is in this context of development policy at the World Bank and 
the need to assess port investments where marginal cost pricing ulti-
mately found a willing ear. As stated by Director of the Transporta-
tion Department, the World Bank sought to put its programs on a 
more solid economic footing: 
In its operations in developing countries, the World Bank has encountered 
a large variety of pricing practices and widely diverse effects on efficient 
port operation. In the belief that there must be a systematic set of princi-
ples that would much improve port pricing, professors Esra Bennathan (of 
the University of Bristol) and A. A. Walters (then of the London School of 
Economics) were asked to undertake this study. (Foreword, Bennathan 
and Walters, 1979, xiv) 
Walters and Esra Bennathan were asked to repeat Walters’ feat on 
road pricing for port pricing in developing countries (Stern and Fer-
reira, 1997, 554-555), which resulted in Port Pricing and Investment Pol-
icy for Developing Countries (1979). The book provides a well-
elaborated plea for marginal cost pricing. While pleased with the 
study, it is telling that the World Bank director remained somewhat 
apprehensive about the ‘radical’ nature of some of its proposals:  
The main conclusion of their sometimes involved discussion is that the main 
basis of port tariffs should be marginal cost. But within this general con-
clusion, certain rather surprising and unorthodox recommendations emerge, 
such as the proposal that ports should charge congestion levies. (In Benna-
than and Walters, 1979, xiv, emphasis added) 
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McNamara’s comments underscore the wish of the World Bank to 
base its port policy on firm economic reasoning that goes beyond nar-
row national economic interests, but also highlights the relatively rad-
ical nature at the time of applying marginal cost pricing to ports.  
This episode shows how the push by economists and the pull from 
international organizations made marginal cost pricing a tool for 
‘economizing’ port policy. From earlier applications in transport eco-
nomics and road pricing in particular, the economic principles of 
marginal cost pricing for ports were ready, tested and available. Be-
cause these principles ran counter to the perceived national and pub-
lic interest of public port authorities and government, and the par-
ticular interests of shipping lines, economists found a first audience 
for their ideas among international organizations. Only there, increas-
ingly mainstream neoclassical economic principles of pricing for effi-
ciency could begin to challenge public interest principles, slowly em-
barking on a long march of global acceptance that would ultimately 
transform the field of port economics and port policy. In this early 
phase, marginal cost pricing was primarily a critical tool provided by 
economics and adopted by international organizations to challenge 
the predominant national interest principles of port policy, by putting 
these on a firmer economic footing. In interplay with economists, in-
ternational organizations were important catalysts in promoting mar-
ginal cost pricing and the gradual ‘economization’ of port policy it 
entailed, switching it from policy based on public, national interest 
principles to one governed by neoclassical microeconomic principles.  
2. Port Pricing enters EU Policy: Marginal Social Cost  
Pricing as a Tool for Integration and Competition 
The legacy of the early episode of port pricing in the 1970s becomes 
clear when one considers the making of European Union policy on 
ports in the 1990s. During this period, marginal social cost pricing 
was turned into the cornerstone of EU policy on ports. While this epi-
sode underscores the march of marginal social cost pricing in port 
policy circles, it also shows that the interaction between economics 
and its audience took a new form.  
2.1. EU Port Policy: A New Audience  
for Marginal Social Cost Pricing 
Since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community 
in 1952, transport has been a central concern in European policy 
(Chlomoudis and Pallis, 2005). The signing of the Treaty of Rome in 
1957 establishing the European Economic Community brought the 
first attention to ports (Bird, 1967), albeit with limited impact. This 
only changed in the 1990s, when due to further integration of the in-
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ternal market and enhanced competition, a number of EU policy ini-
tiatives on transport and port policy were launched under the auspi-
ces of the Commissioner for Transport, Neil Kinnock (Chlomoudis 
and Pallis, 2005; Verhoeven, 2009).  
The first policy document devoted to ports was the European 
Commission’s 1997 Green Paper on Sea Ports and Maritime Infrastruc-
ture. It presented a first proposal for a more uniform, European 
framework for port pricing. It argued that the formation of an internal 
market and increased competition in Europe put increasing pressure 
on the traditional national character of ports. Because of “disappear-
ing national (captive) hinterlands,” issues of “pricing, port develop-
ment and financing decisions of a particular port may have marked 
effects on its neighbors, nationally and internationally” (EC, 1997, 6). 
With increased European and international trade, differences in pric-
ing mechanisms between European ports, and especially differences 
in the role of public funding, have possible distorting effect for the 
entire community. The Commission therefore concluded that “the 
‘general economic interest’ argument loses weight, leading to a more 
commercial and universal attitude towards pricing and infrastructure 
funding” (ibid., 12). 
Putting its focus on port pricing, the Commission also appears to 
stave off a contentious discussion on the potentially distortive effects 
of public funding to ports, and EU rules on state aid:  
Until now the Commission has not considered public funding of port in-
frastructure which is open to all users as aid. However, as ports are in-
creasingly considered as terminals having mainly commercial activities 
with greater involvement of the private sector, and competition is strong 
on a Community-wide basis, a different approach could be desirable for 
the future. Therefore, the Commission finds that port infrastructure 
should be priced in such a way that users should bear the real costs of the 
port services and facilities they consume. (ibid., 2) 
For the European Commission, harmonizing port pricing thus consti-
tuted a politically expedient measure to tackle the increasingly tenu-
ous place of ports between public purpose and market competition. 
Besides a general promise of improving port efficiency, a uniform 
framework for port pricing would especially help the Commission 
“to meet the Community’s responsibilities under the Treaty to ensure 
free and fair competition in the port sector” (ibid., 5) while at the 
same time steering the public involvement in ports clear from state 
aid concerns. The implementation of marginal social cost pricing pro-
posed by the European Commission was hence not in the first place 
driven by efficiency considerations but was instead aimed at creating 
an internal market undistorted by state aid and other protectionist 
measures, forcing all ports to follow the same pricing rules. 
To develop a common framework for port pricing that would 
overcome potential distortions, the Green Paper considers three alter-
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native approaches: average cost pricing, charging for operating costs, 
and marginal social cost pricing. The Commission rejected the first 
two on the grounds that average costs would overcharge for histori-
cal sunk costs and the second would undercharge. It hence conclud-
ed: “The Commission, therefore, considers that port charges could be 
set in line with marginal costs, which would also take into account 
new investments” (ibid., 15). The Green Paper proposed that the 
Commission would make an inventory of existing charging practices 
in European ports to ultimately draw up a framework “on port tariff 
regimes” that, following the principle of marginal social cost pricing, 
would form the basis for a new Council directive.  
There are few references in the Green Paper in support of the en-
dorsement of marginal social cost pricing. The ideas, however, could 
be traced back to an earlier Commission Green Paper titled Towards 
Fair and Efficient Pricing in Transport (EC, 1995), also drawn up under 
the responsibility of Commissioner Kinnock. The central argument of 
this paper was that economic instruments and market-based solutions 
were preferred for dealing with transport externalities ranging from 
congestion to accidents to air pollution, and to noise: “Prices have to 
be right in order to get transport right” (ibid., 50). It speaks favorably 
of marginal social cost pricing when discussing pricing of road and 
rail infrastructures, and congestion for instance, taking its cues from 
OECD research and Walters (1968). Marginal social cost pricing found 
a willing ear again at another international institution, about to be 
made into the cornerstone of EU port policy.  
In 1998 appeared a comprehensive transport White Paper, titled 
Fair Payment for Infrastructure Use: A Phased Approach to a Common 
Transport Infrastructure Charging Framework in the EU (EC, 1998). 
Building on similar arguments, it claimed that in order to avoid dis-
tortions, EU-wide competition would benefit from a comprehensive 
system of pricing. It insisted that “the same fundamental principles 
should be applied to all commercial modes of transport in each Mem-
ber State of the European Union.” It concluded that “the only charg-
ing approach that fully satisfies … is marginal cost charging” (ibid., 6) 
and the “Commission proposes that a framework should be drawn 
up that would introduce the type of charging in all modes at Com-
munity level” (ibid., 8). With a great sense of ambition and urgency, 
then, the White Paper turns marginal social cost pricing into a general 
norm and tool for the EU’s entire transport policy. 
The successful march of marginal social cost pricing in EU port 
policy was short lived. The Green Paper was met with significant op-
position from various directions (Pallis, 1997). In a speech at a port 
conference, Commissioner Kinnock (1998) relayed that the issues of 
port financing and the Community framework for port pricing were 
most contested. While most parties were in agreement with the aim of 
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fair competition, Kinnock tellingly summarizes the criticism as fol-
lows:  
However, at the same time some have quite naturally expressed doubts as 
to whether the proposed Directive on charging is the right instrument for 
achieving these important principles. “Bureaucratic” and “theoretical” 
were the words most frequently used by those who raised this question. 
The Commission’s proposals on port pricing were indeed striking in 
the bureaucratic way it attempted to apply the theoretical principles 
of marginal social cost pricing as an administrative tool of EU port 
governance. After the 1998 White Paper, marginal social cost pricing 
quickly receded into the background in favor of “transparency” of 
financing and charging practices (e.g. EC, 2001a; 2001b). The EU Reg-
ulation that was adopted in 2017 was thus titled, “establishing a 
framework for the provision of port services and common rules on 
the financial transparency of ports” (EU, 2017). 
2.2. A New Role for the Economics of Marginal Social Cost  
Pricing in EU Port Policy 
When comparing the public use of marginal social cost pricing in EU 
policy with its earlier public engagement in the 1970s, two aspects 
stand out. The first concerns the role of academic economics and the 
second is the function of marginal social cost pricing in policy. The 
ambitious plans of the European Union on port pricing had ushered 
in a new involvement of economists. Where economists in the 1970s 
used marginal social cost pricing to critique the existing policy con-
sensus and only found a willing ear with international organizations, 
their role changed significantly in the 1990s. In the case of EU port 
policy, economists took an active role in formulating the policies in 
which marginal social cost pricing became the preferred standard. 
Economists were evidently deeply involved in introducing marginal 
social cost pricing as the standard for EU transport. Economists work-
ing for the Commission probably had the most direct impact. One 
such economist is Gert Jan Koopman, a member of Kinnock’s cabinet, 
who had been an outspoken advocate of market-based solutions for 
externalities problems in transport (Koopman, 1995). Koopman had 
previously worked for the Dutch Central Planning Bureau and as an 
economist at the DG Economic and Financial Affairs at the Commis-
sion. The 1995 Green Paper Towards Fair and Efficient Pricing in 
Transport (EC, 1995) clearly bears his influence (compare Koopman, 
1995) and he appears to have been one of the Commissions’ leading 
voices on pricing in EU transport policy of the late 1990s. Moreover, 
several academic economists were regularly involved as consultants 
in conducting studies and drafting policies. Most visible in this re-
spect is Hercules Haralambides, a maritime economist based at the 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands. According to his CV 
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he was a member of various advisory committees of the transport 
Commissioner, Neil Kinnock.12 Haralambides drafted an early ver-
sion of the Green Paper.13 He was also leading a study (ATENCO) 
that was conducted for the European Union as a follow up to its 1998 
White Paper, in which other port economists such as Richard O. Goss 
and Trevor E. Heaver participated.14 In a paper summarizing his in-
sights, Haralambides writes: “Many of the ideas developed in this 
paper have benefitted from numerous discussions with staff of the 
European Commission over the period of my involvement in the 
preparation of its Green Paper on Ports and Maritime Infrastructure” 
(2002, 342). In the paper, Haralambides defends the EU position, 
claiming that long-term (sic.) marginal cost pricing would provide a 
“powerful pricing discipline that can eliminate subsidies and estab-
lish a level playing field among ports” (2002, 341). Significantly, Har-
alambides underlined that marginal social cost pricing is no longer 
purely an academic idea, but has gained practical political im-
portance: 
The issue of port pricing in maritime economics has not arisen only out of 
academic interest but as a response to the need felt in the port industry it-
self for a self-discipline mechanism that, if consistently applied, would 
eventually lead to the recovery of port investments and to future invest-
ments that are largely demand driven. (Haralambides, 2002, 340)	15 
In another paper on EU policy, Haralambides reiterated the entan-
glement and emerging alignment of economic reasoning and political 
reason: 
The paper argues that the prime goal to be pursued at a European level is 
to achieve a level playing field among competing commercial seaports. It 
reviews … the past and present efforts of the European Commission in 
this area, the difficulties and challenges these efforts are faced with and, 
finally, it attempts to indicate the way forward; a way consistent with Eu-
rope's political thinking, priorities and realities. (Haralambides et.al., 2001, 
368) 
                                                            
12 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2007_maritime_guidelines/ 
elaa_annex3.pdf (last accessed: 1 August 2018). 
13 Haralambides published this draft as part of a compendium of collected papers 
published on this website: www.assoporti.it/media/1407/port-book-incl-
introduction.pdf (last accessed: 1 August 2018). 
14  The academic expert group of the ATENCO study included besides 
Haralambides as chair: Karl-Heinz Breitzmann, Richard O. Goss, Sidney Gilman, 
Trevor D. Heaver, Ugo Marchese, Eddy van de Voorde. 
15 A similar confirmation of the symbiosis between economics and EU policy, can 
be found with Goss and Stevens (2001, 129), defending the EC’s endorsement of 
marginal social cost pricing: “As part of this approach the EC has commissioned 
several studies aimed at introducing such policies into European ports’ charging 
systems; indeed, some of the points made here have arisen from these studies. 
This paper is, therefore, intended to be of practical importance in the current 
development of policies as well as, we hope, of theoretical interest.” 
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These examples serve to show that by the end of the century, an 
intimate entanglement had emerged between economists, economic 
reasoning, and the policy objectives of the European Union around 
the topic of marginal social cost pricing in ports and port policy. In 
this phase of its public life, the economics of marginal social cost pric-
ing gradually shifted from being used as an external principle to cri-
tique policy to become an internal principle serving as an instrument 
for policy.  
This is not to claim that all economists supported the EU’s use of 
marginal social cost pricing. Unlike Haralambides, Goss, and Verbeke 
who were involved in EU policy making, there were also some who 
took a much more distant and critical stance (notably Bergantino, 
2002; Rothengarther, 2003; Abbes, 2007; Acciaro, 2013). In general, the 
critiques were conceptually inspired, but empirical questions played 
a role as well. William Vickrey famously stated in 1948 that average 
cost “can be measured but cannot be defined” non-arbitrarily while 
marginal cost “can be defined but cannot be measured” (Vickrey, 
1948, 232). In their review of EU policy, Abbes (2007) and Acciaro 
(2013) note that empirical studies on port pricing were a rarity when 
compared to, for example, the rail sector. Others pointed out that 
marginal social cost pricing posed the problem of cost recovery when 
marginal cost falls below average cost. The diversity of charging prac-
tices and institutional settings among EU ports and member states 
was also seen as a hindrance which could cause unintended effects 
when marginal social cost pricing was applied across European ports. 
And the argument was made that marginal social cost pricing and 
free and fair competition were two fundamentally incompatible 
goals.  
The intimate entanglement between economics and EU policy thus 
affected the use of the concept of marginal social cost pricing in poli-
cy. In the 1970s, marginal cost pricing functioned as a critical tool de-
veloped by economists that used an economic rationale to challenge 
reigning public and national interest notions of ports. In the hands of 
economists consulting for the EU, this function was expanded, add-
ing a specifically European, namely integration rationale. As it was 
employed in EU policy, the function of marginal social cost pricing 
was not only to promote economic efficiency, but also intra-European 
port competition (“to ensure free and fair competition in the port sec-
tor”, EC, 1997, 6) while simultaneously staving off concerns about 
state aid rules. Even though policy documents have generally tended 
to use vague yet appealing phrases such as ‘level playing field’, the 
aims of EU port policy were fairly clear. The implementation of mar-
ginal social cost pricing proposed by the European Commission was 
directed at creating a market undistorted by state aid or other protec-
tionist behaviour, demanding that all ports follow the same pricing 
rules. At this point in its public life, marginal social cost pricing had 
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been reworked by economists consulting for the Commission into a 
political tool for European integration (and may have acted as a uni-
fying idea in this emerging and heterogeneous institutional context, 
cf. Jabko, 2006). 
Kinnock’s summary of the criticism of EU port policy neatly illus-
trated the instrumentalized use of marginal social cost pricing that 
considered it both “theoretical” and “bureaucratic.” The EU’s port 
policy was indeed using the theoretical concept of marginal social 
cost pricing in a bureaucratic way, as an administrative instrument to 
achieve the political objectives of the EU. In the hands of consultant 
economists, the academic concept of marginal social cost pricing was 
put to a new political use, which was to further European integration 
by leveling the playing field between Member States and ports. While 
with hindsight it seems that the Commission’s economists overesti-
mated the political and practical applicability of their theoretical con-
cepts, they nonetheless contributed to a further ‘economization’ of 
port policy discourse.  
3. Conclusion: The Public Life of Marginal Social Cost 
Pricing for Ports 
This paper examined the public life of the idea of marginal social cost 
pricing for ports. It did so by tracing the ways in which economics 
interacted with its audiences in two different historical episodes. The 
contrast between the two episodes in the history of marginal social 
cost pricing in ports and port policy is significant. The first episode 
revolved around the emergence of marginal social cost pricing for 
ports in the 1970s. The project of marginal cost pricing of the 1970s 
effectively undermined the prevailing principle of national public in-
terest in port policy by replacing it with the neoclassical principle of 
economic efficiency. It was shown that the drive towards using the 
principle of economic efficiency in port policy originated neither from 
calls from port authorities, nor from the demands of large shipping 
interests. Marginal cost pricing in ports was largely pushed by econ-
omists, who were plying their well-established conceptual tools from 
other areas of transport economics to ports as a new area of study. 
The idea could however only become successful if it would find a 
willing audience for these conceptual innovations. When internation-
al organizations such as UNCTAD, the OECD and especially the 
World Bank, took an interest in marginal cost pricing for ports, they 
created a fertile context in which these ideas could be developed, dis-
seminated, and brought to political fruition.  
The second episode took place in the 1990s. At the time, marginal 
social cost pricing was emphatically embraced by another interna-
tional institution, the European Union. The European Union had 
adopted marginal social cost pricing as the cornerstone of its budding 
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port policy to serve as an active tool to promote a level playing field 
and increase competition in Europe. Between the 1970s and the late 
1990s, the relation between economics and its audience had under-
gone a major shift. As an international institution, the European Un-
ion was no longer merely a receptive audience of the economics of 
marginal social cost pricing, but manifested itself as an ardent promo-
tor of marginal social cost pricing in port policy. With the European 
Union’s embrace of marginal social cost pricing, the relationship of 
economists and their audience had changed accordingly. It was 
shown that economists had either adopted the role of intellectual de-
fender and even author of the Union’s policies, or were forced to be-
come modestly critical interlocuters of marginal social cost pricing for 
ports.  
The two episodes provide an interesting insight into the remarka-
ble twists and turns in the history of port pricing. They contain at 
least three lessons with a broader significance. First, they underscore 
the role played by economists in advancing marginal social cost pric-
ing and the ‘economization’ and transformation of the public control 
over ports and other utilities. Backed by the growing dominance of 
neoclassical economics, the ascendance of marginal social cost pricing 
was first advanced as a tool to make port pricing more rational and to 
wean it away from strictly public or ‘political’ considerations; later, 
marginal social cost pricing became the core principle of EU port pol-
icy. Secondly, the two episodes highlight the changing role of eco-
nomics and its relation to its various audiences. In the first episode, 
economics was in the lead in developing and adjusting the ideas of 
marginal cost pricing to the context of ports and port policy. In this 
phase, economists were actively in search of an audience to demon-
strate their theoretical prowess. The second episode illustrated how 
these roles had shifted significantly. No longer merely a receptive au-
dience, the European Union showed itself a very active promotor of 
the idea of marginal social cost pricing, with academic economists 
either lending their expertise in favour of EU port policy or forced to 
take the role of critical bystander. As such, it is a telling illustration of 
the historically intricate and variable interactions between economic 
and public reason. 
The paper thus showed how the emerging field of port economics 
may have contributed to the ‘economization’ of ports and port policy, 
and how it interacted with some of its publics. Thirdly then, our find-
ings about how port economics contributed to the ‘economization’ of 
port policy, provide some much-needed substance to claims that eco-
nomics was not merely a passive onlooker within the broader shift of 
what has been labelled liberalization, deregulation and marketization 
that took place from the 1970s to 2000s. The two episodes in port eco-
nomics demonstrate that economists played a leading role in one as-
pect of the economization of port policy, but could only do so 
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through their engagement with some of their audiences. In their re-
search on ports, economists such as Alan Walters, Richard Goss and 
Hercules Haralambides, promoted a distinct policy agenda. The pa-
per has thus offered a novel contribution to a more detailed under-
standing of the involvement of economics in the micropolitics of de-
regulation, liberalization, and privatization that has swept the world 
since 1970. It has shown that ‘small’ and applied economic interven-
tions were equally important in forging such new political projects as 
were the more visible ideological battles. Alan Walters is sometimes 
called ‘Europe’s Milton Friedman’, due to his role as chief economic 
advisor to the Thatcher government and his guidance of its monetary 
and fiscal policy.16 As this paper shows, his contributions to transport 
economics on road pricing and his forays in port economics may 
however have been equally important in earning that sobriquet.  
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Colander and Freedman use their story of the Chicago School’s aban-
donment of classical liberalism as a way to get at their fundamental 
argument, which is about the failure of American economics general-
ly to maintain appreciation for both economic science and the art of 
economic policy. Economists, the authors argue, have subsumed art 
within science in the effort to turn economics into an applied policy 
science. The focus on the Chicago School emerges from Craig Freed-
man’s extensive familiarity with the Chicago tradition through his 
interviews with Chicago economists, and his previous book Chicago 
Fundamentalism: Ideology and Methodology (Freedman, 2008). Colander 
adds part of the argument’s frame—the emphasis on the lost art of 
economic policy (Colander, 1992), his knowledge of the American 
Keynesian tradition (Colander and Landreth, 1996), and his clear 
writing. After a brief restatement of their argument, this review will 
focus on the part that Chicago economics plays in their story, and 
some brief remarks complicating Colander’s story of the lost art of 
economic policy.  
In brief, Colander and Freedman’s argument is that modern eco-
nomics traded the appropriate balance between science, ethics, and 
the art of policy-making, found in the classical political economy of 
John Stuart Mill and John Neville Keynes, for the hope of creating an 
economics discipline that could shed the woolly-mindedness of ethics 
and art, and stand on its own as the true applied policy science. Both 
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Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson, who shared the classroom as 
students of the classical liberals Jacob Viner and Frank Knight at the 
University of Chicago in the early 1930s, share responsibility for this 
move (which neither Viner nor Knight would have approved of). 
“The Methodology of Positive Economics,” Friedman’s (1953) famous 
essay, provided a framework for Chicago-oriented economics, while 
Samuelson’s various welfare economics essays set the framework for 
American Keynesianism. The policy science that emerged was seen as 
the equivalent of a mechanic finding the right tool to fix your car’s 
engine (Friedman’s analogy), or a dentist choosing the right tool to 
clean your teeth (see Keynes, 1930). In this sense, post-war Keynesian-
ism and post-war Chicago, including the latter School’s considerations 
of industrial organization, externalities, public finance and the rest, 
enshrined the “economist as applied policy scientist” as the new ar-
chetype of a modern policy advisor. Of course, the two schools dif-
fered in their findings, and Colander and Freedman argue that Chi-
cago economists in particular came to emphasize empirical evidence 
as the conclusive difference. In that context, ideological leanings and 
empirical evidence often conjoined to produce policy studies that 
followed predictable patterns. Time after time, Chicago economists 
provided empirical evidence to support free market policies; main-
stream economists used empirical studies to support Keynesian poli-
cies.  
At its core, then, modern economics, especially at Chicago, wed-
ded ideology with methodology in the quest to create an applied pol-
icy science. Here I want to point out that Colander and Freedman’s 
argument about Chicago economics could have been strengthened if 
they had made more use of the Chicago School’s second foundational 
methodological assumption, encapsulated in the Latin expression 
which gave the title to the article articulating the principle—De Gusti-
bus Non Est Disputandum (Stigler and Becker, 1977). Assuming that no 
account need be given for tastes or values means that Chicago-
oriented economists can take tastes as given, and make observed 
changes in costs or constraints the explanatory factor in scientific pol-
icy evaluations. Friedman’s method and the Stigler/Becker de gustibus 
assumption fit together hand-and-glove to create the methodological 
framework for the Chicago School’s work from the 1960s to at least 
the early 1990s. 
There is much to appreciate in Colander and Freedman’s account 
of what went wrong with economics. To their credit, they do not seek 
to counter the scientific conclusions of modern economic research. 
Nor do they attempt to extend their research beyond Becker’s time at 
Chicago. What they do in the final three chapters, however, does ex-
tend their research by considering a) the “Virginia School”—best rep-
resented they say by Ronald Coase and Jim Buchanan (Colander has 
seen an advance copy of Levy and Peart, 2020), b) what a classical 
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liberal alternative focused on “argumentation for the sake of heaven” 
(see chapter 8, 120-138) could provide, and c) a look at several con-
temporary economists, including Amartya Sen, Paul Romer, and Dani 
Rodrick, who the authors believe embody the classical liberal alterna-
tive today. The conclusion of those chapters is upbeat, suggesting the 
promise of what might be if these various ideas or personal styles of 
applying theory to policy are followed. Perhaps an appropriate fol-
low-up to those chapters could have been the contrast of the views 
presented there with an evaluation of the consequences of the aban-
donment of economic theory for piecemeal studies using experi-
mental methods that render economic theory superfluous (Biddle and 
Hamermesh, 2017). Much of the experimental and random control 
trials literature shows little of the judgment about the application of 
their science to economic policy that Colander and Freedman empha-
size. Vernon Smith, a missing classical liberal voice in this book, 
would have usefully served as a another voice crying from the wil-
derness, in this case, of experimentalism (see Smith and Wilson, 
2019).  
 Colander and Freedman mount such an effective argument 
for the resurrection of a classical liberal attitude toward the science, 
ethics, and art of economics that one almost misses a potential line of 
criticism that only a Frank Knight or some members of the Virginia 
School might catch. To appreciate the criticism, we need to return to 
the world of the two classical liberals Colander and Freedman lead 
off with—J.S. Mill and John Neville Keynes. Both Mill and Keynes 
lived in a world where democratization was incomplete, and the poli-
cy-maker was a gentleman of a certain class whose education Neville 
Keynes shared. Mill was born during the debates that led to the abol-
ishment of the slave trade, was a young man as the vote was extend-
ed to middle class men and slavery abolished, and died a decade be-
fore working class men received the vote. Harriet died fifteen years 
before J.S. did, and it was another fifty years before women received 
the same rights to vote as men. Neville Keynes was born into a world 
where working class men had just received the vote, and lived to see 
women receive the same rights. He and his son Maynard also lived to 
see the social and political order that had been the context for classical 
liberalism ripped to shreds twice. Those results were frightening. 
Maynard Keynes’ conclusion was “that civilization was a precarious 
crust erected by the personality and will of a very few” (Toye, 2000); 
the judgment of that few would decide whether civilization or chaos 
would continue. 
Frank Knight drew a somewhat different conclusion. Colander 
and Freedman recognize in a footnote the infamous Knight lecture 
“The Case for Communism: From the Standpoint of an Ex-Liberal” 
(Knight, 1991). “The Case for Communism” was delivered on the eve 
of the 1932 presidential election, and contained a paradoxical explora-
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tion of the prospects for positive change in a democratic society 
(Burgin, 2009). If the radical challenge of communism focuses on the 
weakest aspects of capitalism, and if democracy is “government by 
discussion,” but public discussion seldom takes the real problems of a 
democratic society seriously and often devolves into salesmanship 
and political posturing, is there still hope for a liberal democratic so-
ciety such as the one that Mill and Neville Keynes promoted? Despite 
his constant and paradoxical questioning of free markets and demo-
cratic discussion, Knight’s arguments in the lecture consistently point 
back to the core tenets of the classical liberalism that he (and Colan-
der and Freedman) believed was in danger of being abandoned: mar-
kets function sufficiently well in terms of the spontaneous coordina-
tion that economic theory indicates, a constitutional framework con-
sistent with markets and democratic discussion creates constraints on 
political disorder, and family and social life create a framework that 
enforces social norms. For Knight, the future of a liberal society did 
not depend upon the elite few who knew what was right (Knight, 
1946). Good judgment in a liberal democratic order would balance the 
insights of economic theory, ethics (Knight, 1951), democratic theory, 
family and societal order, political theory, and institutional analysis 
(Knight, 1935) to create a civilizational context within which freedom 
would survive. Throughout the rest of his career, Knight sought to 
find the balance of economics, democratic philosophy, and ethics that 
would enable a liberal society to survive. Colander and Freedman 
remind us that the same challenge remains with us today. 
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Louise Shelley is not a newcomer to the field of criminality: a histori-
an at George Mason University, she is also the founder and director 
of the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center and the 
author of previous books on illegal traffics such as Human Trafficking: 
A Global Perspective (2010) and Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, 
and Terrorism (2014). 
In this new book, Louise I. Shelley aims at providing a compre-
hensive look at the world of illicit trade. Accordingly, she adopts a 
multidisciplinary approach encompassing social sciences, business 
and economics, history, international relations, and—in a more origi-
nal way—science and public health, environmental studies, and cy-
bercrime. The wide range of the approach shows in the number and 
the diversity of references. The book is based on interviews with prac-
titioners and field-work travels. One could even get the impression 
that each chapter could, in itself, be turned into a book. 
The subject of concern is criminal trade. Its estimated annual reve-
nue is supposed to be around 1.6 and 2.2 trillion dollars, which ac-
counts for around 1.5% of global GDP. It represents an economic field 
wider than illegal trade, which relates to criminal acts (for instance 
drugs, human, and arms trafficking). According to Shelley, illicit 
trade also relates to various forms of trade that are less clearly harm-
ful and legally defined. The illegal nature of these forms of trade is 
often not transparent and, as a consequence, it gives birth to “grey 
areas of commerce” (7) that are closely linked to corruptive processes 
but are clearly not “enforcement priorities”, meaning by that term 
that the control over those illicit activities is not high on the political 
agenda. 
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The facts are clear and can be summed up in three major features: 
the growth of this illicit trade is exponential; it benefits from cyber 
technology (computers and social media); its impact on the planet 
and human health is both irreversible and harmful. These facts are 
clearly established thanks to scientific analyses that measure data 
such as extinction of species, decline of bird, and animal populations, 
destruction of forests and other habitats, degradation of public health. 
The aim of the book is to draw attention to the “dark sides of the 
globalized digital economy” (3). Most interestingly, as explained in 
chapter 1, illicit trade is not a new phenomenon. It dates back to the 
Ancient world—smuggling, counterfeiting, or piracy being among 
humanity’s first businesses—and has also seen states involved in ille-
gitimate behaviors and corruption. Nowadays the problem is the im-
pact which the criminal use of new technologies has upon the range, 
pervasiveness and dangerousness of illicit trade. Shelley coins the 
term “computer-facilitated crime” to refer to the increased scale of 
illicit trade. Many novelties are introduced due to computers and 
social media. For instance, internet and encrypted software spread 
impersonal and anonymized trade, allowing for vast profits in rela-
tively short periods of time, in both the legal and the illegal economy. 
It is also sustained by new currencies such as anonymized cryptocur-
rencies. Illicit trade also refers to new commodities: tangible goods 
such as drugs, human beings, antiquities, rhinoceros horns and so on 
are still traded, but trade in the cyberspace promotes also intangible 
commodities. Indeed, malware, botnet and ransomware are new illicit 
commodities based on algorithms. Frauds also prosper on virtual 
products, namely identity, password, and money theft. Consumers 
and organizations directly suffer financially from embezzlement of 
bank accounts, theft of computer data and violation of intellectual 
property rights. 
One of the most interesting aspects in Louise I. Shelley’s Dark 
Commerce is to put illicit trade in a wider context thanks to highly-
documented and varied field examples. Thanks to this multidiscipli-
nary and global approach, the author avoids the simplistic argument 
based exclusively on a cost-benefit analysis, an approach now domi-
nating, after the work of Gary Becker, the economic analysis of crime. 
The costs and irreversibility of illicit trade have to be assessed in the 
long run. Furthermore some costs are not financial but rather politi-
cal. Thus, illicit trade cannot be understood merely through the be-
havior of individuals confronted to the alternative “break a law / 
abide by law”. The frontier is, indeed, now blurred and the institu-
tional dimension of crime cannot be left untold. 
The focus of the introduction on recent technology and its dreadful 
impact on the spreading of illicit trade may leave unnoticed another 
fundamental lesson from Shelley’s case studies. As stressed in chapter 
8, technology is a driver rather than the real cause of the exponential 
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growth of dark commerce. Technology is a tool in the hands of many 
actors in a specific context where illicit trade has become more and 
more tolerated, even from an opportunistic point of view. As a conse-
quence, it becomes highly unrealistic to consider the upperworld and 
the underworld as two watertight spheres of activities. The blurring 
of the frontier already appears in the distinction established by Louise 
I. Shelley between illegal and illicit trade. A further step is taken 
when the role of the state in the process is taken into account, show-
ing some dubious links between (some) state actors and underground 
activities. North Korea and its state involvement in environmental 
and computer crime, or weapon and drug trafficking, gives a good 
example of how a state can also take political advantage of illicit trade 
(210 sq). The official use of illicit trade by North Korea does not only 
stem from greed and profit-seeking strategies; it also aims at under-
mining rival states, such as the United States, thanks to the illegal 
control of nuclear weapons and the diffusion of harmful synthetic 
drugs for the American civil population. 
Even though some states benefit from illicit trade, others suffer 
from it. Shelley’s assessment is that, all in all, the role of states is de-
clining—dark commerce can contribute to the unmaking of states—
while that of non-state actors—criminals, terrorists insurgents—is on 
the rise. For instance, terrorist groups in states plagued by civil 
wars—Syria is a perfect example of the phenomenon—resort to illicit 
trade (in antiquities, embargoed oil, environmental resources, weap-
ons, human beings or drugs) in order to fund their activities. Once 
again, this fact is replaced in a more global context: there is a contin-
uum between conflicts, illicit trade, and global human consumption 
of illicitly sourced resources. Therefore, because they are entangled, 
problems must be tackled together. The same holds for environmen-
tal crime, climate change and population displacement: in the absence 
of viable legal economic opportunities, displaced people will in turn 
develop further illicit trade. It is even more the case if, as is perfectly 
exemplified with rhinoceros horn trafficking, actors in charge of abid-
ing by law do not perceive such rules as legitimate. Criminal tacit 
rules (such as the authorization to poach) then become, for some peo-
ple, rules of conduct. 
Another particularly interesting point in Shelley’s book is the role 
of legitimate actors as facilitators in illicit commerce. Individuals and 
corporations sustain illicit trade. Sometimes they do so unwillingly: 
many citizens buy illicit goods on online marketplaces without even 
knowing that they enrich criminal organizations. In other cases, com-
panies and individuals willingly and openly support illicit business-
es, taking advantage from them. It explains phenomena such as the 
glorification of the criminal world in culture: narco-corridos in Latin 
America, but also the films generated by the powerful and well-
financed entertainment industries. Once more, the entanglement be-
406 Revue des livres/Book Review | 
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 9(2) : 403-406 
tween criminal and legitimate interests is worrisome. It contributes to 
the unmaking of state legitimacy and to the blurring of the frontier 
between what is legal and illegal. 
Perspectives are bleak, to say the least. And the conclusion of the 
book does not leave much room for hope. To be effective, the fight 
against organized crime urgently requires an all-encompassing en-
deavor from all actors, at both the individual and the collective levels. 
In particular, states must strive to regain forces and legitimacy in es-
tablishing what is forbidden or not. International law and controlling 
devices must be implemented. Financial and corporate worlds are 
singled out for their complacency with illicit persons and activities. 
Unfortunately, past evidence shows that, although the effort is highly 
needed, the establishment of more supervising rules is more a wishful 
thinking than a realistic perspective. 
In brief, Shelley’s Dark Commerce is worth reading for its worrying 
but extremely realistic and fact-based account of contemporary orga-
nized crime businesses. Some could argue that the extreme wealth of 
references is paradoxically a weakness of the book: indeed, Louise I. 
Shelley’s work is empirical and lacks theoretical background. Never-
theless, it is necessary to start from the ground in order to, later, build 
a convincing theory of (organized) crime. It is also worth reading for 
the acuteness of the analysis of the intrinsic weaknesses of states, so-
cieties and individuals in front of the various new criminal threats.  
Economists in particular should pay specific attention to the ad-
monitions contained throughout the book. Crime economics, already 
a minor branch of the discipline, is dominated by the Beckerian ap-
proach. Often insulated from field work and empirical data, the Beck-
erian models reduce criminal activities to merely profit-oriented ra-
tional behaviors. Rhinoceros horns trafficking, North Korea’s in-
volvement in criminal businesses, implications of terrorists in traffick-
ing, and other examples show that there is more to crime, than such 
simplistic assumptions. Collective behaviors are at stake, too, and 
profit—though a motivation—is not the only driver for crime. Institu-
tional dynamics and power struggles have to be taken into account in 
order to work out an economic analysis of crime able to give a clear 
understanding of the illicit economy and, consequently, appropriate 
operational tools for public policy. Louise I. Shelley’s work contrib-
utes to building an alternative, institutional approach to crime eco-
nomics. 
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You have probably encountered the acronym ABM before, but in the 
unlikely event that you have not: Agent-based modeling (which is 
what ABM stands for) is a formal modeling technique in which com-
plex (social) systems are represented on the level of individual agents 
and their mutual interactions, seeking to identify by means of simula-
tion analysis how macro-level patterns emerge from agent interac-
tions. 
In recent years, agent-based modelers (such as myself) have be-
come eager and proud to proclaim that their once nerdy niche meth-
odology has moved closer to the mainstream of scientific research in 
numerous fields. One might argue about the degree to which this is 
true for different fields. Yet, papers using ABM are increasingly pub-
lished also in mainstream science journals, and publications range 
across a large variety of disciplines (Macal, 2016). Economics is no 
exception in this regard (see e.g. Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006; Janssen 
and Ostrom, 2006; or more recently Geanakoplos et al., 2012; Klimek 
et al., 2015; Tesfatsion, 2018). 
Not just advances in computational infrastructure account for this 
growing success. While ABM can still be seen as an evolving research 
program, important attempts towards unifications and standardisa-
tions in model analysis and presentation have been made. These at-
tempts center around issues such as robustness and sensitivity analy-
sis, conceptual tools like the so-called ODD (for: “overview, design 
and details”) protocol or the modeling cycle, or the use of NetLogo as 
a widely shared software platform for implementing ABMs. If you 
don’t know any of these: Do not worry, we will get to them.  
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While such standards usually emerge at the frontier of current re-
search enterprises, teaching ABM to students and junior researchers 
constitutes an important aspect for the adaptation and the wide-
spreadedness of such standards in a larger community. In this article, 
I discuss Railsback and Grimm’s Agent-Based and Individual-Based 
Modeling (henceforth abbreviated R&G’s ABIBM), which has become 
a standard introductory textbook for aspiring agent-based modellers 
since the publication of its first edition in 2011. A quick and certainly 
highly unreliable Google search for “Agent-based Modeling syllabus” 
evidences this, as six out of the first ten syllabi (which include litera-
ture at all) use R&G’s book as a primary resource. With now its se-
cond edition out in 2019, a closer look at ABIBM is warranted. 
Before discussing ABIBM, let us ask: Why should economists and 
other social scientists even care about ABM? First as already argued, 
there is an increasing chance for having to engage sooner or later with 
research that involves ABM. Second and more importantly, ABM 
research promises to illuminate micro-macro relationships in complex 
social systems by modeling possible causal mechanisms explicitly. 
This helps in uncovering, understanding and explaining mechanisms 
of social dynamics, even in cases where data are hard or impossible to 
obtain. In this respect, the ABM approach is diametrically opposed to 
other data-driven methods, and thus promises a highly useful com-
plementary tool for social science research in many different areas. 
R&G intend ABIBM as a guide to ABM at advanced undergradu-
ate or graduate-student level, both for university class teaching and 
self-study. Most importantly, the authors promise what one could call 
an “overall package” for using ABM to address scientific questions, 
including technical aspects of implementing, analysing and present-
ing ABMs as well an insight into ABM’s methodological, theoretical 
and conceptual aspects (xii). In short: Work through ABIBM, and get 
started as an ABM researcher. Let us see how the book lives up to this 
goal. 
As its subtitle promises, ABIBM really is a practical introduction to 
ABM. Reading the chapters is only one part of working with this 
book. Already on page 16, readers are invited to get started with 
NetLogo, and first code examples follow merely a few pages later. 
Each chapter is accompanied by a substantial set of practical (pro-
gramming) exercises. While these start easy, they become challenging 
rather quickly and require continued effort to get through. To assist 
learners, documentation is very detailed for modeling and coding 
examples and exercises throughout the book. Additionally, plenty of 
supplementary material is provided online, and there exists an online 
platform for interaction with one’s fellow ABM apprentices. The exer-
cises also frequently feature examples from the NetLogo model li-
brary, which somewhat alleviates the burden of active programming 
before being able to look at and work with ABMs scientifically. This 
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underlines one crucial characteristic of ABIBM ’s approach: Theory 
and practice consistently go together, so you get started thinking 
right away about models, how they are used and what matters for 
good modeling. 
Part I of ABIBM mainly caters to the primary needs just described: 
It gives readers an idea of what modeling is about and how it is done. 
Most importantly, R&G’s well-known modeling cycle (8) describes 
the practice of ABM as an iterative process: Formulate a research 
question, derive hypotheses, implement a model, analyse it. By going 
through this cycle over and over again, each of these aspects is con-
tinuously refined. Importantly, this problem-oriented spirit of using 
ABM carries through the entire book, and advises readers to develop 
habits of mind that are essential to ABM and science more generally. 
Part I also invites the reader to implement her very first model in 
NetLogo: The butterfly-hilltop-model is a simulation of how distinct 
movement corridors emerge when butterflies search for hilltops. 
When I started working with NetLogo as a young PhD student (using 
ABIBM ’s first edition), I still recall my own surprise after seeing but-
terfly highways emerging after having written only a few lines of 
very simple code describing very simple movement procedures. This 
not only vividly illustrates ABM’s potential to explain “much from 
little”, but also embodies many people’s continued fascination with 
ABM. 
R&G’s maybe most well-known methodological contribution is 
their ODD-protocol as a framework for describing ABMs based on 
characteristic model components (35). ODD stands for “overview, 
design and details”, which constitute their three proposed steps of 
model description. The protocol starts by requiring a general over-
flow and purpose, followed by increasingly detailing distinct model 
components. Certainly, not all ABM publications explicitly follow the 
ODD-protocol and its many subcategories. Yet, the fundamental 
principle of spelling out a model’s components in a structured and 
standardised way casts into a concrete form how formal modeling 
induces transparency. This is equally important for research commu-
nication and replication. Such a protocol also forces the modeler her-
self to be clear, consistent and thorough in her thinking and writing. 
Part II introduces and discusses several common components of 
ABMs in detail, leading the reader through the “engine room” (233) 
of ABM. Each chapter provides a closer look at a standard ABM 
building block, what it can be used for, and how it is implemented. 
Apart from some components that are essential to most ABMs (like 
sensing, scheduling or adaptive behaviour), here you can pick and 
choose what you want to focus on depending on your interests and 
needs. ABIBM is modular in this regard: You need not read all chap-
ters and do all the exercises to learn how to use ABM for your pur-
poses. Further, different components are mostly presented on the 
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basis of different models. Hence, wrapping one’s head around each 
model demands substantial resources in terms of focus, time and ef-
fort, especially when one wants to do all the exercises thoroughly. 
While doing so certainly pays off in terms of acquired skill and expe-
rience, those readers with a more restrictive schedule will face trade-
offs at this stage. 
Part III turns the reader’s attention towards applying ABMs to the 
study of real systems. It does so mainly by elaborating on the core 
challenge which every ABM researcher faces: How do we know that 
our models are appropriately “realistic”, and how can we learn from 
them? In response to this challenge, R&G propose and elaborate their 
principle of pattern oriented modeling (234): As an agent-based model-
er, we should design our models so that they reproduce not just one 
pattern we are interested in. Instead, we should evaluate to what ex-
tent they fare well on a multiplicity of such criteria, thereby compar-
ing larger ensembles of models. On that basis, ABM can also be used 
for theory development: If we analyse our models in this pattern-
oriented fashion, we can try to make deductions about, say, how in-
dividuals behave in certain situations, or what cognitive processes we 
can reasonably ascribe to them. 
There is an ongoing debate within the ABM community about the 
issue of learning from very simple models, which is particularly 
prominent in the social sciences. Notably, while most of R&G’s ex-
amples are taken from ecology, the two simple models the authors 
engage with are Duffy (2006)’s minimal intelligence trading model 
(R&G, 253f), and Schelling’s (1971) segregation model (R&G, 286ff). 
The former model supposedly shows that an equilibrium price 
emerges quickly even on a market with minimally intelligent traders. 
Schelling’s model, simulating the residency decisions of agents of two 
distinct groups, supposedly shows how spatial segregation can 
emerge already from rather moderate preferences for neighbor-
similarity. I deliberately use the word “supposedly” here, as there is 
no general consensus on what these models really show. Arguably 
due to their very abstract nature, both models stand somewhat apart 
from the examples taken from ecology. 
ABIBM ’s moderate focus on ecology is not necessarily a hindrance 
for scholars from other disciplines such as the social sciences. These 
models are sometimes more easily accessible since it is clearer what 
their components represent in the real world. In other fields, howev-
er, agent-based models can be employed somewhat differently at 
times. In the social sciences and philosophy for instance, models are 
often taken to provide “how-possibly” explanations, claiming not to 
provide an actual explanation for a certain phenomenon, but only that 
some micro-mechanism would be sufficient to generate it. The method-
ological discussions surrounding simplicity, descriptive accuracy and 
the fundamental mode of learning from ABMs in different fields are 
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lively and multifaceted, see e.g. Grüne-Yanoff (2009); Lustick and 
Miodownik (2009); Reiss (2011); Fumagalli (2016); Reutlinger et al. 
(2017) as a starting point. Tracing these discussions obviously lies 
beyond what can be sufficiently conveyed by an introductory text-
book such as ABIBM. Thus, R&G’s pattern-oriented modeling account 
should be considered as one voice in a broader debate. For ABM be-
ginners, ABIBM nonetheless provides a good starting point for a 
worthwile broader exploration into these matters and offers a great 
introduction to ABM also for scholars from those other fields. 
Part IV introduces the most important concepts and strategies for 
model analysis. R&G’s basic idea consists in treating models as virtual 
laboratories for simulation experiments, where a range of scenarios can 
be explored systematically. Again, many practical examples are used 
to illustrate core tools, such as performing sensitivity and robustness 
checks with behaviour space, or producing contour plots to present 
one’s results in an easily accessible way. Standardised tools in this 
category are of central importance to the credibility of ABMs in main-
stream research domains. Well-performed sensitivity, robustness and 
uncertainty analyses are the agent-based modeler’s answer to the 
question one frequently gets asked at non-ABM conferences: “How 
do we know your little toy model really holds?” Oftentimes, this criti-
cism is not phrased as such, but rather comes in the form of “Have 
you tried modeling X?”, or “What happens if you change Y?”. Even 
though it is clear that one cannot pre-emptively answer all such ques-
tions, following the principles described in part IV provides a solid 
guideline for researchers as to what can reasonably be done to estab-
lish a model’s credibility. 
In summary, if properly worked through, ABIBM offers every-
thing one needs to get started working with ABM scientifically, from 
basic techniques and strategies of model building, to the general ideas 
and core tools of how to do science with ABMs. It does so in an intui-
tive and accessible way, using numerous well-documented examples 
and exercises. All things considered, ABIBM is a great didactic tool, 
and I can recommend it wholeheartedly as a basis for both university 
courses and mavericks who want to get started all by themselves. For 
using ABIBM in university courses, it should be noted that one 
should take some time to carefully pick and choose the topics for a 
one-semester class so as not to overburden students with too much 
input, or failing to cover all areas sufficiently. This is especially true 
for picking exercises and examples, as they sometimes require quite 
some time to familiarise with. For maverick learners, it should be 
noted that patience and a certain amount of tolerance for frustration 
is demanded, as even a very good textbook can only provide guid-
ance up until some point. In either case, you only really learn to use 
ABM if you get started with your own project. That is the real chal-
lenge, but can be very rewarding eventually. 
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In comparison to the book’s first edition, not just the cover illustra-
tion has been updated from orange to blue. Most importantly, the 
second edition is based on NetLogo 6.0.4. This matters, as especially 
the transition from NetLogo 5 to 6 has brought some significant 
changes with it. Some functions and commands were added, some 
work differently than before, which often results in errors when mod-
els programmed in earlier versions are run in NetLogo 6. If you start 
with NetLogo as a novice, using version 6 is a no-brainer. Still, the 
transition is worthwhile also for experienced users, and certainly in 
order to avoid confusion in teaching. Furthermore, as is necessary for 
a rapidly evolving field like ABM, the second edition incorporates 
new sources, and keeps track of the field’s most important develop-
ments. The essence of ABIBM, however, has remained the same. 
Steven Railsback and Volker Grimm’s personality as enthusiastic 
ABM researchers perspires from every pore of ABIBM. They deserve 
much credit for the didactical approach to learning ABM which this 
book embodies. It is certainly no overstatement to say that the ABM 
research community would be much smaller without ABIBM as a 
starter-pack for young researchers. At the same time, the authors de-
serve credit for the conceptual advances they have brought to ABM as 
a research practice, which are all contained in this book. It remains to 
be seen how the field of ABM keeps on developing in the future, and 
whether or not it can truly consolidate as a mainstream research prac-
tice. Coaching young scholars towards following a structured and 
problem-oriented approach to ABM research is crucial in that regard. 
The other task that remains to be taken up over and over again is to 
reach out to non-ABM scholars and join forces on the actual research 
frontier, in order to make agent-based modeling an embedded en-
deavour altogether. 
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Responding to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, this book 
plumbs the history of economic thought for resources that can help us 
understand the relations between the financial and the real sectors of 
the economy. Such an investigation is made necessary, in the view of 
the authors, by the fact that mainstream macroeconomics has “almost 
completely ignored, or amply downplayed” these relations, a fact that 
itself calls for historical investigation and explanation. Why did the 
robust discussion of the 1930s about how best to integrate monetary 
theory and value theory die out, leaving macroeconomists intellectu-
ally disarmed in the face of the rise of global finance? 
According to Ingrao and Sardoni, Keynes and the Keynesians are 
responsible for this. Keynes got the ball rolling in the General Theory 
by shifting attention from banks to money demand, and from the 
dynamic method of his earlier Treatise on Money to the equilibrium 
method. Postwar Keynesians finished the job by constructing the so-
called Neoclassical Synthesis. The monetarist counterrevolution was 
of no help, and eventually (as Frank Hahn repeatedly warned) the 
inherent logic of the Walrasian equilibrium frame pushed money out 
of the picture entirely. And that’s where we are today: DSGE trium-
phant. 
In my reading, the key section of the book is “The Evolving View 
of the Nature of Banking” (127-131) where the authors highlight the 
key role played by Chester A. Phillips in his book Bank Credit (1920), 
that urged the shift from the “old view” to the “new view” of bank-
ing, and the key role played by Paul Samuelson in endorsing and 
popularizing Phillips, starting with his 1948 textbook. This is the 
origin of the treatment of banking in the postwar neoclassical synthe-
sis. The valiant attempt by Gurley and Shaw, in their Money in a Theo-
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ry of Finance (1960), to urge for a broader view gained some traction 
with the work of James Tobin, but ultimately failed to reverse the 
tide. A similar fate met subsequent interventions by Hyman Minsky 
and Charles Kindleberger. 
Why does the disappearance of banks from economic theory mat-
ter? 
The “old view” of banking emphasized the degree of freedom in 
the system that comes from that most basic of all banking operations: 
a swap of IOUs (IOU standing for “I Owe You”), the bank’s IOU be-
ing an immediate means of payment and its counterpart’s IOU being 
a promise to deliver means of payment at some future date. In effect, 
this operation increases the supply of money to meet the demand for 
finance. The old view thus emphasized the elasticity of credit in the 
payments system. Banking could be a force for the better, for example 
by providing purchasing power to entrepreneurs with positive Net 
Present Value projects, thus giving them the green light today by ex-
panding credit (as Schumpeter emphasized). But it could also be a 
force for the worse, giving the green light instead to mere specula-
tions that never pan out, sowing the seeds of eventual financial crisis. 
The art of banking is all about using this degree of freedom with wis-
dom. 
By contrast, the “new view” emphasized the clearing constraint 
that individual banks face, particularly so when creating deposits that 
are likely going to be transferred to someone with an account at some 
other bank, hence an outflow of reserves. In effect, this view high-
lights the constraint that comes from portfolio equilibrium, the disci-
pline of reserves in the funding system, and the role of asset prices as the 
key equilibrating factor. Ex post, after the clearing, all assets must be 
willingly held by wealth holders. Specifically, money demand must 
equal money supply. Thus, if money demand doesn’t change, then 
neither can money supply, and banks are conceptualized as mere 
intermediaries. 
Apparently, the reason for the shift from one view to the other—
elasticity to discipline and payments to funding—was the rise to 
dominance of Walrasian general equilibrium as the frame used by 
economists to think about these matters. An equilibrium frame leads 
inevitably to a focus on funding. Indeed, once one adopts an equilib-
rium frame, it is hardly possible even to see payments. 
The failure of macroeconomics to deal adequately with banking, 
and the financial sector more generally, did not go unnoticed. Lead-
ing figures, not just Hahn but also Kenneth Arrow and Robert Lucas, 
repeatedly bemoaned the hiatus. Eventually, something had to be 
done, and this explains the proliferation of papers that, starting in the 
late 1980s, proposed various ways of bringing in financial factors. But 
essentially, all of this work still takes the non-monetary DSGE model 
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as its central frame, and just adds some imperfection or frictions. In-
grao and Sardoni call for a more fundamental treatment. 
In the old view of banking, banks were active players, choosing 
when and where to expand their balance sheet, and thus directing the 
course of economic activity. In today’s real world, that role is argua-
bly even more relevant than it was in the 1930s—but it is nowhere to 
be found in economic theory. For modern concerns, it is the older 
authors—Wicksell and Fisher, Schumpeter and Robertson—that are 
the best resources. But Ingrao and Sardoni want more than that. They 
call for nothing less than a revival of the tradition of classical political 
economy, specifically Marx, Schumpeter, and Hayek (246). These are 
authors from a tradition that that highlights the role of “large firms 
that directly affect prices and control markets”. This is in contrast 
with the passive role which they play in Walrasian general equilibri-
um theory, where they take prices as given by the auctioneer. 
As an account of what happened in the history of economic 
thought, this book is largely unobjectionable—with the possible cave-
at that Tobin does not strike me as “at the margins of the main-
stream” given his enormous impact on macroeconometric models 
that were actually used by central banks. However, one is left without 
much sense of exactly why all of this happened. Can it really be the 
case that the modelling decisions of Keynes, in one single book, shift-
ed all of economics on the wrong track? For me, the book was inter-
esting mainly for its account of a familiar history from an unfamiliar 
point of view, viz. the point of view of classical political economy. As 
such, its main contribution may be to provide an introduction to 
banking and finance for students of classical political economy. 
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